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CIS Border Troop Commanders Meet in Kazakhstan

LD2907155793 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GTM 29 Jul 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Correspondent Aliya Nugmanova] In Almaty today at the first field session of the council of commanders of the CIS border troops, the urgent issues of working out common approaches to guarding the Tajik-Afghan border, redeploying military cadres, and providing weapons and military equipment for the border troops of the Commonwealth states were raised.

[Begin recording] [B.S. Zakiyev, commander of the Kazakh border troops] We are working to resolve the majority of these problems with Russia. I think it is no secret that over the last two years there has been a fairly intensive exodus of cadres, primarily to Russia. [end recording]

[Nugamonova] The difficulties over the settling of mutual accounts have a negative effect on this, on the acquisition of military equipment. There is a Kazakh battalion on the border alongside the Russian border troops. Kyrgyzstan has sent aid. We cannot sit around doing nothing while our neighbor is coping with a fire. The young men on this difficult military service are not just defending Tajikistan's border but also the interests of all the peoples in the Commonwealth—they are protecting the external borders of the CIS.

Belarus, Ukraine, Russia To Create Customs Union

WS2907115493 Minsk Radio Minsk Network in Belarusian 0300 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] The customs services of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia are uniting their efforts, Henadz Shkurd, chairman of the Belarusian State Customs Committee, said to an RIA correspondent. According to him, this is being done in the interests of all three republics. The creation of a single economic union demands the creation of a customs union. The issue of the creation of a council of the chairmen of the customs committees of Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia is being discussed.

ITAR-TASS Carries Press Review for 30 Jul

LD3007075993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0504 GMT 30 Jul 93

[“Press Review”—ITAR-TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow July 30 ITAR-TASS—Russian newspapers continue to give wide coverage to the money-changing campaign launched by the Central Bank. NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA and ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI write about the response to it of Finance Minister Boris Fedorov, who “resolutely dissociated himself from the Central Bank's money-changing campaign and described

it as economically senseless and politically harmful deception of people.” According to ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI, Fedorov believes that “the damage inflicted by that step will be not only moral, but also very much political. “We have shown once again both to the CIS member states and the whole world that Russia is an unpredictable country and an unreliable partner,” Fedorov said at a press conference.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA comments on Fedorov's statements concerning the “money reform” in Russia, describing them as evidence of the weakness of his position in the government. “Despite the emphatically negative statement of the finance minister about the reform, the president did not suspend it, and no recommendations came from the Ministry of Finance and personally from Fedorov to lift all restrictions on the amount of money to be changed,” the newspaper writes.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA carries the data of a sociological survey about the feelings of servicemen. According to the publication of the Defence Ministry, the public opinion poll, held by the centre of military-sociological, psychological and legal studies of the Russian armed forces among officers and men of the Russian Army, revealed an important fact: two thirds of the polled maintain that their rights, freedoms and privileges continue to be violated in this or that form. After analysing the results of the public opinion poll, the newspaper comes to the conclusion that “every fourth of the polled believes that he and his family are not socially protected, and 37.5 per cent believe that protection exists more on paper than in real life.” As a result of it, the newspaper stresses, about half of officers and men live with a feeling of being unprotected.

NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA writes about the resignation of Security Minister Viktor Barannikov. Touching upon his performance as head of one of the key ministries, the newspaper points out that “he managed to do the most important thing—to preserve the viability of the state security service and to keep top-class professionals from quitting. It is during his term in office that the laws on state security, on federal security bodies and investigation activities were adopted.” According to the newspaper, Barannikov's resignation triggered a strong political response in society. It points out that the parliament declared President Yeltsin's decree on his removal from the post of security minister as invalid, since it runs counter to one of the articles of the constitution.

PRAVDA gives more detail of the resignation of the Russian security minister. It maintains that the resignation was prepared beforehand, and his alleged violation of ethical norms, as well as the developments in Tajikistan, became just a formal pretext of Barannikov's removal from his post. “One thing is certain: his resignation is the result not of his professional characteristics, but of political considerations, PRAVDA stresses.

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA carries an article by Viktor Petrovskiy, which is entitled "twilight of democrats." He strongly criticises the authorities for the policy pursued by democrats, which he describes as inconsistent and destructive. He writes: "Do the democrats realise that, along with razing to the ground the old political system, they at the same time buried their own power under its

debris?" in his opinion, "the moment of truth has come for all, including millions of Russians, who no long will give a cent for the authorities, which so suddenly attacked their purses. Neither will they be supported by the army, although it is headed by the people who are loyal to the president. In addition, the authorities have no ideological support in society."

Yeltsin Edict on Tajik-Afghan Border Published

PM3007105593 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 30 Jul 93 p 1

[Russian Federation presidential edict dated 27 July 1993 and signed by B. Yeltsin: "On Measures To Settle the Conflict on the Tajik-Afghan Border and To Generally Normalize the Situation on the Russian Federation's Borders"]

[Text] Taking account of the threat to the vitally important interests and security of Russia—a threat which is exacerbated by the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border—and of the impermissibility of the cases of irresponsibility reflected in the failure to fulfill state decisions on the strengthening of the border and in the poor degree of readiness to repulse armed attacks on Russian Federation Border Guards subunits (which have led to casualties among Russian border guards), and with a view to ruling out the possibility of uncoordinated actions among organs of power and administration, and to implementing a unified statewide line of settling the conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border and generally normalizing the situation in Tajikistan, **I decree that:**

1. The collaboration between the Russian Federation Ministry of Security, Foreign Ministry, and Defense Ministry to prevent any deterioration in the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and to settle it shall be deemed unsatisfactory.

2. V.I. Shlyakhtin, commander of the Russian Federation border Guards, shall be relieved of his position.

3. Russian Federation Foreign Minister A.V. Kozyrev shall be appointed the Russian Federation president's special representative for Tajikistan.

4. **The Russian Federation president's special representative** shall be responsible for coordinating the efforts of and organizing collaboration between ministries and departments, and for elaborating coordinated proposals on a settlement in Tajikistan to put to the Russian Federation Security Council.

In implementing Russia's line of settling the conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border and generally normalizing the situation in Tajikistan the Russian Federation president's special representative shall proceed on the following basis:

the organization and development of dialogue between the Tajik leadership and representatives of opposition forces shall be persistently promoted with a view to ending the internecine warfare and normalizing the situation in Tajikistan;

meetings and talks shall be held urgently with the leadership of Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan with a view to stepping up their participation in the organization and comprehensive securing of joint protection and defense of the Tajik-Afghan border;

the potential of the Interparliamentary Assembly of CIS members, the CIS Coordinating Consultative Committee, and other CIS interstate coordination organs shall be utilized to organize a joint and collective solution to the problems of a settlement on the Tajik-Afghan border and the general normalization of the situation in Tajikistan;

use shall be made of the agreement to hold a four-sided meeting in Dushanbe with the participation of representatives from Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan on the problems of security on the Tajik-Afghan border in order to bring about the adoption of specific, binding, comprehensive decisions;

systematic work shall be done with Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia with a view to ensuring their participation in a constructive dialogue on a settlement in Tajikistan;

vigorous steps shall be taken to include the United States, Britain, China, India, and other states in solving the problems of normalizing the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and the Central Asia region as a whole;

a discussion at the UN Security Council of the question of the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border shall be initiated together with Tajikistan, bearing in mind the potential of sending UN observers to the border and of giving the armed forces in Tajikistan from Russia and other CIS countries the status of UN peacekeeping forces, their subsequent financing by the international community, and the inclusion in them—if necessary—of subunits from other interested states.

5. The Russian Federation Ministry of Internal Affairs:

shall, under the procedure and the terms defined by specific interstate agreements, provide free assistance to the Republic of Tajikistan Ministry of Internal Affairs in training leading command staff at internal affairs organs and subunits ensuring law and order and combating the most serious types of crimes, including those of an international nature.

6. The Russian Federation Ministry of Security:

shall urgently assign the necessary number of servicemen, including officers, to the Tajik-Afghan border sector in order to reinforce the Russian Federation Group of Border Guards in the Republic of Tajikistan with forces and materiel from border districts and groups of forces;

shall, in conjunction with the Russian Federation Defense Ministry, urgently implement a range of measures to provide field fortifications for border post defensive positions and border detachment reserves' defense areas, and train subunits to conduct defensive operations.

7. The Russian Federation defense minister shall be responsible for implementing comprehensive measures and for providing general operational leadership in coordinating all the forces and hardware involved in carrying

out the defense of the Tajik-Afghan border and stabilizing the situation, with a view to bringing about a speedy end to hostilities and a restoration of peace in the region;

shall ensure that the 201st Motorized Rifle Division is brought up to full strength in accordance with the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Aid between the Russian Federation and the Republic of Tajikistan;

shall determine by his decision the amount of armaments and military hardware needed to effectively resolve the tasks of defending the Tajik-Afghan border, and ensure their delivery to the areas designated;

shall submit for examination by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet and Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies as emergency measures the questions of repealing or suspending the decisions of the Seventh Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies on sending draftees to serve outside Russia only with their personal consent;

shall elaborate and submit for examination by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet draft laws on additional moral and material incentives for servicemen serving in "hot spots."

8. The Russian Federation Ministry of Finance:

shall seek additional appropriations to pay for Russian Federation Defense Ministry orders for rail shipments of men, arms, hardware, and stocks of materiel from Russia to the Republic of Tajikistan.

9. The Russian Federation Ministry of Health:

shall help the Republic of Tajikistan Ministry of Health to restore the Republic of Tajikistan's health care system;

shall send a group of trained specialists in infectious diseases to carry out preventive and anti-epidemiological measures and to prevent infectious diseases being introduced into the Russian troops stationed on Tajik territory;

shall allocate the necessary medical equipment and medicines to prevent epidemics and to organize treatment of infectious diseases.

10. The Russian Federation State Committee for Sanitary and Epidemiological Supervision shall allocate the necessary forces and means to help the Republic of Tajikistan's health care system to localize and eliminate outbreaks of cholera.

11. The Russian Federation Ministry of Security, Foreign Ministry, Defense Ministry, Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Foreign Intelligence Service shall elaborate and submit to the Russian Federation Security Council within one month proposals on comprehensive measures to prevent the emergence of crisis situations along the

entire length of the borders guarded by Russian Federation Border Guards and to effectively protect the interests and security of Russia.

[Signed] Russian Federation President B. Yeltsin

[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin 27 July 1993

Adamishin To Take Part in Border Talks in Dushanbe

LD2907121593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1143
GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS diplomatic correspondent Sergey Staroselskiy]

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—Russia is interested in the earliest possible beginning of talks between Russia, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan on ways to settle the conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border, a Russian Foreign Ministry official said.

Commenting on Afghan leaders' threats of grave consequences for Russia if artillery shelling of Afghan towns continued, the diplomat said that official Kabul was intentionally toughening its position on the eve of talks in Dushanbe seeking to make the most of them. On the other hand, by building up tension around the border conflict the Afghan authorities are trying to distract attention from domestic problems, including differences between branches of power, the official added.

He said that the first deputy foreign minister, Anatoliy Adamishin, has left for Dushanbe to take part in the upcoming four-party talks.

Visit Previewed

LD2907140593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1000 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] As we have learned from the information department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, Anatoliy Adamishin, Russia's special representative and deputy foreign minister, is starting his visit to Central Asian states today. Irina Okhiyeva has the details.

[Okhiyeva] The deputy foreign minister is to arrive in Dushanbe at 1400 and a meeting with Rakhmanov, chairman of the republican Supreme Soviet, has been scheduled for 1500. Anatoliy Adamishin is to hand a special message from Russian President Boris Yeltsin to the heads of Central Asian states. The message stresses that the Tajik-Afghan border is our common concern and that the contribution to its protection by the interested states in the region should be increased.

We have spoken on the telephone with (Suleyman Rashidov), an official from the information department of the Tajik Foreign Ministry, who said that a meeting is likely to be held in Dushanbe in mid-August. It will be

attended by representatives from Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Russia, and Afghanistan. They will discuss the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border and its settlement.

To all appearances, Anatoliy Adamishin will prepare a visit by Andrey Kozyrev at this meeting. Speaking about Russia's role in the region, (Suleyman Rashidov) said that everyone is pinning hopes on Russia and that Tajikistan is grateful that Russia is resisting pressure from certain political circles which are demanding that Russian troops be withdrawn from the region, end quote. [no reference to beginning of quotation as heard]

The official from the Tajik Foreign Ministry's information department also said that one sees with satisfaction that Russia understands the fact that the conflagration on the Tajik-Afghan border, unless put out here, could spread across to other countries in the region and come up to the borders of Russia itself. In the words of (Suleyman Rashidov), all the interested parties are now expecting the talks and hoping that the situation will be settled by political means.

Rejects Pullout From Tajikistan

MK3007095093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Jul 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Anatoliy Adamishin, first deputy foreign minister, by Vitaliy Portnikov under "Diplomacy" rubric: "Adamishin in Central Asia. Russian First Deputy Foreign Minister Carries Message From Yeltsin;" place and date not given]

[Text] [Portnikov] You were among the participants in the Security Council session that considered the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border. That was followed by the dismissal of the Russian Federation minister of security and the commander of the border forces. The functions of settling the conflict have been divided between the minister of defense and the minister of foreign affairs. Are you not afraid that the position of Russian diplomacy on the settlement of the conflict by political methods is not quite shared by the country's top leaders?

[Adamishin] Whenever you say that there are concurring points of view, this always sounds unconvincing. We have been accustomed not to believe in unity of views and it is hard to expect it in our politicized times. Even so, a common point of view on a settlement in Tajikistan does exist. The first thing I would like to point out is that we cannot leave Tajikistan. This is a fundamental matter on which differences exist today. Many are saying: pull your troops out; do not get entangled in a new Afghan war.... And I cannot say that there is no rationale here. The danger really exists. But if we leave, what is to be done with hundreds of thousands of Russians who are there, with our economic interests, and centuries-old proximity? And then: Where to go? Further on we do not have a single guarded border. And the sole possibility of

preserving some borders is according to the external parameters of the former USSR borders.

To leave Tajikistan—does this not mean to leave Central Asia as a whole? Then we would be talking about millions of Russians and interests multiplied many times over. They cite the example of De Gaulle, who withdrew from Algeria, but he took 1.2 million French and 300,000 Algerians who had collaborated with France out with him. We, however, shall be putting the main thrust on methods of a political settlement, not on power options. It is necessary to look for a common language between the Tajik Government and the forces opposed to it. On no account may we take the position of one of the sides involved. Earlier our troops were saving the first side when they were being massacred by the second, and saving the second while they were being massacred by the first. We are trying to preserve a line toward neutrality from the point of view of national conciliation. This is a Tajik-Tajik conflict, not a Russian-Afghan one. The president is sending a message to leaders of the states of Central Asia. This is a call for national conciliation and joint protection of Tajikistan's border.

[Portnikov] Would it be correct to talk about a full coincidence of interests of Russia and the countries of Central Asia, of Russia and Tajikistan?

[Adamishin] It was impossible to talk about a complete identification of interests even during the time of the Soviet Union. It is important simply to analyze the benefits of a common economic space, consolidated geopolitical space, and common cultural space. Why has the pendulum moved from centrifugal efforts to centripetal ones? So far the centrifugal efforts are prevailing but the ruling elites, in particular in Ukraine, have realized that they can be masters in their countries without Russia's interference, without imperial aspirations, and at the same time enjoy all the advantages of a common space. To be sure, Uzbekistan has its own interests and Tajikistan has its own interests, and there can be disagreements between them. Kyrgyzia and Kazakhstan also have their own interests, and they do not necessarily coincide with Russia's. Our task is to identify those areas where our interest coincide and propose our options for a solution. And the main coincidence of interests consists in preventing destabilization of the situation. If this community of interests is understood correctly, if we can act jointly, stability will be retained. If it proves that common sense does not prevail, if the Central Asian republics declare that this is not their concern, that their parliaments forbid them to send troops to Tajikistan, then Russia may not have another way out but to take people out from there, even though that would be extremely difficult, and withdraw. And this is also one of the real perspectives. But without trying to prevent destabilization it is not worth undertaking such radical steps.

Moscow Volunteers To Serve in Tajikistan

MK2907125093 Moscow MOSKOVSKIY
KOMSO MOLETS in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[Unattributed report under the "Hold the Front Page" rubric: "Military Commissariats Enlist Mercenaries"]

[Text] Military commissariats in Moscow and Moscow Oblast are carrying out an action that could be described as unique. MOSKOVSKIY KOMSO MOLETS has learned that the Defense Ministry has decided to bring the 201st Division based in Dushanbe up to strength using Moscow volunteers.

The commissariats are mounting a visible propaganda campaign at enterprises. It is especially intensive among Afghan war veterans. The terms for service in Tajikistan are the most elementary: the eligible age is under 35; applicants are supposed to be fit for active military service and to have no previous convictions. Mercenaries sign three-year contracts with a starting pay of 800,000 rubles a month. Since volunteers would obviously have to take part in combat actions, they will undergo a thorough medical checkup and a refresher training course. The first group of soldiers departed from Moscow yesterday.

Deputy Minister Kunadze Interviewed on Central Asia

MK2907115093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 pp 1, 3

[Interview with Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze by Vera Kuznetsova under general headline "Tajikistan: USSR's Last War or New Russia's First War?"—"Foreign Ministry's Policy: Between Fatality and Probability;" place and date not given]

[Text] Not so long ago Civic Union charged Shokhin, Fedorov, and of course, Kozyrev with botching the country's eastern policy. The cause was Russia's current policy in Central Asia. At that moment the head of the Foreign Ministry had just gone to the southeast—to Malaysia and Singapore. And the man who has stayed behind in the Foreign Ministry—to continue to "botch up" the policy—is Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy Kunadze, who is in charge of Russia's relations with Central Asian countries.

[Kuznetsova] Georgiy Fridrikhovich, do you think Civic Union's accusations with respect to the Foreign Ministry are justified?

[Kunadze] It is hard to single out the Foreign Ministry's personal responsibility within the overall responsibility for the eastern policy of parliament and government. After all, insofar as state strategy is concerned, the Foreign Ministry is not free. The country's leadership makes political decisions—there can be no question about the Foreign Ministry's independent position.

True, talking about the horizontal tier of power, among the ministries the Foreign Ministry occupies a completely independent stand.

It should be added that, objectively, relations with the Central Asian members of the CIS are far from easy. Methodologically, these relations are much more complicated for working out systematized approaches than even links with the European members of the CIS. They have their own laws, life-style, and social strata which under various ideological facades have been around for 75 years. And the alternatives that Russia has today, the Central Asian countries lack. It is more difficult for them to perceive Western standards of democracy not because they are backward but because they are different.

[Kuznetsova] How would you define Russia's interests in Central Asia?

[Kunadze] There is quite a concrete geopolitical interest—that the charge of Islamic (not at all fundamentalism) extremism may not penetrate Russia. It would also be extremely important for Russia for these republics to preserve their internal stability and welfare. A huge amount of Russian-speakers live in Central Asia today. We do not want these people to become aliens in these countries.

Furthermore, it is important that there also be economic stability in Central Asia. The states where all is not well and which remain in the ruble zone are beginning to pull us backward, since the ruble emission required for their needs is a heavy burden for the Russian economy.

There is also a humanitarian problem. The experience with Tajikistan shows how easily the situation can get out of control and a country find itself plunged into civil war. The thesis we advocate here is quite pragmatic. Now we have the border of the former USSR. It is not simply a line on the map but a system of engineering installations—very, very expensive ones. If we leave this border, we would have to decide where and within which time frame to build a new one. And to answer this question we must also know whether we will have enough money for that and how much time it would take if the money is raised. For your information, the Tajik-Afghan border is slightly more than 1,300 km whereas the Russian-Kazakh border is approximately 6,000 km. I am afraid that in the next few years we will simply be in no position to undertake this. And if so, it appears that we must build a border, for instance, between Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan, which is absurd.

[Kuznetsova] You say "we must!" And what about other countries? When on the Tajik border our border guards are being slaughtered en masse, the sound engineering structures that you have just mentioned appear no more than a myth. And would it not be easier to remove the border and start building it in a new place, leaving the countries of this regions to ensure their own defenses?

[Kunadze] Clearly none of the Central Asian countries are capable of protecting their own borders without our

assistance. We have seen this in Tajikistan. If we leave that area we must be prepared for Islamic extremism, the forces of instability in general, to pass through Tajikistan and enter Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, and from there it is not very far to Kazakhstan. Before we know where we are, these forces will be on Russia's doorstep.

Indeed, Tajikistan's border with Afghanistan has been fortified more according to peacetime standards, when it was designed to catch individual trespassers—to protect the border, not defend it. But the border is also a system of communication, a system of warning. All of this would have to be removed, who knows how far to the north. And, of course, there are the peaceful Russian speakers whom we have no right to abandon, and whom we shall never abandon. This is a special factor—political and ethical.

[Kuznetsova] How many Russians and Russian-speakers, according to your estimates, have remained in Tajikistan?

[Kunadze] There are still many Russian-speakers. Insofar as ethnic Russians are concerned, it would be correct to mention the figure of approximately 250,000. Although there are also other estimates—300,000, 200,000, and so forth....

[Kuznetsova] A civil war is under way in Tajikistan. It will be following a well-known scenario.... Incidentally, perhaps you do not agree with this?

[Kunadze] Indeed, I do not agree that there is a certain fatal inevitability of escalation of the conflict according to the Afghan scenario. But I do agree that this probability exists. It is within these confines—between fatality and probability—that we have to draw a line that would make it possible to avoid one and show the justice of the other.

[Kuznetsova] But where is the criterion, the limit of our final perception, if you will? When will we satisfy ourselves as to whether Tajik society is capable of achieving internal accord in principle?

[Kunadze] From my perspective, this limit is the inability of Tajik political forces to reach accord. More specifically: the inability of the present Tajik Government to ensure national conciliation, in other words expansion of the regime's social base so that it enjoys the support of all strata, ethnic groups, and clans.... If the regime fails to achieve this and we have satisfied ourselves about this, then, of course, efforts must be taken only to make sure that the Russians are repatriated from there. And at this point put an end to it.

[Kuznetsova] Do you think that Russia and its leadership are capable of ever telling themselves: Now, this limit has come? Or will we continue to be present in foreign countries until the outcome becomes lethal?

[Kunadze] I do not preclude that a limit could come. I would like to believe that the Russian leadership, society—all of us—are capable of understanding this and

making a decision on this basis. Although this, if you like, is a test of our maturity. It is easy to slip into the Afghan scenario. Not to slip is far more difficult. We are obliged to act so as not to slip.

[Kuznetsova] What possibilities does the Foreign Ministry have of remaining realistic with respect to Tajikistan?

[Kunadze] We have an embassy there. True, it is small and it is working under difficult conditions. We are monitoring the situation and making trips. By the way, it is unfair and unjust when they say that the Foreign Ministry prefers prosperous and well-fed countries. I think that in the near future everyone will see what the Foreign Ministry is doing in the east of the CIS and how it is doing it. It is premature now to talk about this. I shall merely say that the problems related to Tajikistan are taking a lion's share of our working time.

[Kuznetsova] You have been dealing with these problems for a year now. And you knew the time when the opposition was in power. You were officially meeting its representatives. Do you have any contacts with opposition members now?

[Kunadze] Not officially, of course. Even if I wanted to, it would not be easy to meet with these people because they have disappeared, as it were. Some of them are in Pakistan; some are in Europe, Paris, and some are in Afghanistan.... A few days ago I received a phone call from Washington asking me to receive Khudonazarov here, in Moscow. I said there was no problem and I would meet him as a private individual.

Generally speaking, this problem—how to establish dialogue with the opposition—should concern above all the Tajik leadership.

[Kuznetsova] Do you believe that this dialogue is necessary and possible?

[Kunadze] In the final analysis, yes. Tajik officials are saying: There is no opposition in Tajikistan; the population (all without any exception) supports the present government. Those who you call opposition are bandits and killers, and therefore it is not clear with whom we should carry on the dialogue. This approach seems very dubious to me, to put it mildly.

Last November the current Tajik leadership came to office. An exodus of the population began from Tajikistan to Afghanistan. That was the moment when the Foreign Ministry said for the first time that a new conflict was brewing, one fraught with serious consequences for general security. It was a moment of truth in the entire Tajik tragedy, because the Afghan war had turned into a catastrophe when Afghan refugee camps emerged in Peshawar. In these camps a "base" of malcontents is visibly developing and they want to return. Then we began to tell the present Tajik Government persistently: We are not doubting your legitimacy, but your main and direct responsibility is to enable these people to return to their homes as soon as possible. To

that end it is necessary to issue any kind of guarantees of their security and make compromise solutions. Unfortunately, the Tajik authorities failed, or maybe they did not even want to, address this issue. And without this it is impossible to reach a settlement in Tajikistan.

[Kuznetsova] Are you making your doubts known at official meetings with Tajik authorities?

[Kunadze] Evidence of the wish of some forces in Tajikistan to strike a blow at our views—which we, of course, make known—is the appearance on 23 July of an article in SEGODNYA.

We do make statements; how could we possibly fail to do so? To finish with the subject of the possibility and necessity of contacts with the opposition, I will say that during the Afghan epic the Kabul leadership was assuring itself and those around it that the opposition was a gang of bandits. That they did not enjoy any social support and therefore dialogue with them was impossible. It was not until the final period of the Kabul regime's existence that an attempt was made to reach agreement, but it was too late. I hope it is not too late now—in Tajikistan....

[Kuznetsova] In the Tajik conflict there is also a geopolitical aspect which may or may not be taken into account. Judging by the experience of Afghanistan, which is dividing into north and south, do you think that this danger is also threatening Tajikistan? Our Ministries of Defense and Security are not even talking about this publicly. As for our parliament, apparently it simply has no idea that such a problem exists.

[Kunadze] One should start from scratch here, and the "scratch" is Afghanistan's territorial integrity. What would happen if Afghanistan were to split into north and south? This danger is not ruled out. Therefore, if this misfortune does happen, then of course, the question of northern Afghanistan merging with southern Tajikistan would be a technical one. Naturally, in this event, if our border guards leave, there would be no force left to prevent the chaos that is now happening here in north Afghanistan from spilling over into all of Tajikistan. And possibly in this event the centrifugal processes in Tajikistan itself would accelerate several times over. Then a redistribution of territories would occur and new states would emerge: say, north Afghanistan would unite with the ethnically close peoples of Central Asia. But this would be a source of wars that would go on not for years but decades.

[Kuznetsova] But the Afghan war is already measured in decades.

[Kunadze] That is right. But this is precisely the task: to prevent one war from growing into another. I hope that the internal struggle in Afghanistan—this division of portfolios—will run out of steam sooner or later.

[Kuznetsova] Run out of steam? But surely you know of the idea preached by the opposition Afghan and Tajik

leaders about New Areana, when in place of northern Afghanistan and southern Tajikistan plus several more territories, a strong Islamic state would emerge. This idea has historical roots and it can hardly be expected to "run out of steam." Moreover, it will apparently be fought for.

[Kunadze] I shall not talk about how historically justified this idea is. But its implementation would mean a political catastrophe and the emergence of a new source of instability on a world scale. So far I think that such ideas have no operative value for current politics.

[Kuznetsova] But you have said yourself that should Russian border guards leave the area, the question of merger would become purely technical for Afghanistan and Tajikistan. It seems that our subjective interest (incidentally, the interest of a third party) is probably preventing the realization of the aspirations of two other sides which, moreover, are two to three states away from us.

[Kunadze] I do not agree that there is only our subjective, or in other words selfish, interest, at work here. Our interests are quite objective. For example, that millions of Russians now living in Central Asia may not be infringed in any respect and that their security be guaranteed. Everything must be done to protect them.

Furthermore, there is an interest on the part of many world countries that no years-long seat of tension arise here.

[Kuznetsova] Is the United States interested in Russia's maintaining stability in this region?

[Kunadze] The U.S. position on this conflict is still in the definition stage, just as ours is, incidentally. But I think that hardly any political figures in the United States would, in connection with Tajikistan, suspect Russia of seeking to reanimate its imperial ambitions. This must be a situation where every unbiased person realizes that Russia's aims are noble. And apparently according to the same logic that drove the Americans to initiate the UN operation in Somalia, Russia, too, should bear its share of responsibility for what is now happening in Tajikistan.

[Kuznetsova] Does the viewpoint whereby many countries regard Russia exclusively as a buffer not seem offensive to you?

[Kunadze] If we had no interests in Central Asia and acted to serve somebody else's interests, then that would be shameful, indecent. But we do have our own interests....

[Kuznetsova] How far does the Foreign Ministry's position differ from the position of the Defense Ministry?

[Kunadze] In my opinion, the differences are minimal, and they stem from different departmental functions. We believe that the attacks like those that have been launched on our border posts from Afghan territory must be cut short in the most decisive way. This is a firm

position, and we are not going to hide behind the Defense Ministry's back. Those who are accusing us of this are not being honest.

[Kuznetsova] And are there any disagreements with the parliament?

[Kunadze] I do not see any fundamental disagreements. It is another matter that the address parliament adopted was, to use a French expression, "globale general." And naturally, if something about the plan that we are now implementing does not produce a proper result, I think that parliament would lose no opportunity to dissociate itself. And it will start talking loudly about disagreements with the government.

[Kuznetsova] The opposition now has a majority in parliament. Why is it, do you think, that on the issue of Russian military presence in Tajikistan, the government and parliament, which strongly dislike each other, have virtually no disagreements?

[Kunadze] I understand the implication of your question to be this: Is there no common great-power imperial aspiration that is motivating both the parliament and the government? I do not think there is. The opinion that national conciliation is necessary is shared by all. It is only in our beyond-the-looking-glass world that the interrelations between the legislative and the executive branches are usually perceived as a zero-sum game. Therefore the fact that parliament and the government have a coincidence of views on a particular problem can only be welcomed. [Kunadze ends]

Following the Russian president's instructions, this morning Acting (during Kozyrev's vacation) Foreign Minister Anatoliy Adamishin has gone on a visit to the five countries of Central Asia. He is to discuss with the leadership of these states the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border following the 26 July resolutions of the Russian Federation Security Council, and also the regional situation as a whole. The discussions will also include the use of CIS peacekeeping forces. The first capital Adamishin is to visit will be Dushanbe.

Yeltsin Signs 'Instruction' on Abkhaz Cease-Fire

LD2907155593 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1505 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jul—Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed an instruction today "On Implementing the Agreement on Cease-Fire in Abkhazia and on the Mechanism for Monitoring its Observance." In accordance with this document, the press service of the president reports, Sergey Shoygu, chairman of the Russian State committee for Emergency Situations, has been appointed head of the Russian section of the joint commission for settlement in Abkhazia.

Estonian Laws Undermine Talks With Russia

PM2907143093 Moscow *ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian* 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 7

[Report by Dimitriy Klenskiy from Tallinn: "Estonia-Russia: Situation Remains the Same"]

[Text] The 13th round of talks between Russian and Estonian state delegations has ended in Lohusalu near Tallinn. The delegations went to the meeting with diametrically opposed feelings. The leader of the Estonian delegation, Minister Juri Luik, thought that recent events "cannot fail to affect the psychological atmosphere at the talks." Russian special envoy Vasily Svirin, however, said that these events would affect things "in practical rather than psychological terms."

Both proved right. The nervousness was evident even in the reactions to each other's remarks at the final press conference. The latest round of talks produced no tangible results, but it was not a waste of time either: Five treaties are ready for initialing at the next meeting to be held in Moscow.

An hour and a half before the end of the 13th round of talks the Russian delegation handed the Estonian side a "statement" which ends with a pressing call for the speedy drawing up and signing of an agreement settling questions of citizenship. This is a reference to Article 1 of the third interstate treaty of 12 January 1991, which states that Russia and Estonia "undertake reciprocal commitments to guarantee to persons living on the territory of the RSFSR and the Republic of Estonia at the time of signing the present Treaty, and who are now citizens of the USSR, the right to keep or receive citizenship of the RSFSR or the Republic of Estonia in accordance with their free will."

Russia has fulfilled this provision in full. Estonia has unilaterally refused to recognize as citizens of Estonia more than half a million Russians permanently resident in that country. In addition to this flouting of their political, civil, and property rights, they also face the threat of being expelled at any moment, since the list of grounds for this is rather extensive and vague. Military pensioners are in a particularly difficult position, since under this law they are supposed to leave Estonia or else they may be forcibly thrown out, along with their families.

This document is not only contrary to the aims and objectives of the talks the delegations are conducting, it undermines the draft treaties and agreements drawn up earlier. The agreement on pension provisions for former servicemen of the Soviet Union, which has been in the process of being drafted for a long time, becomes pointless, since the Law "On Aliens" denies them even the right to apply for a residence visa.

Estonia recently submitted to Russia an official note of protest in connection with the talks held in Leningrad Oblast between Narva City Soviet Chairman Vladimir Chuykin and high-ranking Russian representatives on

holding a referendum on autonomy for this border city. Journalists found this perplexing. After all, before and after this, Chuykin also met with the Swedish foreign minister and the U.S. ambassador to Estonia. On the same issue, and moreover in Narva itself—on the territory of the Republic of Estonia. This, however, was for some reason not seen as grounds for protest notes.

Contemporary international law not only permits, but makes it the duty of the state to take care of compatriots who are outside the state's borders. Moreover, the Vienna Declaration of the June UN conference on human rights states specifically that concern for the observance of human rights ceases to be an internal problem in any country. The priority henceforth belongs to freedom of the individual, although the country's choice of its path of development remains its natural and inalienable right.

Such provisions patently do not suit the Estonian side. Minister Juri Luik stated that Russia and the Russians in Estonia must reconcile themselves to the fact that in every state the population is made up of citizens and aliens (although, let me observe, there is no state in the world that has declared one-third of its population to be aliens—D.K.). Furthermore Estonia attaches paramount importance to the restoration of its own state, on the basis of the 1920 Tartu peace treaty.

To which Vasily Svirin deemed it necessary, at the press conference after the talks ended, to state that the said treaty ceased to exist in summer 1940, when Estonia ceased to be an entity in international law and became part of the Soviet Union. Therefore all 20 points of the treaty have lost all significance for present-day relations between Russia and Estonia.

Estonia, however, is only particularly "concerned" about Point 3 of the treaty—concerning borders. But they were also revised after 1940 and, under the Helsinki accords, are not subject to revision.

What is noteworthy is the incompatibility between laws adopted with regard to the Russian-speaking population and assurances by Estonia's top leaders that they will not tolerate actions that are in fact stipulated in these very laws.

Prime Minister Mart Laar, for instance, assured Max van der Stoep, CSCE high commissioner for national minorities, that noncitizens nominated as candidates to local councils in the municipal elections in fall will be guaranteed easy access to citizenship. But under the law on local elections there is no way noncitizens can be registered as candidate deputies!

And how are we to understand the prime minister's official promise, in writing, not to pursue a policy of forcing noncitizens out of the country, when this same government recently authorized the activity of organizations whose programs declare a course of ridding Estonia of 200,000-250,000 Russian-speaking inhabitants?

What use are these guarantees, if tomorrow a new government comes to power and rescinds its predecessors' promises? Only clear legal provisions can reassure the Russian-speakers.

The results of the talks were summed up to some extent by Vasily Svirin, leader of the Russian delegation. "The longer Estonia goes on postponing the idea of talks on the status of and guarantees for the Russian-speaking population, the more difficulties lie in store for Estonia," in the Russian diplomat's view. It is no accident that Estonians too are increasingly frequently coming to feel that it is Estonia's stance that determines relations with Russia today.

Foreign Ministry Receives 'Arafat Message

LD2907174393 *Algiers Voice of Palestine in Arabic*
1702 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Excerpts] PLO Executive Committee chairman Abu 'Ammar [Yasir 'Arafat] today sent an important message to the Russian leadership on the grave developments in Lebanon as a result of the continued Israeli aggression against south Lebanon. The message was delivered to the director general of the Middle East Department at the Russian Foreign Ministry, when he received the Palestinian ambassador to Russia this morning. The Russian diplomat expressed extreme regret that the Palestinians, and Palestinian camps in particular, were once again being subjected to aggression. He reiterated that his country had called on the government of Israel for an immediate end to its military operations in south Lebanon.

Condemns Israeli Bombing of Lebanon

LD3007093993 *Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1756*
GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—The Russian Foreign Ministry on Thursday [29 July] circulated a statement which reads as follows:

"Increasingly disquieting news has been coming in for the sixth day in succession from Lebanon where bloodshed continues. The number of casualties, refugees, and the scope of destruction increase. The geography of the conflict expands. There is every indication that a strong-arm operation launched by Israel became an inadequate response to the threat of terrorism. The operation has gone far beyond south Lebanon, where the Hizballah and other radicalist groups that were the target of "retribution" are based.

"Damage is being inflicted on the Arab-Israeli peace process which has been established by dint of considerable international efforts under the cosponsorship of Russia and the United States.

"The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs again calls for efforts to put an immediate end to any military activity in Lebanon, to show the maximum of restraint and

reason, and to avert a dangerous spiral of confrontation in the Middle East and the frustration of the Arab-Israeli peace talks".

Filatov, Israeli Ambassador Discuss Rabin Visit

LD2907214493 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 2000 GMT 29 Jul 93

[From the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] A meeting has been held in Moscow between Sergey Filatov, the Russian president's head of administration, and Hayim Bar-Lev, Israel's ambassador to Russia. The main topic of discussion at the meeting were the dates for the upcoming visit to Moscow by Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin. It had previously been planned for May, but for various reasons it did not take place. The visit by the Israeli prime minister is now scheduled for the end of August and beginning of September this year.

U.S. Plan for Nuclear Control Reported

PM2907154193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 7

[Unattributed report under "World and Russia" rubric: "Offensive on Nuclear Programs"]

[Text] The Clinton administration is preparing a new arms control plan which provides for a universal ban on the production of fissionable materials for nuclear weapons, THE NEW YORK TIMES has reported today. According to the newspaper, the purpose of this initiative is to "halt a further buildup of nuclear arsenals," ITAR-TASS reports.

President Clinton, the newspaper points out, still has to formally approve the plan, which embraces nuclear, biological, and chemical arms and their delivery vehicles, particularly missiles. Broad agreement has already been reached, however, on the need for such an initiative among officials of the Department of State, the Pentagon, and the Department of Commerce and staffers of the National Security Council under the White House. Washington is also now consulting with its allies on this question.

In accordance with this plan, THE NEW YORK TIMES points out, it will be proposed that all countries subscribe to an international agreement providing for an end to the production of highly enriched uranium and plutonium for nuclear weapons. "The United States," the newspaper writes, "has already halted production of such materials. But Britain, China, and Russia are continuing to produce them." At the same time the new agreement would not prohibit West European countries and Japan from producing highly enriched uranium or plutonium for nuclear electric power stations.

The approach to other countries, particularly the Republic of South Africa, North Korea, Israel, Pakistan,

and India, will be quite different, the newspaper points out: The United States will try to persuade them not to construct enterprises to produce fissionable materials even for civilian purposes.

Parliamentarians Discusses Security Services in Washington

LD2907172993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0946 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Matyash]

[Excerpt] Washington, 29 Jul—The topics of the theory and practice of civilian monitoring and the supervision of the activities of the security and intelligence services in conditions of a democratic state were at the center of attention of a Russian Federation Supreme Soviet delegation, which has just ended a week-long working visit to Washington.

The Russian parliamentarians held discussions with members and senior officials of the special Senate Committee on Intelligence—which monitors the budget and the work of the U.S. special services. Meetings were held with a number of former leading U.S. politicians and also with current high-ranking U.S. representatives of the CIA, FBI, and the Justice Department. The delegation acquainted itself with the role of nongovernmental organizations in monitoring the activities of U.S. security and intelligence services. [passage omitted]

Indian Response to Rocket Deal Decision Reported

PM2907124993 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 3

[Report by Nikolay Paklin: "Passions Around Rocket Deal"]

[Excerpt] As was to be expected, the wave of criticism against Russia in connection with our refusal to sell India the technology for the production of cryogenic rocket engines is growing.

Professor Rao, chairman of the Indian space research organization, has just made a critical statement. The purport of this statement by India's "chief cosmonaut" comes down to the fact that the Indian side does not intend to buy from Russia only the cryogenic engines without the transfer of the corresponding rocket technology. If Russia refuses to fulfill in full the contract concluded in 1991 between the Russian space agency and the Indian organization then India will "take the case to arbitration."

But without waiting for the decision of the arbitration tribunal influential Indian newspapers are already giving their advice for "punishing" Russia. Thus, THE ECONOMIC TIMES, the organ of financial and business circle, suggests halting Russia's deferred payments for former long-term Soviet debts. The problem of India's

debts to the former Soviet Union was raised by the Indian side and has substantially delayed the development of bilateral economic relations. [passage omitted]

Indian Official on Reneging on Deal

PM2907122393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 7

[Report from ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA/ITAR-TASS roundup under the "Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow" rubric: "Talks With Russia Necessary"]

[Text] "The contract for Russia to deliver cryogenic rocket engines and the transfer of the corresponding know-how to India can be frozen for six months only; before this it is necessary to hold talks with Russia and reach an agreement for settling the existing situation. If the bilateral contract is annulled, we will take the case to arbitration."

A statement was made to this effect in Delhi by Professor Rao, chairman of the Indian Space Research Organization. THE HINDU reports that he also noted that India is not interested in acquiring just the cryogenic rocket engines from the Russian Federation, without receiving the corresponding know-how.

According to U.R. Rao, the Indian side has already paid 1.02 billion rubles (roughly \$33 million) of the total cost of the contract signed between the Indian Space Research Organization and the Main Administration for the Development and Use of Space Technology for the National Economy and Scientific Research in 1991, for the fulfillment of some clauses of the contract.

Kozyrev Southeast Asia Visit Reviewed

MK3007101093 Moscow SEGODNYA in Russian No. 38, 30 Jul 93 (signed to press 29 Jul) p 3

[Leonid Velekhov report under the "Diplomacy" rubric: "Big Impression From 'Small Dragons.' Andrey Kozyrev Proves To Be 'Asian Experience' Advocate"]

[Excerpts] Kuala Lumpur, Singapore, Moscow—[passage omitted] The main outcome of the Russian minister's trip to Southeast Asia is political. Mr. Kozyrev's participation in the ASEAN foreign ministers' conference in Singapore, the specially arranged meeting of six ASEAN foreign ministers with their Russian counterpart, and Andrey Kozyrev's bilateral meetings with them distinctly show that Russia has been recognized by the ASEAN community as one of them. In the expression of the minister, Russia has found its place and voice in this community. Even if it has not yet received the official status of "partner in dialogue," it has become such a partner de facto. The matter of getting this celebrated [preslovutyy] status already seems to be only a matter of time, and, as Mr. Kozyrev observed, it is generally about time to stop thinking of ourselves as sort of school kids only waiting to be promoted to another grade, and so forth. [passage omitted]

It is quite obvious to what extent the "small dragons" are attractive for Russia. This market is especially favorable due to the political and social stability—something exceptional in today's world—that reigns there. Kozyrev repeatedly stressed the importance for Russia of the unique experience of economic and social reforms in the countries of Southeast Asia that are on record as building within one generation 70-story skyscrapers where slums used to be, and turned from "the world's backyard" into super-modern states.

Andrey Kozyrev stated: The experience of Asian reforms is convincing evidence that carrying them through takes a strong, tough political authority. Had the fathers of Asian reforms, the minister said, sat down more than 20 years ago at a "roundtable" together with communists, instead of getting right down to business, and launched into a dispute on whether their countries needed foreign investments and whether that may prove a "sellout of the native land," these countries would obviously still be lying in ruins. [passage omitted]

Given all the positive political outcomes of their trip to Southeast Asia, Russian diplomats regard with great anxiety the prospects of practical expansion of the newly established links and relations. As one of them said: The trip was very successful, we agreed on many things, and now we are going to make a mess of the whole thing as soon as it reaches the stage of specific economic treaties and their implementation. [passage omitted]

Flights to PRC Increase; Freight Market 'Inexhaustable'

PM2907131593 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 26 Jul 93

[By Vladimir Kulikov from China; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Kulikov] The memorandum on developing Russian-Chinese air ties signed at the beginning of this year is fully in line with the expansion of our trade and economic relations. The memorandum envisages the opening this year of 27 new air routes between Russia and China. Khabarovsk, Blagoveshchensk, Irkutsk, Vladivostok, Chita, and other cities in Siberia and the Far East will be included in the regular services. The number of flights on the old routes will also be increased: There will be 12 flights instead of four on the Moscow-Beijing route, and Shanghai will also receive this number of flights from Russia. So Aeroflot's Beijing office will have more work, and, incidentally, more income. And what about freight—the torrent of Chinese consumer goods descending on Russian markets? This is not a question of the number of kilograms of baggage per passenger permitted on the air ticket, it is a question of tonnes.

[V. Potemkin, Aeroflot's general agent in Beijing] The market for freight transportation to China is, to my mind, simply inexhaustible today and gives us extensive opportunities.

[Kulikov] We were able to observe the operation of these new cargo flights at Beijing's Shoudu airport. And it was tempting to temporarily forget the joke made by someone to the effect that where Aeroflot begins, order ends. But this was not possible, and the airport in the city of Tianjin, 100 km from the Chinese capital, was to blame. Last month 132 charter flights from all over Russia flew in here. This month there will be even more. There is no official Aeroflot agent here, and the freight is loaded by barter enthusiasts, so to speak, at their own responsibility and risk. Responsibility because they must make sure that no freight remains on the airfield, and, as for the risk factor, this is because an overloaded airplane may not be able to take off. In this kind of situation, there is no question of the efficient servicing of these flights, nor indeed of their safety.

'Traffic Jam' Into China

PM3007112593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Boris Reznik: "'Traffic Jam' At Gates into China"]

[Text] Far East—Nearly 2,000 cars with various freight have now accumulated from all corners of Russia and the CIS in Maritime Kray at the railroad station at the Grodekovo Suifenhe border crossing—a tailback of 37 km.

All the cars are for the Chinese side, which receives daily, according to its technical potential, only two trains of 23 cars each. Every day new freight cars are arriving in Grodekovo. And you can imagine the prospect awaiting the Far East railroad: In the next few days it could be completely paralyzed. Today some of the cars en route for China are having to be returned to their dispatchers or held in Khabarovsk, Vyazemskoye, and Bikin, where traffic jams have also formed.

If the situation continues to be aggravated, the Far East railroad workers will be obliged to ask the Russian government for permission to close the Grodekovo station to freight trains. According to their calculations, in order to process the cars which have accumulated they will need at least three months. Of course, closing the station is an emergency measure and to avoid such excesses it is essential, in conjunction with our Chinese partners, to urgently modernize the border rail crossing and expand its potential, bringing it closer to modern requirements. This was discussed at the recent meeting of the leaders and specialists of the two railroads—the Far East and Harbin railroads—held at the border stations. But, as always, everything relies on money. Neither side has the necessary amount of money right now.

Road crossings could take part of the freight flow but unfortunately their construction in the Maritime Kray settlement of Turiy Rog and Markovo is proceeding only slowly and in Poltavka, Kraskino, and Sosnovaya Lad for technical reasons the road crossings are not operating at full capacity. Alas, the meager local budget simply cannot cope with their erection and maintenance. Yet it is not only the Far East people who are interested in trade with China.

There is a no less alarming situation at the Transbaykal railroad. Here, in the settlement of Zabaykalsk, Chita Oblast, there is also a traffic jam. But it consists of cars not going to China but coming back, for Russian freight recipients. Because of the overloading of the railroad and the sluggishness of some addressees the cars with freight are stuck at the station. To transport and economic problems here you can add criminal problems. Gangs of looters from all parts are coming here to make a profit. Over the course of a day freight worth tens of millions of rubles is often stolen here, with up to 100 cars being cleaned out.

The Chita militia has been obliged to put considerable forces into the war against the looters in Zabaykalsk. The oblast administration has had to issue a ruling on restricting entry to Zabaykalskiy Rayon, introducer a border regime, and block the roads, although previously it was planned to create a free economic zone here.

The Khabarovsk Kray administration is also taking steps to emerge from the railroad crisis. On its instructions specialists have studied the situation carefully. At the kray's sidings and stations they have discovered many cars which arrived here back in... 1991. Their conclusion is that the freight dispatchers are also to a certain extent to blame for the present emergency situation, by violating normative requirements for deliveries of output for export.

In this connection the kray administration has given the chief of the Far East railroad additional powers. Henceforth his services must not only impose large fines on violators but also promptly raise questions of the sale on the spot of incorrectly registered freight. The railroad has also been instructed to allocate cars primarily for local exporters and to ensure their priority passage through the border railroad stations. Freight dispatchers from other regions and CIS countries have been asked not to take the risk: Before dispatching goods they should find out the potential of the railroad at the points through which their itinerary will proceed.

So far no way out of the stalemate can be seen.

Political Influences on Yeltsin Japan Visit Viewed

PM2907150593 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 3

["Our Commentary" by Yuriy Vdovin: "President Facing a Choice"]

[Text] Russian President B. Yeltsin is making preparations for the third time to pay an official visit to Japan. A rough date was decided for his visit—this fall—during his time at the G-7 meeting in Tokyo in early July. Russian Foreign Ministry sources announced that careful preparations for the visit have already begun. They are being carried out in the context of the changes in the domestic political situation in Russia and Japan and world events.

This visit has been postponed twice on the Russian side's initiative. Will it go ahead this time? Everything depends

on what forces prevail on the "northern territories" issue—the president's immediate entourage and Kozyrev's foreign policy department, which are directly or overtly impelling him to hand over the South Kurils to the Land of the Rising Sun, or Russian public opinion, which is absolutely opposed to such a disgraceful decision. The former are urging the president to be guided by principles of "legality and justice" in his relations with Japan, stop "dividing states into the victors and vanquished" of World War II, view this country as a "partner and potential ally" in "general eternal human values," and therefore hand over part of Russia's territory. The latter are insisting that Russia show firmness in its talks with its eastern neighbor on the territorial issue, realize its great-power status, and reject the claims.

Both K. Miyazawa, now the former Japanese prime minister, who presided over the G-7 meeting in Tokyo, and Russian President B. Yeltsin, who attended as a poor suppliant, felt equally uncomfortable in the company of the other countries' leaders. And they had good reason. All was not well on the home front for both of them. The scandalous revelations of corruption and links with criminal elements resulted in the former's support among voters dropping to a record low (6 percent). The public, with the support of the press, resolutely demanded his resignation. Nor was the Russian leader in a better position, for reasons with which we are familiar.

Following the 19 July general election defeat, when the ruling Liberal Democratic Party lost its monopoly on power and will now be forced to share power with the opposition, Japan has entered a period of instability. This will be characterized by an acute domestic political struggle, which will of course take its toll on its relations with other countries. The frequent change of governments typical of such a period and the fact that attention will be focused on internal problems will generate suspicion, some mistrust, and a wait-and-see policy among those with whom its representatives abroad will have to do business. All that will undoubtedly be taken into consideration by Russia's representatives. And whereas the president has twice found major reasons during a period of comparative stability in Japan to postpone his official visit to this country, he should now think thrice before daring to make this trip.

B. Yeltsin and his entourage are perfectly well aware that the instability in Japan will force his interlocutors to take an even tougher line on the "territorial problem" in order to score political points with the voters. But in turn Russian concessions or even an unclear policy on this issue will be seen by the Russian public as a betrayal of its interests and will cause a further decline in the Russian Federation president's popularity. He is therefore left with the choice—of going in order to say "no" to the Japanese once and for all on the "territorial problem," or once again postpone the trip until this question can be resolved to the two countries' mutual advantage in a good-neighborly manner that preserves the honor and dignity of the two neighboring countries' peoples, who have to live together and coexist for a long time to

come in our single world that is nonetheless always mindful of its own interests.

'New Results' Hoped For in DPRK-ROK Reunification

SK2907131393 Moscow Radio Moscow in Korean 1200 GMT 27 Jul 93

[Text] Today, 27 July, marks a significant day in the history of the DPRK and the ROK. The Armistice Agreement was concluded 40 years ago today in Panmunjom. From 2200 [1300 GMT] on 27 July 1953, the fight between the sides engaged in a war came to a complete halt. The Korean war occurred because of a confrontation in the social system between the two sides. Over 9 million people were sacrificed in the Korean War and resulted in enormous material loss. The echo of the Korean war can be heard even today. On the occasion of the 40th anniversary of the end of the Korean war, Moscow International Radio wishes each family good luck and that new results can be achieved in the cause of the South-North reunification.

CSCE Delegation Observes Air Attack Demonstration

LD2907174293 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1020 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Aleksey Zavinovskiy]

[Text] Kingisepp, Leningrad oblast, 29 Jul—A delegation of military representatives of the CSCE states, which began inspecting aircraft of the 76th Air Army yesterday, started work at the Kingisepp test site near St. Petersburg today.

They saw demonstrations of bombers, including the SU-24. Also shown at the test site was bombing of the air directorate building. Nonguided missiles hit the "enemy" radar stations. This was followed by a minimum altitude demonstration flight by an air squadron.

The CSCE representatives assessed not only the armaments and combat machines, but also the nature of the work of the flight and technical staff of the 76th Air Army, and their professional level of training. They expressed a high opinion of the skill of the Russian pilots, and noted the openness of the meeting, that took place in a spirit of trust and harmony.

Difficult Talks Forecast on USSR Foreign Debt

PM2907140193 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 7

[Sergey Yakovlev article: "Our Heavy Debts: Will Russia Manage to Reach Agreement With the London Club on the Rescheduling of Payments?"]

[Text] From time to time the questions of debts owed to us and of our debts to "them" trouble those people who are not indifferent to our country's financial position.

Sometimes this leads to fantastic rumors about what would happen if we were paid the money owed to us or conversely what will happen if we do not pay our bills. ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI has already written a number of times about developments in the talks with the official creditor countries of the former USSR belonging to the Paris Club. However, the fate of our indebtedness depends to a considerable extent on what is happening in another club, the equally interesting London Club.

It turns out that in our country far less is known about the London Club than about its Parisian counterpart. The London Club was formed in December 1991 when it became necessary to urgently resolve the question of rescheduling the debt of the Bank for Foreign Economic Activity [Vneshekonombank] to the commercial banks acting as creditors of the former USSR. There are around 600 of them. In the medium- and long-term we owe them approximately \$30 billion or 35-37 percent of all the debts of the defunct Union. The club is headed by the Bank Consultative Committee, which is responsible for elaborating the general principles in regard to our debts. It includes France's Credit Lyonnais and Banque Nationale de Paris, Japan's Bank of Tokyo and the Dai-Ichi Kangio Bank, Austria's Kreditanstalt-Verein, Germany's Kommerzbank and Dresdener Bank, Italy's Mediocredito Centrale and Banca Commerciale Italiana, Britain's Midland Bank, and the Bank of America. The final word in the adoption of decisions within the club now rests with the chairman of the Bank Consultative Committee—Germany's Deutsche Bank.

At the request of the Vneshekonombank, the Consultative Committee has granted it seven so-called rollovers or deferrals of payments (each one for three months) since December 1991. The latest rollover expires next 30 September. In addition to temporary or interim deferrals within the framework of the London Club talks have now been going on for six months on the main long-term deferral of the redemption of our commercial debt which is not guaranteed by the Western countries' governments.

It has emerged from informed sources that work is now almost complete on the revised version of the so-called "main conditions," which resulted from our talks in May and June this year with the Bank Consultative Committee. However, it has also emerged from those same sources that the next meeting within the London Club's framework planned for the end of July will not be easy. No one has any doubts about the schedule and volumes of payments. But the sides are far from clear about what should be deferred and how. We face too many difficult payments in the next three to four years. Nevertheless, the experts rate highly the chances that we will manage to find a mutually acceptable

compromise with the London Club and the prolonged interruption in the negotiations will at last be overcome.

Businessmen Call Trilateral Union 'Shortsighted Policy'

MK2907132093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 p

[NG-signed report under the "In Brief" rubric: "Opposition Is Not Against CIS"]

[Text] A meeting of the coordinating council of the "Entrepreneurs for a New Russia" association has taken place outside Moscow.

The meeting came up with recommendations for setting up the association's local and regional branches.

The association's emergency congress will be held from 23-26 September in Kemerovo to approve its political platform and program and to hear a report on the economic situation and the progress of reform. Grigoriy Yavlinskiy and Konstantin Zatulin were chosen to deliver the reports.

The coordinating council passed the statement "On the prospect of an economic union between Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus" and "On the threat of reprivatization in Russia," expressing concern over the way economic reform is proceeding, the heightening of tensions in CIS member countries, and a lack of a consistent and balanced strategy with regard to the newly independent states on the part of the Russian leadership. The Commonwealth is a zone of Russia's long-term vital interests, on which our security and well-being largely depend. It is these interests that require that the Russian Federation ensure as close a collaboration as possible with all Commonwealth members and assist in their integration on a new economic and political basis. Russia should become a guarantor of stability and security in the CIS to prevent and, if this is not always possible, to quell armed conflicts so that they will not spill over to Russian territory.

The agreement on a would-be economic union reached by Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus was deemed a continuation of the shortsighted policy of Belovezhskaya Forest, aimed at undermining the Commonwealth under the flag of "Slavic solidarity." The setting up of such a union without other CIS members taking part is a clear violation of the agreements reached earlier at the level of the Commonwealth heads of state and heads of government regarding economic cooperation. This is bound to worsen Russia's relations with Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries and lead to the latter's alienation from close relations within the CIS.

Political Issues

Yeltsin Meets With Ossetian, Ingush Leaders

LD2907134393 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1230 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By *ITAR-TASS* correspondent Igor Gavritishvili]

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jul—A working meeting of Russian President Boris Yeltsin, Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, Akhsarbek Galazov, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of North Ossetia; and Ruslan Aushev, president of the Ingush Republic, has started in the Kremlin. Sergey Shakhrai, deputy prime minister of the Russian Government, and Viktor Polyanichko, head of the temporary administration in the Ossetian-Ingush conflict zone, are taking part in the meeting.

At the beginning of the conversation Sergey Shakhrai conveyed some information on the situation in the region. He believes that the nonfulfillment of the agreements on refugees' problems, signed in Kislovodsk this March, is the main reason that the conflict is spreading.

Yeltsin, Chernomyrdin Issue Appeal

LD2907164493 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1526 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Moscow, 29 Jul—The Presidential Press Service has distributed an appeal by Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin, and Viktor Chernomyrdin, Russian Federation Council of Ministers Chairman, to the peoples of North Ossetia and Ingushetia. It says:

"Dear fellow countrymen! Esteemed citizens of Russia!

"The situation in the state of emergency zone in North Ossetia and Ingushetia causes serious alarm and deep concern.

"The consequences of the tragic events have turned out to be unbelievably dire. The flame of enmity and distrust continues to burn bright. Fear and bitterness have entered many human souls. Tens of thousands of people are without homes, work, and are living under intolerable conditions. The fate of those who were taken hostage and who disappeared without trace is a wound that continues to remain unhealed. Shots are fired, and acts of terrorism are committed. People are dying. The measures that have been taken to provide for a secure life are not always meeting with understanding and support.

"This cannot be acceptable. If we have been unable to avert this conflict, we must now extricate ourselves from it wisely, and with dignity.

"We are deeply convinced that this can be done only if the peoples of North Ossetia and Ingushetia make joint efforts while respecting each other's rights. A beginning must be made with the difficult process of restoring trust. We must show generosity, renounce vengeance, and go

down the path of restoring good-neighborliness and harmony, in the spirit of the traditions of the Caucasus peoples.

"We reaffirm that we will do all to seek peaceful ways out of the conflict, and we undertake joint obligations.

"Publication of our assessment of the tragic events of October-November 1992 will be brought forward. A careful additional investigation will be carried out to determine the fate of hostages on both sides, so that this terrible and tragic page of events that occurred may be closed for ever.

"We emphasize the necessity of a moratorium on border reviews. Under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the free choice of a place to live cannot be accompanied by territorial claims on neighboring peoples.

"The process of a gradual return of refugees and forced resettlers to areas of compact populations as per the Kislovodsk Agreement of 20 March 1993 should begin in August. At the first stage this area could be four populated areas proposed by the joint commission. Civil rights and security will be guaranteed to the returning refugees.

"The best temporary living conditions will be set up for those refugees awaiting return. All programs of reestablishment and homebuilding, work placement, schooling for children, and provision of material aid that have been planned will, without exception, be fully financed.

"Taking into account the fact that tens of thousands of refugees from the republic of Georgia, other states, and various regions of the Russian Federation are presently staying in North Ossetia, the Russian Government looks at this problem as a whole. Necessary funds and resources are also being allocated for the arrangements for them. In our opinion, the conclusion of mutually acceptable agreements is a real way of normalizing the situation in the region.

"We expect from the peoples of North Ossetia and Ingushetia an understanding and support of our desire to create conditions for a decent life for every individual, for progress in the economy and culture, and for a free development of peoples. We expect that by joint efforts, with the mediation by the central bodies of the Russian authorities, peace and confidence will come to replace the state of emergency on this unfortunate soil. We address the republics, krais, and oblasts of Russia, major enterprises of the Russian Federation, entrepreneurship structures, and public organizations and movements with an appeal to take part in restoring and building houses, schools, and hospitals, in creating jobs in Ingushetia and North Ossetia, and in assisting in restoring peace and calm in the republics in the spirit of the tradition of friendship and fraternity of the Russian peoples.

[Signed] "B. Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation

"V. Chernomyrdin, Russian Federation Council of Ministers chairman"

Further on Dismissal of Viktor Barannikov

Some 'Fear' for Barannikov's Life

PM3007133793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Jul 93
p 1

[Galina Petrova report: "Thirty Telephones in Barannikov's Dacha—New Details About the Russian Federation Security Minister's Dismissal"]

[Text] It has been learned from reliable sources that, shortly before his removal and during the minister's absence in Moscow, 30 telephones were suddenly installed at his official dacha—even in the room where his young grandchildren stay. For what purpose? Even laymen can provide and answer to this question.

Furthermore, "Vypel," Russia's top professional group for combating terrorism, was withdrawn from Security Ministry subordination literally a few days ago.

It is also known that recently Viktor Barannikov was virtually out of contact with the president, while other power ministers were in constant contact with B. Yeltsin.

All of this, according to evaluations by experts and specialists even within the presidential entourage, proves that V. Barannikov's dismissal was prepared in advance, and that the violations of ethical norms he is alleged to have committed and the events in Tajikistan were merely the formal excuse for the security minister's removal.

Incidentally, there are reports to the effect that the border conflicts were organized by a powerful Western secret service precisely for the purposes of "embarrassing" Viktor Barannikov.

Today it can already be said with confidence that the security minister's ouster was prompted not by his professional qualities but by political motivations. The president's men, seeking to push through its draft Constitution any way they can, were unhappy not only because V. Barannikov himself remained in the constitutional field but also because he urged others, including the president, to follow suit. Actually PRAVDA reported on this yesterday.

The fact that he refused to rubber-stamp the president's edict on dismissing Border Troop Commander Vladimir Shlyakhtin from his post testifies to the minister's steadfastness and honesty. This may have been the final drop causing the cup of presidential patience to overflow in respect of the uncompromising minister.

Two days ago, while bidding farewell to the Security Ministry apparatus collective, Viktor Barannikov categorically denied all accusations of violations of ethical norms and declared that he is ready to give comprehensive testimony to any commission provided there are no homosexuals or newly recruited former KGB agents on it.

In short, he is not afraid of verification or trial, but certain Russian Federation Security Ministry staffers fear for the life of their erstwhile chief.

'Latest Stage' in 'Coup d'Etat'

PM3007103793 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 93
p 1

[Article by Viktor Ilyukhin, state counselor of justice 2d class: "Barannikov Sacked. Troops in State of Combat Readiness"]

[Text] Viktor Barannikov's dismissal from office as Russian Federation minister of security came as no surprise to me. This decision was being hatched for a long time now, and not without help from leaders of the "democratic movement" whose opinion is increasingly often heeded by their obedient President B. Yeltsin. They only awaited a suitable time and a suitable excuse. It seems as if the excuse has been found—the incident on the Tajik border. But there is no doubt that the underlying reason behind the sacking is different—political.

In contrast with other ministers, V. Barannikov proved to be a man with firm character, independent aspirations, and no toady of the president.

It was thanks to him, as well as to Skokov, that the Russian Federation Security Council "buried" several attempts by Yeltsin's adventurous entourage to introduce emergency forms of administration in Russia. V. Barannikov rigorously opposed the transformation of the Ministry of Security into an openly political investigations bureau, a political big stick to beat the opposition wholesale. The Ministry of Security did not participate in the punitive operations against peaceful demonstrations on 23 February or 1 May. The minister repeatedly declared that he advocates strict observance of the Constitution. That selfsame Constitution which B. Yeltsin rejected a long time ago, and is hurriedly trying to replace it with his own dictatorial one.

There will probably be a lot of sound and fury, but V. Barannikov did save Russia's security organs from their final destruction which was launched by M. Gorbachev and V. Bakatin on the West's instructions. He also saved them from B. Yeltsin's "plans." The president repeatedly demanded from the minister a far-reaching purge of the Ministry of Security, essentially meaning the expulsion of its best professional cadres and thus the ministry's intellectual destruction. V. Barannikov would do no such thing. The president began to gradually drive the obstinate minister further away from his entourage. The one to be seen more and more frequently around B. Yeltsin was Minister of Internal Affairs V. Yerin, an individual who is, generally speaking, mediocre but ready to obey any order—even a criminal order—of his "patron." According to available information, it is no accident that the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] is now more actively engaged on "processing" opposition leaders. It is no accident that this ministry has been

allocated vast funds to engage in uncontrolled electronic bugging of persons whom the regime finds awkward.

Another logical result is the institution of higher ranks for MVD officers than for officers in the security organs.

There is also confirmation of the story, carried by PRAVDA recently, that a federal bureau of investigations is being set up in Russia for the precise purpose of squeezing out the Ministry of Security. A few days ago the group of organizers (we were also told their surnames: Shipulin, Khokhlov, Protsenko, Kuvshinov, Fetinin) visited the F. Dzerzhinskiy MVD Division where they approached officers in an attempt to recruit them for the investigations bureau. According to the servicemen, the group constantly bandied the name of Russia's president. It let it be understood that it enjoys material and financial backup from A. Chubays' department.

V. Barannikov's sacking was no doubt also prompted by the institution of criminal proceedings by the Russian Federation Prosecutor's Office against Vice Premier V. Shumeyko. It is, after all, no secret that the Ministry of Security took and still takes numerous operational measures to expose and block corruption, including corruption among the top echelons of power in Russia. The Prosecutor's Office relies on them for its investigation. The president's entourage is seriously worried by this. In his typical style, B. Yeltsin has sacked not the thieves who have discredited themselves but the one who has exposed illegality and arbitrary rule.

V. Barannikov's sacking can be perceived as the latest stage of the coup d'etat which was launched by the Gorbachev-Yeltsin team in August 1991.

The Tula and Pskov Airborne Assault Troops Divisions and the "Alpha" and "Omega" Spetsnaz [special purpose] Groups are in a state of heightened combat readiness. There are reports—which need to be confirmed, of course—about the unofficial arrival of representatives of Western special services in Russia. They were met by people from the president's immediate entourage. Events may develop unpredictably. Everything must be done to prevent the recurrence of a new August putsch.

Motives for Ouster Viewed

PM2907141793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 1

[Unattributed report under the rubric "Details": "Dismissal Follows Reprimand"]

[Excerpts] At a meeting with leaders of the Russian Federation Ministry of Security 27 July Russian Federation President Boris Yeltsin informed those assembled that he had signed an edict relieving Viktor Barannikov of the post of security minister for violations of ethical standards personally committed by the latter, and also for serious shortcomings in his work.

"This news came as a complete surprise to us," one high-ranking Ministry of Security official told

ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA's correspondent. "Usually, when it comes to dismissing departmental leaders, rumors of some kind circulate beforehand. This time there was nothing of the sort. [passage omitted]

There is also another version of Viktor Barannikov's dismissal. Unlike the leaders of the other two power ministries, he was fairly independent. He was able to say "no" as well as "yes" to the higher-ups, and did not refuse to cooperate with the Supreme Soviet or rush to make statements of support for the president's every step.

Barannikov Seen as Scapegoat

PM2907153193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 1

["Commentary" by section editor Aleksandr Mozgovoy: "A Good Hiding Has Been Meted Out. But Is the Border Secure?"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] At the Security Council session the president signed there and then a decree relieving Vladimir Shlyakhtin of the position of commander of the border troops, and his boss—Minister of Security Viktor Barannikov—was reprimanded (a day later B. Yeltsin fired the minister too). I do not undertake to judge the degree of guilt of the leaders of the Ministry of Security, but this kind of dressing-down strongly smacks of the old oblast committee "sort-outs," at which "scapegoats" were always found. Why did the lord and master not punish the high-ranking military chiefs who have far more impressive forces and means at their disposal than the border troops? Why did the foreign ministry chiefs, who "lost sight of" the region and were unable to avert the conflict through their diplomatic channels, escape a good hiding? God alone knows. [passage omitted]

But here is what is alarming. Literally a few hours before the Security Council session, A. Kozyrev, commenting on the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border in an interview with INTERFAX, stated that the possibilities of settling the conflict through diplomatic means are extremely limited, and that dialogue with the Tajik opposition operating on the territory of Afghanistan "can be conducted only in the language of missile strikes." In other words, the president has entrusted the task of finding a political settlement to a man who prefers the force of arms to the art of negotiation. And here an extremely alarming tendency shows through: A certain number of Russia's current leaders, it would appear, are not adverse to playing the war card in order to divert the attention of ordinary citizens from the obvious failures in social and economic policy within the country. The trick is not a new one. But, alas, one which those in power have pulled off successfully more than once.

And I think that it was no accident that at the Security Council session Defense Minister Pavel Grachev was charged with overall day-to-day management of the collaboration of the forces and resources of various ministries and

departments. Although it would have been more logical and more expedient to have transferred this function to the secretary of the Security Council—incidentally, also no stranger to military problems.

The Security Ministry session, unfortunately, demonstrated yet again that Russia's leaders still do not have any sort of clearly formulated concept of national security. Nor have they a mechanism to back it up. And this means that tragic incidents like the one which happened on the Tajik-Afghan border could continue.

Democratic Russia Issues Statement

LD3007135193 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1100 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] Mayak radio station has received a statement from the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Russia Movement. It expresses concern at the situation concerning the Security Ministry of the Russian Federation.

Under the leadership of former minister Barannikov, in cahoots with the conservative forces of the Supreme Soviet and the General Procuracy, the ministry is again changing into a political and criminal investigation agency, the statement says.

As confirmation of this thesis, the Democratic Russia Coordinating Council cites the example of repeated attempts to institute criminal proceedings with regard to people's deputies Ponomarev, Yakunin and Mironov, and of the participation of a representative of the Security Ministry in the search of the offices of Poltoranin, the head of the Federal Information Center.

At the same time we observe the absolute impotence of the security bodies in the struggle against crime and corruption that is swamping Russia, the abuse by some of the ministry's leading officials of their official post, and also their stubborn unwillingness to pay any attention to the unbridled nazi and chauvinist propaganda being conducted by a number of public organizations and mass media.

In this connection the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Russia Movement regards as justified the decree of Russia's President Boris Yeltsin on the security minister.

Possible Candidates To Replace Barannikov Named

MK2907111093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[NG-signed report: "Who Will Be Minister?"]

[Text] According to rumors that have been persistently circulating in the top echelons of power, those who have been mulled over as candidates to fill the post of Russian Federation internal affairs minister include: Ye. Savostyanov, chief of the Russian Security Ministry's Moscow administration; S. Stepashin, chairman of the

Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee; A. Ivanenko, former chairman of the National Security Agency, which existed some time ago; and Russian People's Deputy G. Starovoytova.

Ilyushenko Rumored

MK3007093093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 30 Jul 93 p 1

[Andrey Poleshchuk report under the "Special Services" rubric: "Viktor Barannikov Fired. Who Will Replace Him? Reshuffle in Security Ministry May Be Accompanied by 'Leaks' of Secret and Strictly Secret Information"]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] Spokesmen in the Russian Security Ministry's public relations center are so far unprepared to make official comments on the sensational event. According to a number of high-ranking officials at the Russian Security Ministry's central apparatus, however, Viktor Barannikov's forced resignation came as an unpleasant surprise for many security people. It is believed in Lubyanka that Mr. Barannikov should definitely be given credit for his persistent attempts to remove the state security system from the influence of political forces and to make it subordinate only to law. [passage omitted]

Barannikov's subordinates, for whom his resignation came as a painful blow, insist that in the current complex situation the minister managed to do the main thing—to keep the state security system alive and qualified professionals at work. It was during Barannikov's tenure as minister that laws on state security, on federal security agencies, and operational and investigating activity were adopted. [passage omitted]

Who will replace Viktor Barannikov? We wrote in yesterday's NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA that, according to persistent rumors circulating in the top echelons of power and among Russian Security Ministry personnel, potential candidates for minister include: Ye. Savostyanov, chief of the Russian Security Ministry's Moscow administration; S. Stepashin, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee; A. Ivanenko, former chairman of the former National Security Agency (NSA); and Russian People's Deputy G. Starovoytova, who is known to have been groomed for the post of defense minister. Later, another candidate was added to the list, who, it is said, is most likely to step into Barannikov's shoes. This is Aleksey Ilyushenko, chairman of the control division of the Russian president's administration. Mr. Ilyushenko, however, said in a telephone interview for your NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA correspondent: "I hear this news from you for the first time. Naturally, I cannot comment on it. Can I see myself holding this post? I do not know, so far I have not asked myself the question."

Presumably, in the next few days all the i's will be dotted. Presently, however, this is reminiscent of events at the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992 when there was a fierce struggle between supporters of two candidates for

the post of security minister—Barannikov and Ivanenko. It was then that one sensational “leak” of secret and strictly secret information followed another.

What it will be like this time?

Acting Security Minister Golushko Profiled

MK3007092093 Moscow KURANTY in Russian
30 Jul 93 p 2

[Ivan Zavyalov report under the “Newcomers” rubric: “Old Hand Golushko Will Not Rock the Boat”]

[Text] General N. Golushko, appointed acting Russian security minister, is unlikely to go any higher. The parliament speaker, together with his aktiv of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, intends to put up a serious fight, for “reasons of principle,” to reinstate the fired V. Barannikov, making an official confirmation of Golushko a remote prospect anyway. Besides, Barannikov too has decided to add a human tinge to Khasbulatov’s move by becoming, as they say, indisposed owing to the shock he sustained from his dismissal.

As for Golushko, who has been with the organs of state security for more than 30 years. He is quite at home in the Security Ministry, and thus is unlikely to suffer from special complexes. The acting minister, most of whose career was made in the central apparatus of the kontora [KGB], is one of the KGB elite cadres. Golushko also worked in the country of his ancestors, Ukraine, but when the independence drive heightened there he was called back to Moscow. Once in Russia he quickly made his career, becoming a first deputy to Barannikov in the wake of the Security Ministry and KGB reshuffles.

His candidature clearly does not cause a surge of enthusiasm among liberals, who remember his serving in the infamous Fifth Directorate for dissidents. As far as the Security Ministry apparatus is concerned, Golushko without a doubt personifies stability and the continued present-day course of the ministry. Men of Golushko’s class seem to be needed by every regime. As long, of course, as they remain loyal to their bosses.

Prosecutors Investigate Calls To Topple Yeltsin

LD2907135793 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1311
GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Moscow July 29 ITAR-TASS—The Information and Public Relations Centre of the Procurator-General’s Office of the Russian Federation has circulated the following statement today:

The news agency POSTFACTUM and some other mass media outlets have lately circulated reports that calls “to overthrow Yeltsin’s anti-people regime”, form paramilitary groups of the National Salvation Front and the like were voiced at the recent 11th Congress of the National Salvation Front.

As calls for forcible toppling of the constitutional system to seize power and the formation of paramilitary groups by public organisations are outlawed in the country and are punishable under law, the Procurator-Generals’ Office of the Russian Federation is now checking up the reports in accordance with the powers vested in it.

‘Hard-Liners’ Said Fomenting Coup, Civil War

PM2907142193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
29 Jul 93 First Edition p 5

[Article by political scientist Aleksey Kiva: “Party of Soviets Demonstrates Readiness for Coup d’Etat”]

[Text] The line of conduct pursued by the political camp opposing the president, his team, and supporters of the present course of reform seems to be emerging more clearly. As might have been expected, Speaker Ruslan Khasbulatov has proved to be the focus of the political activity. He was unable to conceal his dismay for some time after losing the April referendum. What he said about the referendum’s having decided nothing and his extremely arbitrary interpretation of its results only underlined the speaker’s dismay. He failed too to conceal his fear of another congress of people’s deputies that could once again raise the issue of the speaker’s unsuitability for his job.

Even knowing just a little about Khasbulatov one could have foreseen that the dismay would soon pass and retaliatory action would start. The only question was what Khasbulatov’s priority would be. Keeping his post at any price, and the actions associated therewith? Or soberly taking into account the correlation of forces and sentiments in society, including on the basis of the referendum results, and accordingly seeking a compromise with the president and the democrats? The speaker settled on the former option.

However, a few things should be borne in mind when talking about Khasbulatov, about what can be expected of him, and how far he is prepared to go in his confrontation with the president and his political course; when talking about the kind of political forces on which he may rely and the kind of alternatives, slogans, and so on that may be put forward. First, time has showed that the speaker does not have any firm convictions and principles. Yesterday Khasbulatov considered himself a staunch supporter of Yeltsin, a democrat, a fighter against communism and the “hated center” and he opposed the State Committee for the State of Emergency [SCSE], but today he is almost on friendly terms with A. Prokhanov, V. Chikin, G. Zyuganov, and company. Today he addresses the “Russian idea,” the idea of great-power status, he flirts with Russia’s traditionalist intelligentsia, and his political style is increasingly reminiscent of the style of the communist-patriots [kommunopatrioty]. Today there is in effect little to distinguish between him and the “SCSE men.”

Second, while giving credit to Khasbulatov’s abilities as a politician and acknowledging his speed of response and

ability to improvise, one must at the same time be blunt and say that the speaker is hampered by his narrow outlook, he does not have the gift of conceptual, systemic thinking, he is unable to anticipate and view things from the standpoint of historical practice. However much he criticizes the current course of reform, however many fine words he spouts about social-market relationships, the social role of the state, and so on, he cannot put forward a working alternative model of reforms. You cannot get an idea of the kind of model of postcommunist development the speaker-economist or political economist favors. Yet there are not dozens of them, but just two: the state capitalist and—conventionally speaking—the liberal democratic models.

The speaker gladly talks of a Scandinavian-type social democratic model of development but says nothing about how to achieve it amid the conditions prevailing in the former countries of "real socialism" with their inverted pyramid of a society. Possibly, one should begin at the beginning with Adam Smith and not where Roosevelt began and not with what Keynes wrote about. Without well-developed private-ownership relationships there will be nothing to regulate, nothing with which to ensure the population's social protection, and, instead of the Scandinavian model, the same beggarly Soviet socialism will smile ominously at us. The principle of parliamentarism will certainly not prevail—which again Khasbulatov is constantly talking about—until a class of owners and economically independent citizens emerges as the most important element in civil society. There can be no developed middle class without developed private ownership.

Nor does the speaker demonstrate an understanding of the nature of the political system, especially in the transitional period. As we know, he advocates a parliamentary republic, and that alone. All world experience shows that a parliamentary republic can only function normally with a developed party system. But that in turn requires a higher level of socioeconomic relationships. If the speaker is worried by the question of what we are building and where Russia is going, but is nonetheless turning to the "Russian idea," it means that he has totally no idea of how society should advance.

Third, in my view the speaker has considerably reduced his responsibility for his actions. To further his ambitions and personal interests he has done plenty to establish an effective dyarchy in the country with unpredictable consequences. Only a gambler who has lost all restraint can behave like that.

Lastly, the speaker has proved himself an extremely vengeful, rancorous man, incapable of reaching an amicable arrangement for the sake of the cause, for the sake of the common good. This recalls the image of the "father of the peoples"—"Comrade Stalin"—who could only take refuge in treachery, but who never forgave what he considered a personal insult or slight. In short, we must not be misled about Ruslan Khasbulatov. This man will go to all lengths. He will undoubtedly be

defeated, but he will fight to the last. Compromise with him is impossible, or is only possible on his terms. And that is the same or roughly the same compromise as was possible with Stalin.

What Provoked the Speaker's Counterattack?

So, Ruslan Khasbulatov has switched to a vigorous counterattack. Why? To make up for his defeat in the referendum and devalue the president's success during the work of the Constitutional Conference? To delay the adoption of a new Constitution. To delay or remove altogether the issue of early parliamentary elections? And thus keep his post and postpone his political demise?

That is all true, but I am not convinced that this is the limit of Khasbulatov's appetites. He is quite possibly counting on perpetrating a constitutional coup as a result and, when the opportunity affords itself, securing the impeachment of the president. It is no coincidence that the speaker is trying so hard to cajole Aleksandr Rutskoy. With Rutskoy as acting president and a new government formed from communist-patriots, and with their total supremacy in parliament and at the congress, sheer tyranny is possible. Elections may not be held at all. You can even survive without a constitution.

Be that as it may, it seems to me that the speaker and the forces in our country acting with him or in parallel have never before launched such a broad counteroffensive. I admit that the opposition has also worked out a phased scenario for its actions. The brazen bluff, the attempt to convince Russian citizens that powerful forces are behind the "hard-liners" and "Khasbulatov's people," the attempt to intimidate certain representative of the progressive intelligentsia (I have just been reminded of that by a prominent Russian sociologist who has received telephone threats from "hard-line" supporters), and the dramatic increase in revanchist propaganda in the mass media all prompt the thought that there is such a scenario.

Let us remember that the communists and nationalists decided at the last congress of people's deputies to teach Khasbulatov a lesson by showing him who is actually master of the situation. The speaker learned his lesson, and since then you simply cannot recognize him. He veritably bends over backward to please the communists and the nationalists. Just what won't he do for that! Not only has he started lamenting the "values" of real socialism, which, to use his expression, "we are satanically trying to discard," not only does he yearn for the empire, and not only does he evaluate the country's present foreign policy from the standpoint of jingoistic patriotism, but he has also launched an "ideological purge" in parliament. Take the latest decisions that parliament adopted literally at the culmination of its work with Khasbulatov's vigorous participation!

Of course, the paradox is that the nationalists and the communists, who do in fact—however they may bluff—hold marginal positions in society, have become a crucial

force in parliament and at the congress. Historians of the future will spend a long time racking their brains as to how this could have happened after the abortive putsch in August 1991 and the victory of the antitotalitarian democratic revolution.

Soviets Plus National Salvation Front

The tactical devices and the main salients of the speaker's attacks are plain as day. The unification of all forces, including fellow travelers, capable of combating the "present regime," as the speaker says, using the soviets as a base. The attempt surreptitiously to overturn the principle of the separation of powers and establish the supremacy of the soviets, not only as the legislative but also as the executive power, moreover. The Supreme Soviet's interference in the activity of the executive is becoming unprecedented. A planned series of blows to the presidential authority, the president himself, and particularly his entourage with the aim of weakening and even neutralizing the president's activity and also discrediting the presidency as an institution. The aspiration to pose as champions of democracy and depict the president as a man hankering for dictatorship. The seizure of the mass media. The attempt to split the government. And, presumably, the usurpation of the entire fullness of power as the ultimate goal.

The speaker's activity clearly provoked the latest outburst of aggression on the part of the National Salvation Front [NSF], which at its Second Congress raised the issue of the need to switch to offensive tactics, the need to eliminate the institution of the presidency as such, which can mean only one thing if you read between the lines—the establishment of dictatorship proper in the country. But the president stands in the path of the extremists' dictatorship, and this causes them undisguised malice.

Another paradox of our postsocialist life is the fact that the activity of the extremist NSF is being directed by people's deputies. The extremism in parliament is stronger than the political extremism of the street, yet the extremism of the street is in stark contrast to the sentiments of the overwhelming majority of the population, who shun extremism. This is in itself an anomaly. It is ridiculous and intolerable. After this, need one be amazed that the extremist actions of the "hard-line opposition," including those involving fatalities, have effectively gone unpunished. While democratic figures are on the other hand losing their deputies' immunity with amazing ease. The following question arises: What is the nature of our Supreme Soviet led by Ruslan Khasbulatov today? Is it legitimate?

What Are the Conclusions?

ONE. The path of evolutionary, peaceful changes based on civil accord has effectively been rejected by the "hard-line opposition"—and it is the opposition, I stress, that now sets the tone in parliament and at the congress. There is every indication that the opposition is

ready for tough confrontation, if not civil war, and its illegal actions, particularly those designed to split the army, continue practically uninterrupted. There is no one to stop them. The legislature is unwilling and the executive unable within the framework of the current Constitution. It was the activity of the local NSF that in many respects provoked parliament's ill-conceived decision on the Sevastopol issue and called in question many vital interests of Russia and the Russians.

TWO. After the speaker, the Supreme Soviet leadership, and Vice President Rutskoy closed ranks with the communist-patriots and after the collapse of the so-called political center, the opposition effectively had nothing to counterbalance it in parliament other than the democratic forces, who are in a clear minority there. Mikhail Gorbachev, along with many Gorbachev supporters and reformers from the recent past, have also taken up an incomprehensible stance. The impression is that they have either been blinded by their animosity toward Yeltsin or have succumbed to a political night blindness and see nothing around them. Nor do I recognize many political scientists and journalists who are behaving as if they are at a feast during a plague. They scoff and swear and occupy a nihilistic instead of a civic stance, all the time waiting impatiently for "pure" democrats, a "civilized market"....

THREE—and possibly the main conclusion.

If we call a spade a spade, a conspiracy is gestating in the country. A conspiracy not so much against the president and the reform (whose task is to do away with the legacy of communism and put us on the road to a normal human life) as against the people and their will. The speaker, Rutskoy, and the entire "hard-line opposition" have refused to yield to the will of the people, who have expressed confidence in the president and given him the go-ahead to continue and deepen the reforms. They are doing everything they can to discredit the reforms and complicate and ultimately wreck their implementation. Obviously, they are counting on a drastic deterioration in the economic and social situation and on the emergence of mass protest demonstrations. That is what Rutskoy is saying openly. Failure to submit to the will of the people is also a conspiracy, comrade gentlemen.

LAST:

I have no doubt that the speaker and the entire "hard-line opposition" would suffer a crushing defeat in a head-on clash with the president, democrats, and everyone who has had enough of political intrigue and demagoguery and really wants profound social change rather than to mark time, much less turn back the clock. There will be no communist-patriotic dictatorship. What, however, is behind the fears? The hard times we are experiencing. The anarchy. The chaos we are gradually creeping into. I fear the intensified disintegration of Russia. I fear lest once again we become embroiled in an absurd war like the Afghan war. I fear an even greater

deterioration in people's standard of living, an even greater increase in crime, corruption, and so on.

We cannot resolve a single major national problem without a strong authority devoted to the people, to democracy, market relationships, and the principles of integration within the world community. Some day history will pass its verdict on those who have deliberately sown the seeds of dyarchy and disintegration, those who, to further their own ambitions and careerist aspirations, have toyed with the destiny of the nation and tried to transfer the confrontation between the authorities to the level of confrontation between citizens, to take matters as far as civil war.

I have no doubt that everything will ultimately return to normal. It is just a question of the price society will have to pay to normalize the life of society. And to ensure that this price is an acceptable one, that it is not paid in much blood, as happens in our country, the corps of deputies must be fully renewed. As soon as possible! Only elections can provide a civilized solution to the current highly acute crisis, not references to the sanctity of a Constitution inherited from another system and another state. Elections will speed the formation of a party system and may give us a real—and not a fictitious—political center as a possible alternative to the current democrats.

But, obviously, we cannot succeed without political will on the part of the president, without his adoption of thoroughly conceived but hard decisions. It is the president and certainly not Khasbulatov and company, parliament, or the congress on whom Russians are pinning their hopes for the future. Keep calm! Let us not be intimidated, much less demoralized. The anticommunist, antitotalitarian forces are a hundred times stronger than the revanchists.

Government Activities, Shakhray Comments Reported
PM2907132993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[Unattributed feature: "Executive Branch Monitoring"]

[Excerpts] Meetings, Trips, Conferences

Viktor Chernomyrdin, head of the Russian Government, has left Saratov and gone to Orenburg Oblast. The main themes of his discussion with representatives of the agrarian structures were problems of the region's agrarian policy.

On the evening of 28 July Viktor Chernomyrdin returned to Moscow, and today he chairs a session of the Council of Ministers Presidium. The Council of Ministers Presidium intends to discuss such questions as improving the activity of the state taxation service, the redemption of commodity debts under securities held by Russian citizens, and the financing of supplies of material assets to the state reserve as envisaged in the 1993 state defense order. [passage omitted]

First Vice Premier Oleg Lobov has received the leadership of the FRG firm Deutsche Babcock and then held talks with a Taiwanese delegation on transport questions.

First Vice Premier Oleg Soskovets took part in a session of the enlarged collegium of the Russian Federation Transport Ministry.

Vice Premier Aleksandr Shokhin held a working conference with experts from the Government Apparatus.

Vice Premier Anatoliy Chubays is on vacation through 7 August. [passage omitted]

Vice Premier Aleksandr Zaveryukha is on official business in Saratov.

Vice Premier Yuriy Yarov is in Yakutia attending an economic conference on questions of providing the kray with produce. Yuriy Yarov will then hold conferences in Anadyr, Magadan, and Vladivostok. The subject of the discussion—food supplies to the Far North.

Comments

There are three ways of overcoming the dyarchy, Vice Premier Sergey Shakhray stated. The first is for the new power to be born amid chaos and civil war; the second is for the new power to be born as a result of the victory of one side, as a result of a "palace coup"; and third and last is for the new power to be born as a result of compromise and the sides' agreement to put their fate in the hands of the voters. The attempts by the president and the government to adopt a new constitution are a conscious choice aimed at ending the dyarchy.

Documents

Boris Yeltsin, president of the Russian Federation, has issued an edict on measures to support peasant (private) farms and agricultural cooperatives. The edict is aimed at promoting the development of the private farming movement and establishing a private interfarm cooperative sector and a system of private farm self-management. [passage omitted]

Shumeyko Holds Conference on Financing Mass Media

LD2907174893 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] The following report has just reached us from the government press center: Vladimir Shumeyko, first deputy prime minister of the Russian Federation Government, held a conference on questions of financing the electronic mass media. I think that Mayak will be especially interested in this.

It has been found necessary to improve, in the shortest time possible, the system of financial mutual settlements, and also introduce a number of new parameters into them, and draw up practical measures to give state support to television and radio companies.

Broadcasting, Union Chiefs on Impending Air Time Cuts

MK2907130093 Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[Unattributed report: "'Communications Ministry Proposal is Unprecedented,' Thinks Kirill Ignatyev, First Deputy Chairman of 'Ostankino' Television and Radio Company"]

[Text] Kirill Ignatyev, first deputy chairman of the "Ostankino" Television and Radio Company, said yesterday that he categorically disagrees with the Russian Communications Ministry's suggestion for a 40 percent cutback in state-run television and radio air time. "One would like to believe that the point of view of the Russian Federation Communications Ministry is not the point of view of the government." This was his comment in an interview for an ITAR-TASS correspondent on the statement made by Deputy Communications Minister Mikhail Yelizarov at a Press and Information Ministry conference that discussed prospects of development of television and radio. Addressing the conference, Mikhail Yelizarov expressed sharp dissatisfaction with the contents of many radio and television programs and said he was convinced that broadcasting should be discontinued in the morning and afternoon hours, and late at night.

According to Kirill Ignatyev, "the attempt forcibly to curtail television broadcasting is unprecedented in peacetime." World experience shows, he stated, that "similar steps were taken by states solely in conditions of hostilities, or those beset by a dictatorship." Besides, with the realization of such a "project," he added, the Communications Ministry is endangering the existence of the single informational space.

Kirill Ignatyev highlighted the need for revising "the existing principles of financing television and radio. These principles are no different from the financing of Russian industrial enterprises." In his words, it is intolerable "to draw parallels between the workings of the electronic media and industrial production." This is all the more intolerable, he said, considering that, unlike the latter, television pays up to 80 percent of the budget-funded money to those same communications people for sending "the signal" on its way.

Kirill Ignatyev thinks in this connection that one way out of the predicament may be to discontinue provision to television and radio broadcasting of budget funds derived from taxes and to adopt instead direct financing based on subscribers' payments—like what people now pay for television antennas and landline radios—and on independent economic projects run by television companies.

Meanwhile, the Central Committee of the Communications Workers Trade Union has proposed to labor collectives of radio and television transmission enterprises in Russia to put off the planned transmission facilities switch-off till 12 August.

"We give the government one more chance to speedily solve the sector's pressing socioeconomic problems," an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told by the union's Central Committee Chairman A. Nazeykin as the reason for the postponement of the action, first scheduled for 27 July. Saying that, he referred to the cable he received shortly before from A. Bulgak, minister of communications, and A. Vavilov, Russian Federation first deputy finance minister, that points out that both agencies were actively pursuing the questions of how to offset the costs of a radio enterprise that transmits radio and television programs. A. Nazeykin reiterated some of the key demands of the labor collectives—indexation of the current tariffs, regular financing for television and radio companies, and compensation of inflationary losses owing to delayed payments.

Ostankino Official Interviewed

PM2907140793 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 7

[Interview with Kirill Ignatyev, acting chairman of the "Ostankino" television and radio company, by observer Valeriy Turovskiy; date and place of interview not stated: "...And Censorship Returns"]

[Text] Kirill Ignatyev, acting chairman of the "Ostankino" television and radio company, answers the questions of IZVESTIYA observer Valeriy Turovskiy.

[Turovskiy] Kirill Borisovich, over the past six months the Russian parliament and the committee for the mass media have adopted many decisions and decrees on television and radio broadcasting. Often they were adopted hastily, not to say in a fuss. This lawmaking fertility will hardly help to create friendly relations between the third and fourth powers.

[Ignatyev] I can say that recently, particularly since the April referendum, the attention of the Supreme Soviet leadership toward the mass media has been drastically sharpened. But a new motif has appeared in this sharpened attention. It is connected with the fact that the legislators are now making an attempt on the fourth power, using the methods of apparatus, corridor, silent politics, and are trying to keep their activity beyond the limits of public attention. Those are their offensive tactics.

There are three forms of legislative pressure on the mass media. The first is to create a financial crisis in the mass media—leaving them without finance, blocking their activity, and encouraging strikes in the printing plants.

The second form is control over the mass media and seizing leadership of them. That was manifested when, counter to the law on the mass media, the Supreme Soviet tried to subordinate IZVESTIYA to itself.

And the third form is interference in the professional activity of journalists' collectives, an attempt to restore censorship by creating oversight councils on radio and

television. Particular means are used in turn by the legislators, changing their tactic and strategy as they go along. The fruit of this activity by the legislators was the creation of the "RTV-Parliament" television and radio company, which represents one viewpoint. When they did not manage to seize state television and radio broadcasting they created their own.

But even after that the attempts to establish censorship on the content of information by no means ceased but were merely intensified.

For corroboration let us turn to the text of documents which have either already been adopted by the Supreme Soviet or are at the final stage of adoption. It is well known that after inadequate appropriations from the state budget, which is approved by the Supreme Soviet, all the biggest Russian television companies have found themselves on the verge of an unprecedented crisis. For instance, the financing needs of the "Ostankino" company are 160 billion rubles [R] yet this year the company can receive only R52 billion from the budget. The budget cannot satisfy even 50 percent of our requirements!

What are our legislators doing in this situation? Seeing our financial plight very well, they are making no efforts to help but instead are adopting at the first reading the law on the introduction of changes and additions to the law on the mass media, which states in particular that the financing of state television and radio companies is from the Russian Federation state budget. They are thus cutting off the possibility of the companies' independent financing from outside the budget.

In general terms the Supreme Soviet, while not giving us money, is forbidding us to earn our own. Where is this situation leading? To the point where by approximately the end of September all state television companies will be on the verge of collapse, on the verge of absolute bankruptcy. Broadcasting could stop. Our television sets will become blind and our radio receivers will become dumb.

But this plan is not so primitive as simply to seek to halt broadcasting by independent, "wayward" television and radio. Probably in September the Supreme Soviet will say: "Let's adopt a new law, let us subordinate the television and radio companies to ourselves and resolve all their financial problems. And let us introduce order in this confusion, let us allocate them money, but we shall allocate money only if we control these television and radio companies, subordinating them to ourselves."

[Turovskiy] Well, in this truly Kafkaesque forecast, if it comes to pass (and in Russia only the gloomiest forecasts come to pass) television viewers will be able to watch nothing but "Parliamentary Hour" at any time of day.

[Ignatyev] Yes, only it will be "Parliamentary Day."

[Turovskiy] Or to be even more precise "Parliament's Day."

[Ignatyev] Something like that. Very like that. They are trying with all their might to encourage a crisis in

television in order to acquire political influence and establish censorship. That is one aspect of the matter.

But at the same time in the same parliamentary documents on the electronic press there again surfaced the idea of oversight councils and in an utterly caricature-like form, but it is only to us that it looks like caricature. What are the functions of these oversight councils and primarily of the Federal Oversight Council, which in other parts of the same document is called the federal council for ensuring freedom of speech.

[Ignatyev] That is characteristic deputies' cynicism.

[Turovskiy] Indeed. So this council should provide equal opportunities for different political and public associations to set forth their views over the air. But the granting of airtime on television is strictly a matter for the television company.

The federal oversight council is designed to ensure effective coverage of sociopolitical events in the country. But where are the criteria of such "objectivity" in the deputies' council? How can that be ensured without interfering in the company's professional activity?

Virtually no one in television will be on the council and it will be ruled by nonprofessionals. And this organ formed from "factionalists" is being entrusted with monitoring broadcasting policy. Ninety-nine percent of the council consists of people who are delegated—with one representative from each registered faction of the congress of people's deputies.

[Turovskiy] One can see what kind of representatives they will be...

[Ignatyev] I can see too. In addition the council will include two representatives of the Russian Federation president, two representatives of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, and another two are elected for membership of the council by secret ballot at the journalists' congress.

[Turovskiy] So you see there will nonetheless be a whole two professionals on the council.

[Ignatyev] That's it—a whole two! But even then they will hardly be television or radio journalists, lawyers or sociologists. Considering the number of factions plus two members of the federal oversight council from the Supreme Soviet Presidium, a qualifying majority of four fifths of the votes is fundamentally assured here. In addition actions are planned to replace the leadership of the television companies. It is not for nothing that this plan, adopted at the first reading, states that the federal oversight council appoints and dismisses the leaders of all-Russian companies. These same representatives of the factions, the authors of this document, are planning to clear a path for themselves and join the television and radio companies as chairmen and deputy chairmen.

[Turovskiy] But then they will have to leave the council.

[Ignatyev] And they will. Their term is nonetheless running out and, you see, early elections are imminent. Of course, they will choose television so that they can wholeheartedly exercise control every minute.

[Turovskiy] That is natural. Without understanding anything, without doing anything or knowing how to do anything, it is very hard to make mistakes, to stumble. A sinecure for life is guaranteed.

[Ignatyev] The law on television and radio broadcasting which is being prepared contains the following "inventions": "The freedom of television and radio broadcasting is incompatible with permissiveness for teleradiojournalists, with their imposition of their own opinions on television viewers and radio listeners..." Incidentally, how do you like the word combination "teleradiojournalist?"

[Turovskiy] I prefer the word "centaur." It is more understandable.

[Ignatyev] All these provisions mean that journalists are forbidden to voice their opinion on the air—that means that programs like "Itogi," "Live Broadcasting Dialogue," "Moment of Truth," and "Public Opinion" will disappear. On the other hand the "Vremya" program will return, in which the journalist will be transformed into an announcer reporting impartial information without comment.

In addition the Supreme Soviet appoints 14 directors for each television company. The council of managers and Supreme Soviet henchmen should "define program policy..., approve the structure of programs (!)..., elaborate criteria for the production of programs and broadcasts depending on their type and purpose (!), approves the rules for internal routine," and even "approves the journalist's professional code!" Is that not tyranny and censorship?

Rutskoy Blames Media for Bias Against Him

LD2907185993

[Editorial Report] Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian at 1445 GMT on 29 July carries a 60-minute live interview with Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy by correspondent Rimma Altukhova on the "Parliamentary Hour" program.

Altukhova tells Rutskoy that many listeners have written to "Parliamentary Hour", asking why his latest interview with Karaulov on the "Moment of Truth" program appeared to be incomplete or deliberately edited. She invites Rutskoy to comment on this.

Rutskoy replies: "The important thing is that these programs came as a massive assault. There were no less than three of them in one week. First, there was 'Resonance' on 7 July, featuring lawyer Makarov, who is currently head of the interdepartmental commission for fighting corruption and crime. After that was Karaulov with Yakubovskiy, and then Politkovskiy's 'Politburo'.

They all used the same materials: a tape with a recorded conversation and a paper signed by me that contained suggestions to get some financing. All this was presented in such a way as to show who the real mafia in our country are, who is a corrupt bribe taker, and so on."

The video shows fragments of the aforementioned programs. Rutskoy says that all these programs have just one aim—to smear his public image and to clear Shumeyko from allegations of corruption. He claims his interview with Karaulov was heavily edited and parts of the interview in which he shows documentary evidence to Karaulov were not included in the program.

The video then shows a lengthy fragment from "Moment of Truth" that was omitted from the broadcast of the program, which shows Rutskoy showing Karaulov some documentary evidence in support of his allegations of Yakubovskiy's corruption and the way top officials were protecting him.

The video next shows a fragment of a foreign television documentary featuring a 1992 Christmas party in Yakubovskiy's house in Toronto. Karaulov is seen sitting next to Yakubovskiy.

Rutskoy talks about the special patronage Yakubovskiy seems to enjoy from Russia's leaders. He claims that anyone who does not wish to toady before the president eventually gets fired, as the recent case with Barannikov demonstrates.

The program ends as Rutskoy says to viewers that he will not give up his struggle against corruption. He asks viewers not to believe what the media is trying to make of him. He says that the media is trying to present him in a totally wrong light and is strongly biased. He talks in general terms about the problems of corruption and other problems of the Russian society.

Poll Shows Yeltsin's Approval Rating Falls

MK2907112093 Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 5

[Aleksandr Kinsburskiy report under the "NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA-VP Poll" rubric: "Yeltsin's Chief Success and Failure. Public Opinion Standouts Assess President's Performance in June"]

[Text] A survey has been conducted by the Vox Populi service (headed by B. Grushin) at the request of NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA using telephone interviews of those who have taken an active part in shaping and expressing the viewpoints and opinions of the broad masses and thus can justifiably be regarded as public opinion leaders. They included eight key groups—members of the Russian Supreme Soviet; heads of ministries and other federal executive agencies; leaders of political parties; directors of state enterprises; chiefs of nonstate businesses such as private, joint-stock, and joint-venture enterprises and commercial banks; representatives of the top military command; mass media

chiefs; and scientific and cultural figures. The poll was conducted between 1 and 9 July 1993 among a total of 400 people.

Regular public opinion polls among representatives of the Russian establishment make it possible to describe the curve of the combined average mark given to the Russian Federation president in the first six months of this year. On the whole, it fluctuated no more than 0.4 points in either direction on a 5-point scale, but for the most part tended toward "3" (satisfactory). The peak was reached in May when public opinion standouts assessed the president's main successes and failures against the backdrop of the results of the April referendum.

Two months later, in July, the average mark was down by 0.19 points, primarily due to two groups of those polled: entrepreneurs (0.48 points lower) and chiefs of federal executive authorities (0.44 points). The attitude of top brass and Russian Federation people's deputies to the president's performance, on the contrary, improved from May: by 0.18 and 0.11 points respectively. In all, according to the poll results Yeltsin's performance got the highest score from military commanders (3.44) and the lowest from political party leaders (2.52), especially those of Communist hues (1.92).

In the opinion of many representatives of the Russian elite, the key recent event against which the Russian Federation president's performance should be measured was undoubtedly the Constitutional Conference in Moscow. Over one-half of those polled judged its deliberations to be the president's main success or failure. The total balance of responses, however, was in Yeltsin's favor: There were twice as many positive assessments (37 percent) as negative ones (18 percent). More often than others, it was chiefs of ministries and other federal agencies (68 percent) and scientific and cultural figures (48 percent) who considered this event an asset for the president. The least enthusiastic group proved to be people's deputies, who, moreover, produced on the whole a negative balance: 12 percent (success) against 28 percent (failure). Notably, in the opinion of political party leaders, the Constitutional Conference proved as much an asset as a liability for Yeltsin: 12 percent against 12 percent.

The following fact appears fairly characteristic of the poll. When asked "What was Yeltsin most successful in? Which of his actions do you consider the most successful?" 22 percent of the public opinion standouts responded: "No successes" and 14 percent did not know or refused to answer. At the same time, when answering the question "What was Yeltsin's chief failure, his miscalculation, or maybe even his defeat?" only 4 percent said "No failures" and 20 percent did not know or refused to answer.

Judging by the information obtained, it can be presumed that President Boris Yeltsin (despite some success in the Constitutional Conference) has so far been unable to capitalize on the domestic policy gains he acquired in the

April referendum. His performance last month in other areas of public life should apparently be judged even less successful.

Changes in the average assessment of the Russian Federation president's performance (on a 5-point scale)

January—2.86
March—2.86
May—3.26
July—3.07

Balance of Boris Yeltsin's successes and failures last month (as percentage of those polled)

Areas of activity	Success (1)	Failure (2)	Difference (1)-(2)
Constitutional Conference	37	18	+19
Search for compromise with his opponents	3	3	0
Economic reform	1	2	-1
Management of economy	1	2	-1
Financial regulation	3	4	-1
Drafting of action plan	1	3	-2
Implementation of social programs	0	2	-2
Foreign policy	9	15	-6
Desire for confrontation with political opponents	0	6	-6

Economic Issues

Khasbulatov Report at Economic Conference

PM2907120793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "Ruslan Khasbulatov: 'The Economy Will Not Withstand Political Confrontation.' Report at the All-Russia Economic Conference" in Moscow on 27 July 1993]

[Text] From "Roundtable" to National Accord

The All-Russia Economic Conference is being held at a time which is unusual for such serious events—the time of summer vacations in most countries coincides with a political calm. This tradition was typical of our own society but, unfortunately, the summer of 1993 can certainly not be described as calm in Russia.

Society is tensely awaiting further developments, primarily of the socioeconomic and sociopolitical processes.

The population suffered the latest shock as a result of unilateral and unconsidered actions by the government and the Central Bank to forcibly withdraw old bank notes from circulation. This measure, apparently approved and implemented by the government, the president, and the Central Bank, is illegal, and the hasty attempts to amend the conditions of exchange are equally illegal. It would therefore be correct for the Central Bank to immediately respond to the statement by the Supreme Soviet chairman and rescind these decisions, something which obviously must be done today.

You know that inflation is galloping, but it is also true that production has yet to reach its lowest point of decline. June saw continued cutbacks in the extraction of oil, gas, and coal, while the output of chemical products, machine tools, motor vehicles, the most important categories of equipment, and foodstuffs continued to decline. The main point is that investments are declining, and this is a correct sign that no upturn in the economy is to be expected even in the long term. I think that there is not a single person, not just among politicians but also among all people who are worried about the country's future, who is not asking him- self: So what must be done to overcome as soon as possible the difficulties we are experiencing, to prevent the reforms for whose sake people have suffered so much from getting bogged down yet again?

In the most general terms the answer is, of course, obvious. We need profound, consistent, and actually comprehensive reforms of the economic and political systems along the avenue of society's democratization and a socially oriented market economy. There seems to be understanding and accord in society on this point. Especially since, for some time now, the idea of "socially oriented reforms" which we introduced has been used for two years now by the president, the government, and some leading entrepreneurs. The debate centers on other problems: What methods should be used to implement reforms, where should priority be given, are we not incurring far too high social costs for the radical change of our socioeconomic development's paradigms.

Unfortunately, the constitutional clamor over the last few months has diverted the attention of society, of parliament, and of the government from economic reform. Even though the political intrigues, the source of social tension and instability in society, are actually rooted in the economic difficulties, in our shared miscalculations and defeats (I would not like to single out any individual branch of power). In this context, the task of the All-Russia Economic Conference actually is to draw the whole of society's attention to the economy's problems and its reform, to take the debate outside the walls of parliament, the government, and academic auditoriums and submit it for an all-Russian businesslike discussion. Without any political intrigues.

The composition of participants presupposes a really businesslike discussion. The conference is attended by

eminent economists, specialists, scientists, and representatives of business circles, and this will certainly determine the high professional standards of the decisions to be adopted. It seems to me that there is full justification for expecting the conference to turn essentially into an all-Russian economic "roundtable" which will help us all—both legislators and government—to elaborate decisions which would rally society to the utmost around the idea of economic reform. This would be the logical continuation of the work done jointly by the Supreme Soviet and the government to elaborate a program of anticrisis measures and development of reforms, the beginning of which was marked by the decision of the Seventh Congress of People's Deputies.

For about five months the "roundtable" participants sought a way to achieve social accord on the most acute questions of economic reform. The result was the signing of the Declaration of Nationwide Economic Accord. This is an exceptionally important stage, without precedent in the time since first the Union, and then the Russian Federation and other countries, took the path of implementing economic reform. Unfortunately, society evidently underestimates the fact of the accord achieved on the question of economic reform, and I think that this document must be publicized as widely as possible so that the ideas contained in the nationwide economic declaration can be implanted in our compatriots' minds. People must really perceive that there are mighty forces, both in parliament and in the government, willing and able to eliminate the sundry conflicts which are artificially imported into our society.

It is hard to exaggerate the importance of this fact in our uneasy sociopolitical life. First, this is the first ever document prepared on the basis of consensus in the course of Russia's reforms. Second, it lays down a whole series of fundamental value guidelines, bringing us closer to a better understanding of the society we are building. This means the emergence of a base on which we could develop in detail various aspects of economic reform.

Third, in the conditions of establishing a genuine multi-party system in society, the "roundtable" represents quite a good channel of communications between parliament and the government and the parties, movements, and sundry public associations which have emerged in the recent past. It is important to ensure that both the Supreme Soviet and the government embark on the practical fulfillment of these decisions and recommendations, precisely within the framework of this accord. After all, if the measures for the exchange of bank notes, for example, had been implemented within the declaration's framework, the effect would have been completely different. At the same time, it is obvious that it is necessary to extend as widely as possible the sphere of influence of the accord achieved at the "roundtable," bringing into its orbit new participants and new strata of society.

Another equally important task is to prepare for the next Congress of People's Deputies to actually tackle the

problems of economic reform. In accordance with a decision adopted earlier, this Congress should have been held first in April, and then in June this year. But the holding of two extraordinary congresses in a row, coupled with the lack of a government program for anticrisis measures, necessitated amendments. We believe that this conference will help to prepare the various sections of such a program with a view to having it further discussed at a Congress of People's Deputies.

We Are Being Driven Toward the Status of Raw Material Appendage

The government and the Supreme Soviet will certainly expound their views of the situation. Business meetings were held shortly beforehand at the Supreme Soviet with representatives of the timber industry, leaders of defense and machine building enterprises, bankers and business circles, and agrarians. Parliamentary hearings were held on the banking system, and a series of economic conferences were held, organized by various parliamentary factions.

Of course, it is hard to foresee at the start of our work the contents of the documents which will be adopted. But they should obviously include recommendations on the solution of the most acute problems facing Russia's economy. Primarily on overcoming the slump in production, curbing hyperinflation, and preventing mass unemployment and people's impoverishment. Finally, it is necessary to decide the nature of the development of economic, technological, and production ties with our good neighbors, the CIS countries, and priority should certainly be given to relations with them.

The reforms will inevitably get bogged down if they continue to produce a catastrophic decline of people's living standards. This is why the legislators constantly draw attention to this knot of problems and insist on state support for science, education, public health, and culture. We cannot, we have no right to, allow any curtailment of the social base of reforms. This is where the main danger lies, not in the fact that some people somewhere might be red, black, or brown.

It is necessary to propose economic mechanisms for implementing the Federation Treaty, which incorporates the structure of the budgetary system, the principles of taxation policy, the distribution of powers between the Federation and the Federation's components, and so on. Incidentally, enough superficial opinions have been expressed hitherto about the Federation Treaty. I would like to remind many people, especially those adopting such a condescending attitude toward it, that the emergence of the Union Treaty's problems in society in the past and the failure to complete this process ultimately resulted in the Union's disintegration. These disintegrational tendencies have made their presence very powerfully felt on the Russian political scene as well, and had we not concluded the Federation Treaty in good time,

despite certain defects contained in it, it is difficult to say whether we would have been able to assemble here today or not.

Third [as published], it is extremely important to pursue and consolidate the policy of accord and constructive collaboration in the process of implementing economic reforms. The crisis has affected our country's entire socioeconomic system, the process whereby vitally important categories of production are disappearing is virtually under way, there is a danger of losing the production potential for meeting the population's elementary needs. Machine building is under threat of collapse, especially the high technology sectors; the current forms of conversion are virtually destroying them. Private farming is a "washout." We cannot nurture any illusions about the 200,000 private farmers who, statistics tell us, are currently registered—the number of proper commodity producers among them hardly reaches 2,000-3,000. Many agricultural enterprises, including former major kolkhozes and sovkhoses—which, by the way, are now turning into agro-companies—are also on the point of disappearing.

You may recall the stormy discussions we had about the budget amendments. Parliament disagreed with the government's proposal not to go ahead with indexation of minimum wages and pensions and to sharply reduce the proportion of expenditure on social and cultural needs, education, science, and public health. Nor did the deputies back the government's proposal for an additional social tax of 7 percent on the added value of goods being sold, subject to the conditions and procedures laid down by the Russian Federation Law "On Value Added Tax." Up to 85 percent of earned revenues already go on taxes and mandatory payments. Commodity producers are literally groaning under the burden of tax liabilities, and therefore it was no accident that I proposed cutting by one-half the taxes on commodity producers. Afterwards, once this cut has taken effect, we could move on to a more differentiated definition of tax rates by sectors, production spheres, and so on. A 7-percent increase of the tax rate would boost tax collection by some R2.5 trillion but it would also result in a further inflationary rise of the cost of output by R4.5-5 trillion. Judge for yourselves how well-considered this proposal is, especially bearing in mind the struggle against inflation, about which so much has been said. Incidentally, the Ministry of the Economy took a completely different stance, proving the need to enhance the investments sphere and develop housing construction, the agro-industrial complex enterprises, federal road building, and credits for fundamental science programs. Questions concerning the investments program were the topic of a special examination in parliament and were analyzed in committees and commissions, thus making it possible to find additional sources of finance.

The deputies' desire to at least protect the interests of the population and of the national economy's base sectors is often depicted as populism, while the decisions adopted

by them are perceived as nothing but dangerous inflationary swelling of the money supply. For some reason our critics are stubbornly unwilling to note such economically important consequences of the adopted decisions as the maintenance and even enhancement of the population's effective demand. After all, the catastrophic decline of demand, by curbing the consumption sphere, actually aggravates the slump in production, which is happening now. This aspect is as important as the actual stabilization of the finance and credit sphere. All these are inseparably interlinked.

During the discussion of budgetary questions, the parliamentarians were justified in noting that the main sources of budgetary deficit and inflationary spirals now also include foreign trade operations, the flight of capital to foreign bank accounts, the country's dollarization, the unregulated cash circulation, and the growing might of the black economy. The government's efforts to solve these problems have been totally inadequate so far. Even decisions adopted by the government itself, the president, and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet are not being implemented. Let me cite just one example, the occasion when the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Budgetary Control Committee had to be involved in a special investigation of the situation regarding the acquisition of credits to finance defense industry conversion programs and investment programs.

It is well known that on 2 June 1993 Russia's Supreme Soviet adopted a decree on the granting of government credits for conversion and investment programs during the second quarter of 1993. The Central Bank concluded credit agreements with the Ministry of Finance to grant credits of R300 billion to finance defense industry conversion programs and R400 billion to finance investment programs. In accordance with these agreements, the Central Bank of Russia credited the Ministry of Finance current account with the relevant amounts on 28 and 30 June. But to this very day we still do not know whether the Ministry of Finance met its own commitments.

Make your own appraisal of the telegrams being sent by the Ministry of Finance to the regions, trying to somehow shift the blame onto the Supreme Soviet. Here we are again coming up against some incomprehensible political intrigues. It is no accident that at its final sitting, the Supreme Soviet instructed the General Prosecutor's Office, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the Ministry of Security to tackle directly the Ministry of Finance which does not implement the Russian Federation laws. This is also necessary because recently we have been increasingly often coming up against attempts to actually replace constitutional practice with such autocratic and neototalitarian methods.

Citing commitments to the IMF, the Ministry of Finance is prepared to ruin the country.

The result of this practice can be judged by the fact that to this day virtually not a single international machine building company has made any sizeable investment in

our economy. At the same time, there is vast interest in raw material resources and a growing tendency toward the exportation of raw materials from the country. This tendency was typical of the country during the sixties when the exports of raw materials and semimanufactures accounted for 78 percent of total exports, while finished products accounted for only 22 percent. By 1990 raw materials exports had reached 83 percent, with finished products accounting for 17 percent. The results for 1992 showed that exports of raw materials and semimanufactures are already accounting for 93 percent. There you have the real results of two years of reforms.

Yes, Russia's role is growing but only as a raw materials appendage of the world economy. This is no accident. We are seeing Russia's integration in the world economy as a third-rate country. Through the involvement of raw materials regions in the sphere of international division of labor. There are, incidentally, serious political factors emerging against this background—in the form of tendencies toward disintegration which are frequently manifest in the regions' policies, when the center lacks sufficiently clear perception of the processes under way. It is necessary to bear in mind that, by destroying the advanced technologies, especially as a result of the current investments policy, we could end up lagging behind forever. The defense, space, and all other sectors of machine building will be ruined. The point is that the modern technological revolution is qualitatively different from all its earlier stages—those who lag behind are doomed to remain laggards for ever, for eternity.

Another tendency, which we first noticed in December last year and is already clearly visible, has already become stable: the growing mortality rate among the population, the excess of mortality over birth rate. In the first place, it is obviously a question of the quality of nutrition. This naturally affects the individual, his family, and society as a whole. Having consequently lost many of its moral and ethical mainstays, a sizeable proportion of society finds itself in a state of degradation and decay, crime and corruption are swelling. The state is losing the effectiveness of protective mechanisms (and this is a very important trend), disappointment has gripped the bulk of the population, and young people are increasingly losing their faith in the reformers. It has finally become clear that the actual methods and means for effecting economic changes, mainly the pernicious monetarist mechanism for achieving the set guidelines (and the present government remains a captive of this mechanism), are certainly not the methods and means which will extricate the economy from the crisis. Incidentally, not a single country, be it developed or developing, has ever yet achieved the desired economic effect with the help of monetarist models. There is just one single reason: As a rule, the implementation of the ideas of monetarism has blown apart the social situation and governments have sensibly refused to follow this model. Yet, for two years now people in our country have been trying with manic stubbornness to uphold these very approaches.

Specialists—experienced economists, entrepreneurs, scientists, and Russian and foreign experts who are well aware of what the market is—are unanimous that the economy is approaching a state of collapse, a situation whereby the elementary components of productive forces are being autonomously ruined. This will mean the total disappearance of any opportunity to create competitive market conditions. And the national economy is being transformed into weak regional enclaves operating on the basis of barter.

Over a six-month period the new government has undertaken almost nothing to remedy the mistakes committed in 1992. What is happening under the guise of privatization is that the most technologically advanced shops and subdivisions are being literally torn away from the structures of major associations, as a result of which all these production units are practically doomed to perish. We must do some serious work here to regulate this process. But each attempt by parliament to embark on discussion of the privatization program and the regulatory elements introduced in it produces a fit of hysterics. But this does not at all mean that parliament will abandon its policy of imposing order in the economy. There is no need to whip up tension. This will not scare us off, in my view we have already proved this. We will impose order come what may.

Dangerous processes are under way in the countryside. Today we are forced to reduce the livestock headcount, often including the headcount of pedigree herds, something which was not allowed to occur even during the critical war years. This has already resulted in a sharp decline of the production of meat and milk, which have always been in short supply. At the same time, in the current conditions a series of republics, oblasts, krais, and okrugs have no markets for their meat and milk. Meanwhile these products are being bought for foreign currency. All this is a reflection of the fact that the new government leaders have not utilized the potential for positive changes presented by the Seventh Congress. I think that our conference could adopt a declaration—address to the rural workers which, in parallel with outlining the countryside's immediate needs, should lay down a program of measures to salvage agriculture.

It is necessary to implement the idea of an effective federal government which could really improve the state of the economy and be really accountable for the state of affairs in the country. Nothing will change in the country if we do not change the situation, if we are left with a flabby [rykhlyy] executive who is not accountable to parliament. The government must be accountable to one supreme organ—exclusively to parliament. The Supreme Soviet has embarked on a course of constructive businesslike work with the government. The necessary laws are being adopted, existing laws are being amended, we immediately discuss any amendments proposed by the government. The only limitation is that we cannot allow any breach of the law. That happened in years past, in the era of the dominance of communist structures according to accepted parlance, the radicals are making

intense efforts to implant this practice again, but we will block it most resolutely: the law, the law, and nothing but the law.

Policy Amendments Are Necessary

The development of the situation has confirmed the conclusions by a whole series of previous congresses about the need for fundamentally amending the actual models of economic reform, for a transition from monetarist-liberal paradigms of transformations to a socially oriented mixed market economy. Let me once again outline the features of the proposed model. It will be based upon the free coexistence of different forms of ownership, effective social functions by the state, and indicative planning and forecasting. As you know, this avenue is basically typical of most countries, including Europe, Scandinavia, Israel, and Canada. This path has also been taken by Turkey, India, South Korea, Egypt, China, and Vietnam, as well as the fast developing countries in Asia, Latin America, and the Arab East. All these countries have a very developed mixed economy, which is becoming a worldwide trend. It would be naive to try and ignore this, striving to Americanize our economy. Each form of ownership has its own niche in a mixed economy and satisfies society's relevant needs. Consequently, a move toward modern forms of socially oriented market economy must become the strategy for future actions. This development and deepening of reforms is advocated by the country's main political movements, business circles, and population. These ideas are also reflected in the Declaration on Nationwide Economic Accord, which I mentioned at the start of my report.

It ought to be noted at this point that there are general avenues for practical actions which are recommended by all specialists for the country's extrication from the crisis.

First. To set as a starting point not only and not so much macrostabilization, but the factor of improving the conditions of people's life and work, developing the consumer sector as the key avenue, and deepening reforms. This is the only possible way to really expect an expansion of the social base of reforms, without relying on propaganda.

Second. To fundamentally analyze and define the correlation of different forms of ownership in the economy, at least for the next five years. This approach will make it possible to map out at least the outlines of a mixed economy. The central element would be a clear definition of the state sector, of its limits and criteria. Here we can actually apply the experience of many countries which can certainly not be dubbed antimarket (Germany, France, Austria, Italy, Canada). To utilize the state sector's potential by encouraging to the utmost its market and competition features, to consistently transform ownership relations with due consideration for their specific national-state and territorial features and the demands of the social orientation of the

reforms being implemented, and to transfer the state enterprises themselves to a regime of autonomous corporation operations.

Third. Not to allow any further slump of production, to create breeding grounds for its growth in each region, to organize the selective training of personnel for future progressive structural changes. Incidentally, this trend is very clearly visible in a whole series of regions whose leaders have abandoned all hope that a savior in the form of the federal center will hasten to assist them.

Fourth. To stimulate reforms from below, to actually implement the idea voiced by us back in 1991 that the reforms ought to switch to the regions. It is very good that recently the government has been inclining toward an understanding of this idea, the only pity is that regional conferences are still, for some reason, used for purely propaganda purposes. Generally speaking, a rather interesting castling move has taken place in our country: Parliament, which is always and everywhere a political instrument, is becoming a lever for the implementation of actual economic reforms, while the government, which should be engaged in economic affairs, is becoming a political propaganda instrument.

Fifth. To ensure real priority for the development of the economy's agrarian sector via a price regulation policy. Let us recall the 32 percent of the EC's consolidated budget is allocated for the regulation of agricultural production.

Sixth. To actively promote the development of small-scale enterprise, utilizing this sector's ability to respond swiftly to consumer demand.

Seventh. To ensure considered decisions, accountability, and constructive cooperation between parliament, the government, and the president in the cause of implementing economic reform. People everywhere, especially in the regions, are saying that society can no longer tolerate the existing confrontation and these contradictions. They are all fed up with sundry declarations by both sides. The time has come for us all to jointly tackle the same job—we have the same country, the same economy, the same citizens.

Eighth. To observe the priority of our country's interests, including the interests of our own entrepreneurs. To provide a legislative base to underpin both the "open doors" policy and the policy of protectionism as regards our own firms (both state and nonstate). Here we need a thorough revision of foreign economic activity, which has been implemented to the detriment of state-national interests. This is an exceptionally important point, bearing in mind that recently we have been nurturing too many illusions, broadly introducing the relevant legislative amendments to current legislation in the assumption that our firms will actually gain free access to Western markets. Business circles have probably seen for themselves that this is a very, very complex matter. East

Europe attempted to somehow integrate and join the world market, but it has simply not been allowed to do so to this day.

About legislative backup for reforms by the Supreme Soviet.

It is important to renounce in deed, rather than just in words, all actions which destabilize the political situation, to solve emerging contradictions between the legislature and the executive without threats and blackmail, calmly and amicably; this is demanded by society today, and it is already being demanded quite firmly. This has to be done, there is no other sensible way. We, the Russian parliament—the plenipotentiary representatives of society—propose this strictly peaceful and businesslike approach for the sake of civic accord, for the sake of national reconciliation, for the sake of the supreme interests of our country's peoples.

Esteemed meeting participants, I would like to note that, despite the exceptionally complex political and psychological situation in which people's deputies worked, the sixth session [of the Supreme Soviet] was exceptionally productive in comparison with all previous sessions. It lasted six months, there were 54 joint sittings and 20 separate sittings by each Supreme Soviet chamber. They examined over 600 questions. They adopted the final version of 107 laws, and more than 30 draft laws were given their first reading. They also adopted 146 normative decrees. The bulk of the legislative acts which were adopted are aimed at solving socioeconomic questions and reform questions—141 of them, including 69 on citizens' social protection, 34 on ensuring the state's constitutional development, and 40 on implementing judicial reform and improving the work of law enforcement organs. There were 30 questions examined in connection with foreign policy and international relations.

As you can see, the Supreme Soviet actually focused its attention on society's sore spots. Three-fourths of the legislative acts examined by the session were elaborated in the chambers' commissions and the Supreme Soviet's committees. Three-fourths—what does this mean? This means that these three-fourths should actually have been submitted by the government of reformers. As conditions change, the government (the main instrument for the implementation of policy) must submit to the legislative organ the necessary draft laws. But this had to be done by the Supreme Soviet.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize the importance of accord and compromise, to emphasize yet again their topicality in our stormy sociopolitical life. The "round-table" showed that society is capable of arriving at compromise provided there is a desire to achieve accord; generally speaking, at a time of danger all societies have always found the courage and energy to concentrate on the solution of the main problems, the main questions. These main questions now are the deteriorating situation of people, the disruption of economic ties, and the course of economic reform as a whole. We have a real opportunity to pull society away from the brink of civil war.

Serious work lies ahead of us, I think that we will succeed in working out important documents which will, to a certain extent, become guidelines for legislators and the government's practical work, they will introduce clarity in the perception of the need to coordinate the activity of the federal center and the regions without which it will be altogether impossible to engage in any normal economic activity, let alone large-scale economic reforms.

Further Reaction to Withdrawal of Bank Notes

Bank Must Be Subordinate to Government

LD2907152093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1100 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] The public committee of Russian democratic organizations and the Union of Russian Cossack troops have made a joint statement today in which they rated the decision of the Russian Central Bank on the exchange of bank notes a political provocation that aimed to cause dissatisfaction among the population with the president and the government, and, in essence, with the course of reforms that was backed by citizens during the referendum of 25 April 1993.

They demanded the immediate resignation of Central Bank Chairman Viktor Gerashchenko. Two public organizations have also raised the issue of the Central Bank being subordinate to the government.

Bank Aide Explains Decision

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["Topical Interview" with Aleksandr Khandruyev by Andrey Sharapov; date and place not given: "Aleksandr Khandruyev: The Supreme Soviet Did Not Know That an Exchange of Money Was Being Prepared"]

[Text] The All-Russia Economic Conference discussed mainly strategic questions of the development of Russia's economy. However, bothersome questions did not escape attention, and perhaps the most important among them was the exchange of bank notes. We approached Aleksandr Khandruyev, deputy chairman of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation, for a comment on the process of exchanging bank notes of the 1961-1992 type.

[Khandruyev] Many rumors and conjectures are circulating today concerning the exchange of bank notes of the 1961-1992 type. First of all, I want to stress that there can be no question of any monetary reform, still less of confiscatory measures with regard to Russian citizens.

The Central Bank used two schemes for withdrawing the old money. The soft scheme that was implemented from the beginning of the year consisted of gradually withdrawing the old bank notes. However, increasing negative tendencies (in particular, the "dumping" of old notes from outside Russia's borders) forced us to resort to the second scheme—the tough exchange option.

The initial limit of 35,000 rubles [R] on the amount of bank notes that could be exchanged was based on thorough calculations. If the R247 billion of the "old money" in circulation were shared out among all the inhabitants of Russia, there would be an average of R10,000-15,000 per person. Average pay in June came to R45,000-47,000, whilst most benefits, grants, and pensions were significantly less than this sum. Estimates put the figure at an average of R35,000. There was also one more important aspect. It is no secret that a definite proportion of the money is in the sphere of fiddled accounts and the so-called "dirty" [gryaznogo nala] of corporate bodies. [sentence as published] It was very important that corporate bodies handed in the old bank notes on 26 July to bank institutions (where they will be certified), and did not release them into private circulation. Therefore, we already had proposals prepared to increase the time limit and the amount of bank notes that could be exchanged. These amendments were to have been made, and were made following the president's edict after 26 July, when corporate bodies were obliged to hand over their old bank notes.

[Shapurov] The exchange of bank notes has become a kind of political "heavy artillery" weapon, which the executive power, in particular, is using to make accusations against the Supreme Soviet. Does parliament accept responsibility for this measure?

[Khandruyev] In accordance with the law on the monetary system the Central Bank has the right to withdraw bank notes from circulation without consultation. The bank cannot introduce new notes, but that is not what we have done. This indication alone is enough to suggest that there can be no question of monetary reform. Of course, only a strictly limited circle of people should have known about the measure being planned. The top leadership of the Russian Federation was informed about the decision to switch from the soft to the tough scheme of exchange. At the same time the Central Bank assumed full responsibility for the planned measure. According to the tradition prevailing in the banking business, when central banks make decisions they proceed on the basis that the measures in question are prepared under conditions of strict secrecy, and the bank itself carries the responsibility for these measures.

All conjecture concerning the Central Bank's decision or attempts to drive a wedge between the legislature and the executive and the Central Bank or to earn political dividends from this are, from my point of view, beyond the bounds of ethics.

I can confirm that the chairman of the Supreme Soviet spoke the truth in his television statement: The Supreme Soviet did not know of the planned exchange of bank notes. It was the desire not to give this measure any political coloring which determined the fact that the Central Bank at once assumed full responsibility.

I earnestly advise Russian citizens who do not envisage immediate expenditure not to crowd outside the savings

banks. You can exchange your money calmly. Modification in the rules of exchanging bank notes in the interests of Russian citizens is entirely possible. Do not trust opportunists who engage in "buying up" old bank notes. In all exceptional circumstances (funerals, illnesses, vacations) your money will be exchanged.

Once more I wish to stress that the measures taken enable us to get out of a definite financial impasse. Russia now has monetary units of full value on a level with the state flag. Russian citizens henceforth have the maximum protection against forged money infiltrating into circulation, or the "dumping" on the Russian economy of old rubles from outside.

Constitutional Court Rejects Criticism

PM2907154793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[Russian Federation Constitutional Court Press Service statement: "The Constitutional Court Disagrees with ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI"]

[Text] T. Sadkovskaya's report "Constitutional Court Stays Silent. But Who Will Defend People?" published in ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI on 27 July requires certain revisions, in the view of the Constitutional Court press service.

The article's criticisms of the Constitutional Court for the absence of an official assessment of certain decisions by the Russian Federation Central Bank which infringe civil rights were clearly due to the author's inadequate information about the legal statutes governing the court's activity.

Under the law, the Constitutional Court (like the Supreme Court and the Higher Arbitration Court) does not have the right to give any "official assessments" but merely adopts judicial acts—decrees, decisions, and rulings.

The Constitutional Court (let us recall that it is the supreme organ for the protection of the constitutional system) has been closely monitoring the development of events over the currency reform and the actions of the corresponding legal structures and has noted with satisfaction the proper reaction of the Russian General Prosecutor in appealing against the decision on the compulsory payment into deposit accounts in Savings Bank establishments of amounts of money held by citizens in excess of 35,000 rubles [R]. Incidentally, raising the ceiling to R100,000 changes nothing in principle in respect of the juridical qualification of the legal acts as a breach of the right of citizens to own property.

In conditions whereby the proper legal institution has adopted the necessary actions under the law to protect citizens' rights and interests it is scarcely expedient for the supreme organ for the protection of the constitutional rule of law in the country to hastily adopt decisions in violation of the letter of the law.

The reference in the report to the Constitutional Court's prompt actions in connection with the events of 20 March, when the court, observing all the procedures of constitutional justice, produced a ruling (not an assessment) on the constitutionality of actions (not normative acts), was clearly due to an inadequate knowledge of the subject which formed the subject of the report.

The court has never been guided by considerations of political expediency, nor did it intend on this occasion either to become involved in a political race (thereby acting contrary to the Law on the Constitutional Court) organized by certain officials trying to distance themselves from the Central Bank's unpopular decision.

Trade Official Views Exchange

PM3007082993 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI Correspondent conversation with German Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the Russian State Committee for Economic Cooperation With the Commonwealth Member States, under the rubric "Keeping Tabs on the Situation": "Russia Has Introduced National Currency"]

[Text] Russia has introduced a national currency—that is how German Kuznetsov, first deputy chairman of the Russian Federation State Committee for Economic Cooperation With the Commonwealth Member States, characterized the Russian Federation Central Bank's recent decision to remove Soviet rubles from circulation and exchange them for 1993 issue bank notes when he talked with your ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI correspondent.

This measure is aimed primarily at protecting national interests and the internal Russian market. As is well known, many states in the CIS have already introduced their own national currency and others intend doing so in the near future. The Russian ruble (1993 issue) will protect the country's internal market against the intervention of Soviet rubles released by the introduction of national currencies in the republics of the former USSR.

In German Kuznetsov's opinion, the steps taken by the Central Bank will not have an adverse effect on Russia's trade and economic cooperation with the CIS countries. The existence of their own currencies, he said, does not stop anyone from trading successfully and cooperating productively. Recently, by the way, the [exchange] quotation of the national currencies of CIS countries has been used in settlements.

As for the states which are only intending to introduce a national currency but at the moment are remaining in the ruble zone, (such as Turkmenistan for example), we are ready on the appropriate terms to help them resolve the cash problem and also sell them the necessary quantity of new Russian rubles for hard currency.

Nuclear Plant Chiefs' Complain to President, Premier

MK2907131093 Moscow FEDERATSIYA in Russian No 84, 29 Jul 93 (signed to press 28 Jul) p.1

[Igor Mosin of "NEKOSA" press service report: "Atomic Facilities Chiefs Accuse"]

[Text] Directors of Russia's nuclear power stations and enterprises of the nuclear fuel complex have addressed an open letter to Russian President B. Yeltsin and Council of Ministers Chairman V. Chernomyrdin.

They remind the state leaders that nuclear power engineering is Russia's only sector that is operating on a stable basis. A grave situation now prevails in the sector. The money for the transmission of electrical power from nuclear, thermal, and hydropower plants to the population and enterprises is collected by the Russian Joint-Stock Company "YeES Rossii" [Single Power Grid of Russia]. Today's debt of the Russian Joint-Stock Company to nuclear plants runs to nearly 70 billion rubles.

There were several decisions of the Russian Federation Government and Central Bank obliging the Russian Joint-Stock Company's president A. Dyakov to pay up the debts for the energy received. But A. Dyakov does not seem to give a damn for all the decisions of state organs.

The situation is becoming critical at the plants. There is no money to pay wages. As winter draws near, scheduled repairs should be carried out, but there are no funds. The safety of nuclear plants' operations is steadily falling.

The nuclear facilities directors think that chiefs of the Russian Joint-Stock Company with A. Dyakov as its head are doing considerable moral, political, and economic damage to Russia. Their actions betray clear elements of willfulness. The inaction of state authorities in respect to the Russian Joint-Stock Company in the given case is a crime.

Chernomyrdin Signs Subsidy Decision on Coal

LD3007100093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0900 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin has signed a decision on measures for providing state support for the coal industry. The support will be provided by subsidies from the republican budget, budget allocations for centralized capital investments, and other budget means.

Provisions have also been signed on transferring to the use of free prices for coal, shale, and products processed from them. Chernomyrdin has established a precise mechanism for determining the industry average essential base prices for coal products.

Government Decision Raises Domestic Gas Prices

LD2907190193 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 1430 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Gas prices were raised beginning 20 July under a decision made by the Russian Government. A state wholesale price of 7,900 rubles [R] per 1,000 cubic meters of gas has been set for gas marketing organizations. For commercial customers, the cost of gas will R9,000 per 1,000 cubic meters, but the public will be charged R2,000 per 1,000 cubic meters. The wholesale price of gas used to be R1,420 per 1,000 cubic meters. The public was charged R600 per 1,000 cubic meters.

Tax Inspectorate To Augment Personnel, Computers

LD2907114693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1116 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Ivan Ivanov]

[Text] Moscow July 29 TASS—The Presidium of the Russian Government has decided to increase the number of tax inspectors and use computer technology on a wider basis to increase the efficiency of Russia's tax service.

The head of the Russian Tax Inspectorate, Vladimir Gusev, said that tax revenues totalled 12.8 trillion rubles and 122 million U.S. dollars since the beginning of the year. He also pointed out that tax revenues grow by about 18.9 per cent a month, almost catching up with the wholesale price growth rate.

Speaking about lost tax revenues, Gusev described as "ungrounded" reports which say that up to 30 to 40 per cent of the total tax revenues never reach state coffers. He believes this figure is around 15 per cent, blaming the situation on tax dodgers and the continuing payment crisis.

Gusev stressed the need to "further develop the mechanism of tax collection," adding that most problems arise during the collection of taxes from enterprises and private businesses which deal with cash. He also called for the earliest possible introduction of teller machines for conducting financial operations.

He said every rouble invested in the development of the Russian tax service will bring 16 to 18 roubles in tax revenues.

Commodity Producers To Review Structure, Aims

PM2907133393 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jul 93 First Edition p 2

[Vitaliy Kovalenko report: "Change of Leader. Industrialists Elect Yuriy Skokov"]

[Text] The Federation of Russian Commodity Producers Coordinating Council has met in Moscow to discuss the socioeconomic situation in the country. Both main speaker Aleksey Shulunov and the other speakers were

extremely brief. The country is at the end of its tether, everyone is suffering from the same thing and suffering identically, while no positive changes can be seen. Complete unanimity of assessments and positions was demonstrated by "sovkhoz general" Mikhail Lapshin and private farmer Aleksandr Yezhikov, by military-industrial complex representative Nikolay Mikhaylov and Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia Deputy Chairman Vasilii Romanov. Differences were revealed only in ways of reacting to the idea of picketing Staraya Ploshchad until the Congress of People's Deputies has been convened and a new government chosen. Because normal working contact between the current government and the Federation of Commodity Producers has failed to materialize. Although it was this contact on which hopes were pinned and the most comprehensive efforts were made.

Yuriy Skokov's approval as chairman of the Federation of Russian Commodity Producers Council put an end to the debate. Or rather his speech did, which he began by declaring that he was pleased to be addressing those present again and simultaneously the colleagues they were representing. I would especially single out three things from his speech.

First, the directors' psychology. Although they consider themselves—and are generally justified in doing so—the backbone holding the economy together, even now old habit forces them to seek the tallest of the secret doors behind which justice is concealed. So they have cause to unite in order to solve three possible tasks: to make it easier to request, to demand, or—what I thought was the most preferable option for the author—to sort out the situation, devise decisionmaking mechanisms, and put them into effect for themselves. Relying once again primarily on themselves.

The second thing is the attitude toward reform. One of the most widespread clichés of the last 18 months was the accusation that the opposition was trying to propose an alternative to the government program of reforms. But, as Skokov justifiably comments, there can only be an alternative to something that exists. Neither Gaydar's team nor the present government has had or has any program. Consequently creating one is a top-priority, inescapable task. If, of course, we are interested in real reforms rather than simply in a power struggle.

Finally, the third thing is linked to Skokov's request that he be given the job of carrying out a review of the existing structure of the Federation of Commodity Producers. In his opinion regional ties should be strengthened above all. In late August or early September it could be possible to hold a congress of commodity producers which would start off a new phase.

Right from the start Skokov asked that his speech be viewed as impromptu because he had not yet had time to go into specifics. Possibly it should indeed not be taken as a program statement. But a program is clearly visible behind it. I therefore venture to predict that very soon,

most likely in the form of the Federation of Commodity Producers, we will get an actively operating force. And, perhaps most importantly, one aimed at constructive activity.

Military Issues

Far East Surface-to-Air Missiles To Be Dismantled

OW2907125593 Khabarovsk Radio Khabarovsk Network in Russian 0845 GMT 29 Jul 93

[From the "Kray News"]

[Text] Major General Aleksandr Lomatenko, deputy commander of the (second) Army for (anti-aircraft weapons) told our correspondent that almost 2,000 surface-to-air missile warheads along with their airframes will be recycled during the course of reduction of anti-aircraft points at combat posts in the region. The recycling of the warheads, which includes the extraction of precious metals, will be carried out by specialists of this army at the deployment locations of the anti-aircraft missile battalions.

Stepashin Denies Corruption in Western Group of Forces

LD2907125593 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0331 GMT 28 Jul 93

[From the "Slavyanka Studio" of the Russian Defense Ministry]

[Text] Rumors of corruption in Russia's Western Group of Forces have no foundation. This was said during a working trip to Germany by Sergey Stepashin, chairman of the Russian Supreme Soviet Defense and Security Committee. He also added that the economic management activity of the Western Group of Forces command not only made it possible to improve the material provision of Russian units on German soil, it also served as a source of currency revenue for Russia's budget.

Pacific Fleet Seeks 'Urgent' Aid From Defense Ministry

LD2907122193 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 29 Jul 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The Administration of Maritime Kray, together with the Command of the Pacific Fleet, has prepared an appeal to the Russian Ministry of Defense to provide urgent financial aid to the fleet. This measure has been forced on them by the increase in the Navy's indebtedness to the defense complex.

The majority of enterprises serving the fleet are on the verge of a complete halt; this includes the leading ship-repair enterprise, Dalzavod, which is owed over 10

billion rubles [R]. The total state debts to Maritime Kray's military-industrial complex amount to R30 billion, RIA reports.

Official Notes Ongoing Decline in Troop Numbers

PM2907123793 Moscow ROSSIYSKIYE VESTI in Russian 28 Jul 93 p 7

[Roman Zadunayskiy article: "Nobody Left To Serve?"]

[Text] Unless targeted and highly urgent measures are taken the Armed Forces will be facing a crisis—there will be nobody left to serve in the Russian Army. Soldiers from one detail are being forced to join another, even though considerable federal draft resources are available.

On the whole, the spring draft plan has been fulfilled, and around 170,000 draftees have joined the Armed Forces, but this number is clearly inadequate, Lieutenant General V. Bondartsev, first deputy chief of the Russian military department's Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate, said. He noted that, following the 1993 spring draft, NCO personnel and enlisted ranks were only 51 percent up to strength, and the Army and Navy are currently short of more than 700,000 men.

According to calculations, the general went on to say, the 1993 fall draft will bring in 130-150,000 men, but, at the same time, more than 320,000 soldiers and NCO's who have completed their service will be discharged to the reserve. If things continue in this vein, V. Bondartsev advised, then by 1 January 1994 NCO personnel and enlisted rank numbers in the Army and Navy will have fallen to 30-35 percent of what they should be.

As an emergency measure the Russian Federation Defense Ministry is proposing to cut draft deferment requests—particularly for medical reasons, which will make it possible to draft around 300,000 men, and for students at higher and secondary specialized educational establishments (an extra 1 million men, approximately). The Defense Ministry is also opposed to the immediate adoption by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet of the law "On Alternative Service" and is proposing that its examination be deferred to 1994-1995, since the introduction of this law will cost the Armed Forces another 100,000 young people.

Some 109,000 men have been recruited to military service on a voluntary basis—under contract—in 1993. But contract service is not having a substantial impact on basic Armed Forces staffing. The possibility of increasing the number of contractors is being undermined by a shortage of funds. The Russian Federation Defense Ministry has proposed that the Russian Government recruit another 50,000 under contract. This new voluntary recruitment would require at least an additional 12 billion rubles.

According to Russian Defense Ministry Press Service figures, there are problems with new recruits to cover the troop withdrawal from the Baltic. Thus, as of 1 July

NCO personnel and enlisted rank numbers were only 48.2 percent of what they should have been in Lithuania, with the figures for Estonia and Latvia being 27.7 percent and 40.6 percent respectively. At the start of last year these states' governments decided to refuse entry to their territory to draftees arriving to replenish Russian units. Following talks, only Lithuania agreed to allow transport [pogruzochnyy] crews into the republic until 31 August 1993 to ensure the withdrawal of troops from its territory. In Latvia and Estonia there will soon be nobody left not only to transport but even to guard hardware, armaments, and military property.

The Russian Federation Defense Ministry Main Organization and Mobilization Directorate notes the good attitude shown by authorities in all parts of Russia toward the organization and implementation of the draft campaign. After all, under the Russian Federation law "On Military Obligations and Military Service" adopted 11 February 1993, "the administration head of a rayon or city is responsible for organizing the military draft." Previously the military commissar had been in charge of the draft. Chechnya and Ingushetia alone have "failed to provide" any draftees for the Russian Army for more than 18 months now.

Supreme Soviet

Parliament Issues Decree on Draft Constitution

PM2807161993 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jul 93 First Edition p 4

[Decree No. 5469-I of the Supreme Soviet "On Work on the Draft Russian Federation Constitution," signed by Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov and dated Moscow, House of Russian Soviets, 20 July 1993; published under the "Official Section" rubric]

[Text] In light of the draft Russian Federation Constitution received by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet from the Russian Federation president 14 July 1993, the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. The draft Russian Federation Constitution received by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet 14 July 1993 is to be sent to the Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies Constitutional Commission and to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet chambers' standing commissions and to committees of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet for consideration.

2. In accordance with the procedure stipulated by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decree of 4 June 1993 "On the Procedure for Agreeing to the Adoption of the Draft Russian Federation Constitution," the Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies is requested to continue work on the draft Russian Federation Constitution, whose main provisions were approved by the Sixth Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies, taking account of the draft Russian

Federation Constitution received from the Russian Federation president and the comments and proposals of the Russian Federation's components.

The Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies Constitutional Commission and the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet Committee for Constitutional Legislation are to consider and summarize the incoming proposals and amendments regarding the Russian Federation Constitution drafts.

3. In order to increase the efficiency of work on the creation of an agreed draft Russian Federation Constitution, the Congress of Russian Federation People's Deputies Constitutional Commission is to prepare proposals on the inclusion in its composition of additional Russian Federation people's deputies, authorized representatives of the Russian Federation's components, constitutional law specialists, and representatives of public associations.

A proposal is to be put to the Supreme Soviets of the republics belonging to the Russian Federation, soviets of people's deputies of krais, oblasts, autonomous okrugs, and cities of federal status to recommend one authorized representative each to work in the Russian Federation Congress of People's Deputies Constitutional Commission.

[Signed] R.I. Khasbulatov, chairman of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet

[Dated] Moscow, House of Russian Soviets, 20 July 1993

Former Interior Deputy Details Dismissal to Presidium

LD2907154693 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 1110 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] [Announcer Tatyana Ivanova] On several occasions in the past, all sorts of divisions—including even the Tula division, I believe—have been placed on alert. Usually that was in the autumn. The authorities justified their action by saying that they were getting the paratroopers ready for the potato harvest. Well, autumn may still be some way off, but the events of August may indeed give rise to some rather unpleasant reflections.

Incidentally, at yesterday's meeting of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet, [Andrey] Dunayev, former first deputy minister of internal affairs, also mentioned the possibility of repression. I shall now play you a recording that I made at the Presidium yesterday. I apologize for the rather poor quality of the recording. The conditions in which it was made were not very suitable.

[Begin Dunayev recording] Esteemed Ruslan Imranovich, Esteemed Members of the Presidium, People's Deputies: I have been on vacation since 5 July 1993. On 22 July I received a telegram from the Russian Federation minister of internal affairs summoning me back from vacation. I arrived back in Moscow on 23 July, where

[word indistinct] I learned of my dismissal from the post of Russian Federation first deputy minister of internal affairs.

On 24 July Minister Viktor Fedorovich Yerin informed me that a former assistant to the first deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, Vladimir Filippovich Shumeyko, had allegedly testified against me, the minister of security, and certain other officials, giving evidence which compromised us. [passage indistinct]

Yerin [words indistinct] prepared a decree about my dismissal, flew to where Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin was on vacation, and got it signed. On 24 July Yerin categorically demanded that I submit a resignation on the grounds of illness and warned that, if I didn't, I would suffer.

The true reason for my dismissal is the fact that I was openly saying—as I do now—that thanks to Viktor Fedorovich Yerin, the leadership of the Interior Ministry troops decided to hand over weapons to the Ingush side, which led to the bloody events of the Ingush-Ossetia conflict.

To continue: At a time of repeated and direct calls for the dissolution of the representative branch, knowing of my commitment to democratic methods and my decisive role and influence in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and realizing that I could not be bypassed in this matter and that I would side with democracy, they decided to get rid of me by a manifestly illegal method.

In my view, exactly the same thing happened with Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov. Unfortunately he was unable to endure the stress and fell sick. Furthermore, certain members of the president's entourage are clearly working against the president. They know that I could not betray the president. Therefore, they have been hoping to discredit me for a long time.

I also received threats as a result of the investigation, led by me, which led to the exposure of gigantic thefts achieved through the use of false bank [word indistinct]. Furthermore, on 7 May 1993 I received a telephone call from Exchange No. 1, from Minister Viktor Fedorovich Yerin. He demanded that I take Anpilov into custody for the whole of 9 May 1993 and prevent him from taking part in the demonstration on that day. I made representations to the minister, based on the law. Yerin rejected them. Analyzing recent events, I have come to the conclusion that I was the only indirect witness to [words indistinct] whom they decided to get rid of.

Certain members of our mass media are suggesting that I was dismissed for poor results in fighting crime. No, I'm not happy with them either. But take a look at the figures. [words indistinct] 35,067 serious crimes more than last year have been cleared up during the first months of the year, compared with the same period last year. In other words, this is an increase of 36.4 percent. More murders have been solved than last year, 47.9 percent more. More cases involving grave bodily harm—

40.9 percent more—have been cleared up. The success rate with muggings and robberies is 43 percent better. The number of bribe-takers caught was 43.9 percent. The number of big and especially large thefts resolved was 47.7 percent higher.

Unfortunately, without even consulting his first deputy minister responsible for the CID [Criminal Investigation Department]—myself—or other colleagues in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, including heads of operational directorates, Minister Yerin separated the directorate for organized crime from the CID and set up 11 interregional directorates for organized crime, transferring mobile groups to them [passage indistinct].

As a result the best detectives are leaving the CID and subunits responsible for the struggle against economic crime. Some 16,000 CID officers have exposed 41,533 crimes. The subunits responsible for fighting organized crime, which have over 20,000 officers, have only managed to resolve 1,192 crimes, or 0.2 percent of the total number of registered crimes. In the present political situation you wonder why we have mobile detachments equipped with radio equipment and helicopters.

Don't think that I came to the Presidium to boast about the work I did in my previous job. No. I have been involved in active CID work for 36 years. I have been Russia's minister of internal affairs as well as first deputy minister. Anybody would be proud of such a career. I have earned my pension. I did not risk my life and my destiny to connive at the return of 1938.

In August 1991 I was the only general in Russia to give direct orders to armed Interior Ministry troops to come to Moscow and defend democracy and the White House. [end recording]

[Ivanova] I deliberately left in those last few words so that listeners could have an idea of the glorious democratic past of the former first deputy minister of internal affairs, Dunayev. It will not surprise you that this list of people who have been removed, sacked, or dismissed is growing. Rutskoy has been sidelined, I remind you. Boldyrev was dismissed. Justice Minister Nikolay Fedorov resigned. Dunayev and Barannikov have been dismissed, Skokov too. Who will be next? The worst thing is that people are being sacked without any explanation being given, just as in the old days of stagnation, which are the target of so much criticism from the democrats nowadays. Ignorance naturally gives rise to rumor and conjecture. This does not make for peace in the country.

Regional Affairs

Shakhray Attends Far East Association Meeting
OW2907122693 Moscow Russian Television and Dubl Networks in Russian 0446 GMT 21 Jul 93

[By V. Gorbunov and S. Moskvina; from the "Dalniy Vostok" program]

[Text] Sergey Shakhray took part in the regular meeting of the Far East Association for Economic Interaction which, on this occasion, held its meeting in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk.

[Begin Gorbunov recording] Sergey Mikhaylovich Shakhray, the Vice Premier of Russia, arrived in Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk by special flight from Moscow this morning. He was met at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk airport by Anatoliy Aksenov, chairman of the oblast soviet of peoples deputies, Vitaliy Gemilevskiy, vice governor of the oblast, and other responsible officials and representatives of the oblast and city executive. Sergey Shakhray will take part in the work of the circuit meeting of the council of the Far East Association for Economic Interaction which opens in the big hall of the oblast administration building in two hours. The high-ranking guest was asked the following question: In the wake of the current show of sovereignty, could the meeting become the venue for federation subjects could proclaim a free and independent Far East Republic? Sergey Shakhray answered negatively, saying: Common sense prevails in your region as nowhere else. [end recording]

[Begin Moskvina recording] The Council of the Far East Association for Economic Interaction began its work at 1000 hours. Representatives from the Center and the whole of the Far East region took part in the meeting. The participants had to examine 12 basic issues and listen to presentations on some of them. The particularly acute issues included the use of fish stocks, and the development of oil, coal and gas deposits. It was emphasized that Sakhalin must lead the development of natural resources in the Far East, because the island is a base for the extraction of oil and gas. Other issues were also examined. [end recording]

[Begin recording] [Shakhray] On 12 July, the detailed social protection scheme was presented at the government meeting and there were two problems—specific social protection, and the protection of the budget office. It contained a program for a phased increase in wages for the budgetary branch. I think that inasmuch as this conference was conducted with the regions, this will come out in the shape of a government decision in the very near future. This draft will be announced by Vice Premier Yarov in the Supreme Soviet.

[Gorbunov] Is there any hope for establishing general stability in Russia?

[Shakhray] Undoubtedly, otherwise it is not worth living and working. [end recording]

Udmurt Leader Defends Right To Decide on Foreign Trade

PM2807155793 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jul 93 First Edition p 5

[Unattributed report from "Federation Chronicle" column]

[Text] Izhevsk—In the opinion of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, Mariy El, Mordovia, and Udmurtia, which are components of the Russian Federation, have exceeded their powers by signing agreements with President Arpad Goncz of Hungary.

Vitaliy Volkov, head of the Udmurt Republic Supreme Soviet Legislative Affairs Department, considers this step an attempt to put down the leadership of a republic within the Russian Federation which is trying to secure independent access to foreign economic activity. To all appearances, the republic's leadership will insist that Russia fulfill the Federation Treaty, under which foreign economic activity comes within the joint competence of the republic and the federal center.

Tyumen City Soviet Not To Implement Minimum Wage Decision

*PM2907130593 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jul 93 First Edition p 1*

[RIA report from the "From Our Correspondents and News Agencies" column: "Tyumen Authorities Oppose Increase in Minimum Wage"]

[Text] The Tyumen City Soviet Inner Soviet has refused to implement the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet decision to raise the minimum wage of workers in budget-financed organizations.

As reported at the soviet press center, this stance is due to the fact there is no money in the city budget. Its deficit in the third quarter of this year alone is 4.5 billion rubles [R]. While the implementation of the Supreme Soviet decision requires another R4 billion. At the same time some work in providing amenities and constructing certain social facilities in the city has been halted through lack of resources. The minimum wage for teachers, doctors, and workers in culture and other budget-financed spheres remains as before for the time being—R4,275.

Threat of Break-Up in Siberian Oil, Gas Region

LD2807182693 Moscow Ostankino Television First Channel Network in Russian 1400 GMT 28 Jul 93

[By correspondent Yevgeniy Fateyev from Tyumen, including recording of remarks by L. Yu. Roketskiy, head of administration of Tyumen oblast; from the "Novosti" newscast]

[Text] [Fateyev] Only recently up to 40 new deposits were commissioned in north Tyumen oblast every year. Nowadays only one, the Komsomolskoye gas deposit, has been commissioned thanks to heroic efforts.

[Roketskiy] Why should I worry about declining volumes of oil and gas today? They give us nothing but upturned soil, felled forests, polluted lakes and rivers,

dying fish, difficulties with the indigenous population, the impossibility of hunting... Oil and gas are our oblast's misfortunes, a scourge.

[Fateyev] The Tyumen governor deliberately lays it on thick, of course. Both he and the people who work here understand very well that oil and gas are the basis of the oblast's and the country's well-being. But the money made on the extracted raw materials still bypasses Tyumen.

Today yet another problem is looming large over the oil and gas region—the threat of the region's break-up. Yamal-Nenets and Khantiy-Mansi autonomous okrugs are seriously claiming their rights to sovereignty and independent decisions on their natural resources. The separatist feelings have noticeably increased with the appearance of the new Russian draft constitution. It is precisely for this reason that, together with some other leaders of subjects of the federation, Leonid Roketskiy refused to sign the draft.

[Roketskiy] The constitution legitimizes our oblast's undoing. This is impossible. Russia cannot be a great power if we should try to break up whole oblasts.

[Fateyev] For the time being, fortunately, the fight for independence of oil and gas regions is nothing but games of politicians. A break-up of this powerful energy-providing complex will hardly give us more oil or gas.

Vorkuta Miners Demand Suspension of Job Cuts

PM2807161593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 27 Jul 93 First Edition p 3

[Yevgeniy Pishchikova report under the "Conflict" rubric: "Don't Cut Jobs Without Thinking About It First"]

[Text] Vorkuta City Workers' Committee has held a joint session of representatives of mine collectives on no small pretext.

At issue is a reduction in the work force at the "Yun-Yaga" pit and the forthcoming reduction of Vorkuta mining jobs in general. At the pit faces, the leadership explained the dismissals as follows: Mines will be getting rid of ballast—people who drink or who are not zealous enough about digging coal. However, it is perfectly clear to miners that the action is by no means due to a touching desire on the authorities' part to raise production standards. Given existing levels of pay, it is profitable to cut back on manpower, thus anyone can be labeled "unsuitable" and dismissed. Workers in unprofitable pits are in particular danger.

This type of conflict between the authorities and miners' trade unions is one of the most widespread in world practice. At the joint session the miners adopted a decision that is entirely explicable from the viewpoint of worldwide tradition:

—the forthcoming cuts must be suspended until the adoption of a program for enterprise closures and until the government offers social guarantees;

—a political statement would be made to the mass media on the inadmissibility of such actions on the government's part as aggravating social tension.

Workers Strike at Ural Defense Industries

LD2907130893 Moscow Russian Television Network in Russian 1000 GMT 29 Jul 93

[From the "Vesti" newscast]

[Text] The trade unions of defense enterprises in the Urals are holding a warning strike today. The regional trade unions of the defense industries are protesting against the deterioration of the social and economic situation of the workers and the collapse of the enterprises' scientific and technical potential. They are also insisting on tax benefits and the provision of credits for conversion. If the authorities do not heed their demands, then on 6 August the Ural defense enterprises will cease to service military installations.

Ingush Congress Will Consider Ties With Moscow

PM2907155593 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 2

[Aleksandr Aleshkin report under the "Press Conference" rubric: "Ruslan Aushev: Ingushetia May Secede From Russia"]

[Text] Ingush Republic President Ruslan Aushev made this statement 28 July at a press conference for Russian and foreign journalists at Moscow's international press club.

The republic head cited the Russian leadership's unwillingness or inability to resolve his people's problems as the main reason for this inclination. In his words, in the nine months since the armed Ingush-Ossetian conflict virtually nothing has been done to return Ingush refugees to their places of permanent residence in Prigorodny Rayon, North Ossetia. They number some 70,000 people.

The federal powers have failed to repeal a decision by the neighboring republic's Supreme Soviet on the impossibility of further cohabitation between the Ingush and Ossetian peoples. The president described as miserly the aid from Russia needed to set up the Ingush Republic's economic, political, and social infrastructure.

Mentioning relations with the Chechen Republic, the president noted that by mutual agreement they are not establishing borders between themselves, and they do not recognize the right of another, third party to intervene in solving this question: the fraternal Veinakh people are united and will resolve their own fate.

Aushev described the fundamental question in future relations with North Ossetia as the return of Prigorodny Rayon to Ingushetia. But, he stressed, we continue to hope that this may happen through constitutional means on the basis of the federal Law on Rehabilitating Repressed Peoples.

A congress of the Ingush people is scheduled for 31 July at which, as the president stated, their future will be defined. First and foremost, whether or not the Ingush Republic will exist as part of Russia.

Yarov Views Transport, Energy Problems in Anadyr, Magadan

LD3007102493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0844 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Nina Borisova]

[Text] Magadan July 30 TASS—The problem of the shipment of cargoes to the north-eastern regions of Russia were discussed today by the government commission led by Deputy Prime Minister Yuriy Yarov, which visited Anadyr and Magadan. The commission saw only two ships being unloaded at the Magadan port. Alarming facts were cited at the conference held here today. Only 26.3 per cent of meat and meat products were brought to the Magadan region this year, as against the corresponding period of 1992. The figure for milk is 10 per cent, for butter—4 per cent and for cereals—only 4 per cent. Plans of the shipment of oil products have practically been disrupted.

Northerners spoke with concern about the extremely difficult situation with energy generation, the threat of the temporary closure of the Kolyma power plant, the miners' settlements which are being abandoned, people who can neither leave the regions for many months, nor live in the north any longer.

Yuriy Yarov said that the government was taking measures for organising the transportation of cargoes to the north and was granting credits, but payment transactions are taking too much time, and the money is not always spent in the most rational way.

The local government of the region and the corresponding agencies have been assigned to submit within a week a clear programme of overcoming this situation. They may count on the support and assistance of the government.

Kuzbass Parties on Constitution, Privatization, Tajikistan

PM3007102193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 29 Jul 93 First Edition p 2

[Report by Viktor Kostyukovskiy: "Majority of Kuzbass Parties and Movements Favor Adoption of New Constitution"]

[Text] Kemerovo—The consultative council of Kuzbass political parties and public movements has adopted three important statements, clearly revealing its position on the constitutional process, the further course of privatization, and the position on the Tajik-Afghan border.

The council noted that the Constitutional conference, overcoming many contradictions, has succeeded in elaborating a document which could become the basis of the new Constitution. The question of the mechanism and deadline for its adoption is becoming increasingly acute. "We cannot underestimate the danger to society of the political demagoguery which is being undertaken by the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet chairman, the vice president, and other forces," the statement says.

The council appeals to the president, government, Supreme Soviet, and components of the Federation to do everything possible to adopt a Constitution no later than the fall of 1993. If the congress does not adopt a Fundamental Law, in the opinion of the overwhelming majority of Kuzbass parties and movements a referendum should be held and the constitution should be adopted by a specially elected Constitutional Assembly.

It was noted that the Russian Supreme Soviet has already adopted and is preparing more resolutions which threaten the continuation of reforms in the country. The introduction of a system of privatization accounts will strike primarily against enterprises which are being privatized and will lead to a loss of confidence in them, to uncertainty in investors, to the collapse of the stock market, and to chaos in the sphere of financial dealings. A powerful new spiral of inflation will inevitably be a result of these steps. The majority of Kemerovo Oblast political parties and movements are appealing to the Supreme Soviet deputies and leadership not to make such destructive decisions.

With regard to the situation on the Tajik-Afghan border the council noted that the full political responsibility is borne by the Supreme Soviet and its chairman, who have held up the ratification of the treaty on mutual aid between Russia and Tajikistan and refused to examine the appeal on aid for the border guards from regular troops. The council is pleading to the Russian general prosecutor that criminal proceedings be initiated with regard to the specific culprits and is demanding that a decision be made on the withdrawal of Russian troops and the border guard from Tajikistan territory.

International Affairs

Morozov on U.S. Visit, SS-19's, Sevastopol

LD2907163993 Kiev Radio Ukraine World Service in Ukrainian 1000 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Report on interview with Defense Minister Kostyantyn Morozov with an unidentified UKRINFORM correspondent in Washington on 29 July]

[Text] For many Americans, Ukraine's real image is still covered by an artificial portrait, painted by the same mass media as THE NEW YORK TIMES, which not so recently wrote that Ukraine is a barrier on the path of world nuclear disarmament. The exaggeration regarding the extent of the processes of nuclear disarmament is absolutely obvious.

A UKRINFORM correspondent asked Colonel General Morozov: If we are to talk about Ukraine's image in the eyes of the U.S. Administration, however, in the course of the present meetings in Washington how far have you succeeded in moving along the path of a more complete and just mutual understanding between Ukraine and America?

Morozov replied: We really have moved in my view. In this respect, the signing yesterday of a memorandum on mutual understanding and cooperation in the area of defense and military relations, carried out by the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine and the U.S. Defense Department, became a realization of this. This is the beginning of professional military relations between Ukraine and the United States, as the list of mentioned areas of military relations is not exhausted and will lay the basis for the search for new areas to broaden and deepen relations between our states. We achieved an understanding of the Ukrainian position; I would even say support. I assess the signing of such an important political document as the result of considerable preparatory work at the level of experts during the visit of Secretary Les Aspin to Ukraine in June of this year and of a corresponding visit by Ukraine's defense minister to Washington.

A UKRINFORM correspondent asked: In many publications of the American press dedicated to your official visit to the United States, the fact that Ukraine has begun and is conducting the removal of warheads of some strategic missiles located on its territory for the second week has already been mentioned. Could you officially confirm this fact?

Morozov replied: The deactivation of the SS-19 missile complex began on 15 July in Ukraine. The dismantling of the former Soviet arsenal is continuing, and we regard this as an act of goodwill because Ukraine began dismantling its missile complexes itself, without the granting of specific financial and technological assistance. We hope that this will be valued as an expression of our trust, and

we will speed up the implementation of all decisions on which the granting of financial and technological aid to our state depends.

Another unidentified journalist asked: It is probably not by chance that one day before your visit to the United States, the ITAR-TASS news agency and other Russian mass media circulated a statement from the Russian minister of foreign affairs that asserted that measures were being taken to place these weapons under national physical control after the Ukrainian Supreme Council practically declared its country the owner of its nuclear weapons. How do you assess the publication of such a statement and the time frame chosen for this?

Morozov answered: I consider a statement that asks such a rhetorical question to be cynical—possibly Ukraine is being threatened and is preparing for a nuclear war. We know that the tension around the question of the real independence of Ukraine never subsided. This is why we are forced to take measures to guarantee our security and to prepare to defend our fatherland.

The correspondent asked: One more question that today continues to attract the heightened attention of the Americans and that is taking up noticeable space in the American press is the issue of the status of Sevastopol and the fate of the Black Sea Fleet. Mr. Minister, in your view is there a move toward a positive resolution of these urgent problems?

Morozov answered: I am only calmed by the fact that the state of relations between the executive and the legislative power of Russia helps, because the populist decision of the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet was ignored. We have drawn the conclusions for ourselves, and we are obliged to prepare to defend our fatherland at any time.

The official visit to the United States of Col. Gen. Konstantin Morozov, Ukraine's minister of defense, is continuing. In particular, his schedule envisages a visit to the military base at Norfolk, the aircraft carrier George Washington, and new meetings and negotiations, with the aim of strengthening relations between Ukraine and the United States in the military sphere. The visit will continue until 30 July.

Confirms Dismantlement of SS-19's

LD2907143593 Kiev Ukrayinske Radio First Program Network in Russian 0900 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Ukraine has begun taking its SS-19 missiles off alert and dismantling them, Ukrainian Defense Minister Konstantin Morozov has confirmed, speaking on 28 July at the Atlantic Council, an influential public organization, during his official visit to the United States. This step, the minister said, was taken in accordance with the agreement between the presidents of Ukraine and Russia. He said certain breakthroughs have been made in the past few months in terms of mutual understanding between Ukraine and Russia in the interest of settling the nuclear problem.

I would like to stress, the minister said, that we in Ukraine have begun deactivating [dezaktyvatsiya] and taking measures to cut down the nuclear arsenal and reduce the nuclear danger well before the parliament's ratification of the START I treaty.

The minister described the initiative of U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin during his visit to Kiev in June to keep the missiles' nuclear warheads and (?nine) airplanes dismantled in the process of disarmament on the territory of Ukraine under international supervision as a step toward understanding the legitimacy of Ukraine's concern for its national security.

Speaking on the subject of Ukraine's nuclear or nonnuclear status, Morozov said: Ukraine's Government, leadership, and Defense Ministry adhere to the official policy proclaimed by Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk on Ukraine's accession to a nonnuclear status in the future and pursue the appropriate domestic and foreign policies. At the same time, he noted that a considerable number of quite influential people's deputies believe that Ukraine should declare itself a nuclear state.

Morozov also touched briefly upon the problem of funding nuclear disarmament. He said the cost of it, according to the most modest calculations, would amount to approximately \$3 billion. In the present critical economic conditions, we do not have even one-hundredth of that. Unfortunately, he said, neither the United States, nor [word indistinct], or a single state has so far offered us any financial assistance to this end.

Deputy Naval Commander Opposes 50-50 Division of Fleet

PM2907131393 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 29 Jul 93 p 1

[Vladimir Maryukha report under "From Our News Bureau" rubric: "Black Sea Fleet Cannot Fulfill Will of Two States"]

[Text] "It is, however, inadmissible to divide it up '50-50,'" Rear Admiral Nikolay Kostrov, deputy commander of the Ukrainian Navy, declared in an interview in the newspaper FLOT UKRAYINY.

His suggested version of the Black Sea Fleet's partition is to a considerable extent similar to the proposals of the Russian Navy High Command, which were advanced at a time when Ukraine had only proclaimed the start of building its own fleet. In N. Kostrov's opinion, "it is expedient to transfer to Ukraine those fleet structures which Russia does not now need." If such a position also prevails in official Ukraine, it will remain to take the next step—to reach agreement on the presence of the Russian part of the fleet on the territory of the neighboring republic—and the "Black Sea knot" will have been untied.

Crimean Ukrainians Discuss Sevastopol, Fleet

AU2907162993 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian 28 Jul 93 p 4

[Oleksandr Pilat report: "Congress of Southern Crimean Ukrainians"]

[Text] On 25 July, a congress of Southern Crimean Ukrainians was held in Yalta. It brought together delegates from all populated areas of the southern shore—from Foros to the village of Malorechenskyy near Alushta. As is known, in recent months the first congress of Crimean Ukrainians and the congress of Sevastopol Ukrainians were held. It is expected that a congress of northern Crimean Ukrainians will be held this coming fall. It will be followed by the second congress of Ukrainians of the entire peninsula. The Yalta congress focused on the complex situation that has taken shape in our state, and all delegates bitterly condemned the Russian Federation's Supreme Council decree "On the Status of Sevastopol." Chairman of the Crimean organization of the Ukrainian Officers Union Lieutenant Colonel Serhiy Lytvyn assessed the decree as an attempt "to provoke a conflict between Ukraine and Russia, or even new world wars leading to a total revision of borders." That is why, in Lytvyn's opinion, it is necessary "to fulfill the will of our great military predecessors Yevhen Konovalets and Symon Petlyura: To create, as soon as possible, our own truly national and powerful Ukrainian Army that will occupy positions at the borders and will reliably block the passage of imperial hordes into Ukraine."

Ukraine's people's deputy and deputy minister for questions of nationalities and migration, Oleksandr Piskun, called upon those present to strive for interethnic accord and expressed a hope that the Ukrainians of the peninsula, together with other people who reside in the Crimea, will do everything possible in order to maintain peace and calm. Ukraine's people's deputy and editor in chief of HOLOS UKRAYINY, Serhiy Pravdenko, conveyed greetings from the editorial board of the newspaper and reminded that it was not Ukraine that had caused the Union to collapse (although it had been an objective process that could not be stopped by anyone), but Russia. It was the first to adopt the Declaration on State Sovereignty. "Russian chauvinists must know and remember this," pointed out Pravdenko and continued: "as regards the insinuations around the Crimean president, I want to say that the Crimea needs a Ukrainian presidential representative and not a president."

Ukraine's people's deputies Mykhaylo Shvayka and Oleksandr Vorobyov also took part in the work of the congress.

The congress adopted an appeal to the Alushta and Yalta local councils of people's deputies in which it demands, in particular, that, starting from 1993, Ukrainian instruction and indoctrination be introduced in individual secondary schools and kindergartens, that Ukrainian state flags be, at last, hoisted over state administration buildings, and that "monuments to bolshevik

butchers of the former Soviet people be demolished." The resolution "On the Mass Media" adopted by the congress brings to the attention of the Ukrainian president and of the security services of Alushta, Yalta, and Ukraine the fact that "their temporizing attitude toward the information blockade and open anti-Ukrainian activity on the part of the majority of the mass media in our region is inconceivable."

The congress called upon the president and Supreme Council of Ukraine to take decisive measures in order to establish constitutional order in Sevastopol, immediately divide the Black Sea Fleet, and withdraw its Russian part from Ukrainian ports, including Sevastopol. A resolution on this point reads, in particular: "The fate of our state is being decided in the Black Sea Fleet, in Sevastopol, and in the Crimea. We ask the leadership of Ukraine to remember this." A telegram of greetings was sent to the Crimean Tatars Kurultay that will start its work on 27 July.

A Coordination Council of the Southern Crimean Ukrainians was unanimously elected.

Spokesman Unaware of Possible Asylum for Demjanjuk

LD3007105293 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 0952 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jul—A spokesman for the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, telephoned in Kiev by an ITAR-TASS correspondent, stated he knew nothing of the potential extension of asylum to John Demjanjuk.

On Thursday the Israeli Supreme Court acquitted Demjanjuk, a former U.S. citizen, whom a lower court had previously sentenced to death for the mass murder of inmates at the Treblinka concentration camp during World War II.

A number of foreign news agencies, citing statements by Demjanjuk's lawyer, reported on Friday that he might ask for asylum in an unspecified country. Ukraine was named among the possibilities.

Legal Agreement With Lithuania To Be Ratified

AU3007083693 Kiev *HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian* 28 Jul 93 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Recommended for Ratification"]

[Text] Ukraine's Cabinet of Ministers has resolved to submit, for ratification by Ukraine's Supreme Council, an agreement between the Government of Ukraine and the Government of Lithuania on legal assistance and legal relations in civilian, family-related, and criminal cases, which was signed in Vilnius on 7 July 1993.

National Affairs

Cabinet Examines Economic Development, State Procurement

WS2907114993 Kiev *UNIAN in Ukrainian* 1533 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Text] Kiev—On 28 July, the concept of economic and social development in Ukraine in 1994 and the principles behind state procurement and contracts were examined at the Cabinet of Ministers session under the chairmanship of Yukhym Zvyahil'skyy. The Ukrainian Ministry of Economy insisted that the state influence over state property management should be increased and that a range of production in the basic branches of industry and agriculture should be established. In particular, the introduction of mandatory state procurement (up to 50 percent of total production) for the state enterprises and providing them with necessary resources was underlined. Nevertheless, Deputy Prime Minister Viktor Pynzenyk categorically rejected such a concept. He pointed out that it is erroneous, does not cure but kills the economy, and is utopian, because one cannot expand state procurement, for example, to Russia. Observers believe that the supporters of the state central planning system decided to take revenge, taking advantage of Leonid Kuchma's absence.

Rejects Economic Plan

WS2907123493 Kiev *UNIAN in Ukrainian* 1946 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Text] Kiev—On 28 July, after hours of discussion, the Ukrainian Cabinet of Ministers did not adopt the draft economic and social development plan for 1994 and the draft decree "On the state procurement and contracts, and the order of supplying extraordinary state demands and priorities in the year 1994". The debate on the drafts ended in Vice Prime Minister's Viktor Pynzenyk's favor, who stated that the plan prepared by the Ukrainian Ministry of Economy could be adopted only if the Soviet Union was reestablished and Russian reforms were canceled. As Volodymyr Syvul'skyy, first deputy minister of finance, pointed out, it is hard to find in the economic and social development plan answers to the two important questions: How to overcome the balance of payments deficit, and how to secure the necessary production level. A resolution was adopted to revise all the documents by 15 August and then submit them to the Cabinet of Ministers. Minister of Food and Agriculture Yuriy Karasyk reported on the fulfillment of the government decree "On immediate steps to secure organized harvesting in 1993 and create food and forage resources". He stated that only 30 percent of crops have been harvested.

Relations Between Religion and Government Viewed

AU2907132193 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
28 Jul 92 p 1

[Unattributed report: "Religion Is a Delicate Sphere"]

[Text] Ukraine's Christian Democratic Party, with the participation of representatives of many religious denominations, held a "roundtable" on the theme "Religion and Culture." During the discussion, representatives of three currents in Ukrainian Orthodoxy and Greek Catholic and Roman Catholic churches voiced their vision of the religious situation in Ukraine, stressing that interference of state structures in religion and the existence of such an institution as the Council for Religious Affairs at the Cabinet of Ministers further exacerbate the interreligious confrontation. As was stressed at the meeting, coexistence of numerous religious denominations is a characteristic of a democratic society, and to speed up, with the help of politicians, the process of uniting churches means to create a new state-controlled church that will be both far from genuine faith and the needs of believers themselves.

Crimean Tatars Favor 'Renewing' Statehood

AU2907132293 Kiev HOLOS UKRAYINY in Ukrainian
28 Jul 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Kurultay Is in Favor of Unity"]

[Text] The second session of the second Kurultay [congress] of the Crimean Tatars opened in a festive atmosphere in Simferopol yesterday. A total of 220 delegates are participating. Numerous guests from Ukraine, the Russian Federation, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan are present, as well as Acar Germen, Turkish ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary in Ukraine; John Stepanchuk, first secretary of the U.S. Embassy in Ukraine; and senior officials of these embassies. Leaders of Crimean Tatars organizations stationed in Turkey, Germany, the United States, Hungary, Romania, the Netherlands, the Turkish Republic of Cyprus, and in other countries also arrived to attend the Kurultay. More

than 100 correspondents are covering the session. They represent the mass media of five continents.

Opening the session, Mustafa Dzhemilev, chairman of the Crimean Tatars Majlis, said, in particular: "We are in favor of renewing our statehood in the framework of the Ukrainian state."

Working groups of the Kurultay have been formed and the agenda adopted. In particular, the session will have to discuss the report on the activity of the Crimean Tatars Majlis on implementing the decisions of the first session of the second Kurultay, the question "of the sociopolitical situation in the Crimea and in Ukraine, the tasks of the Crimean Tatars Kurultay, and the sociopolitical situation of the Crimean Tatars—the problems of their return and settlement." It will also introduce alterations and additions to the Kurultay agenda and will carry out a rotation of the members of the Majlis and the Kurultay's Auditing Commission.

In the afternoon, Mustafa Dzhemilev, chairman of the Crimean Tatars Majlis, delivered a report on the activity of the Crimean Tatars Majlis aimed at fulfilling the decisions adopted by the first session of the Kurultay. It is expected that the work of the Kurultay will be concluded on 30 or, maybe, 31 July.

Crimean Supreme Council Chairman N. Bagrov and Crimean Council of Ministers Chairman B. Samsonov were officially invited to the Kurultay session but did not come.

Military Property Put Up for Sale

WS3007103893 Kiev UNIAN in Ukrainian 1533 GMT
28 Jul 93

[Text] Sumy—The management of municipal property and privatization of the Sumy Oblast administration has announced the first auction of the disbanded military units' property. Barracks, depots, warehouses, and other buildings of a total value of several dozen billion karbovantsi will be put up for sale. Any kind of enterprise with any kind of property status is entitled to purchase these facilities. There is only one stipulation: that the buyers will use them for production of domestic consumption goods or for public services

Kazakhstan

Uzbek Delegation Visits, Signs Economic Agreements

LD2907150493 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1437
GMT 29 Jul 93

[By KAZTAG correspondent Konstantin Borodinov for TASS]

[Text] Almaty July 29 TASS—Prime Minister Sergey Tereshchenko of Kazakhstan and visiting Uzbek First Deputy Prime Minister Ismail Dzhurabekov signed a number of intergovernmental documents on Thursday [29 July], the concluding day of a working visit to Kazakhstan of Uzbek President Islam Karimov who met here his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbayev.

The agreement on the deepening of bilateral economic integration in 1994-2000 provides for forming joint expert groups to work out proposals concerning the organisation of joint ventures based on the optimal use of the production capacities available in the two republics.

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan also agreed to cooperate to increase their export potential and develop high-tech production.

As to other intergovernmental agreements, they aim to consolidate a legal basis for equal and mutually beneficial economic relations and create propitious conditions for large-scale bilateral cooperation.

Exact guidelines were given for remitting non-commercial payments, redrafting indebtedness under technical credits, regulating mutual settlements for gas, electrical power and oil products supplied to Kazakhstan during the first six months of 1993.

As Uzbekistan needs food grain badly, the two parties signed an agreement on grain supplies (one million tonnes) via the "Kazkhleboprodukt" Kazakh concern in 1993. Besides, local authorities are now entitled to sign direct agreements for the supplies of another million tonnes of grain to Uzbekistan.

Karimov and accompanying officials left for Tashkent on Thursday [29 July].

Presidents Address CIS Leaders

LD2807141993 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1358
GMT 28 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Amangeldy Akhmetimov]

[Text] Almaty July 28 TASS—Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, who arrived for a brief working visit here today, and Kazakhstan President Nursultan Nazarbayev had a prolonged conversation. In addition to matters related to the activity of both republics, they

exchanged opinions on the political and economic situation that formed in the post-soviet space and adopted an "address to the heads of state of the Commonwealth of Independent States".

The document says:

"Unjustifiable damage has been done of late to the economic reforms in the CIS countries and to the strengthening and development of their cooperation. Instead of making efforts to integrate economies and doing specific work to create interstate structures for coordinated interaction, individual states engage in increasingly prevalent separatism and isolationism within the CIS framework and wish to overcome the crisis on their own or at the expense of infringing the economic interests of neighbouring states. Arrangements achieved through much effort are disrupted by unilateral actions now and again. For instance, the implementation of the agreement on creating an interstate bank, ratified by a number of parliaments, is unjustifiably delayed. A collective security treaty and coordinated principles of the financial and crediting policy have been virtually buried.

All this destroys the possible common space of interaction between CIS countries in various areas and does outright economic damage to them. The main thing is that all this disappoints people and makes them distrustful of any authority, and so dangerously aggravates social tension.

Concerned over such developments, we propose a prompt convocation of a meeting of the heads of state of the Commonwealth member countries to discuss the following questions:

1. On the implementation of the decision to create an economic union and its coordinating bodies, taking into account the fact that the coordinating and consultative committee has completed drafting a corresponding treaty;
2. On undelayed putting into operation of an agreement on an interstate bank, first of all, multilateral interstate settlements on the basis of establishing a payments union of the CIS;
3. On effective implementation of a collective security treaty and fulfilment of agreements on strategic forces of the CIS.

We believe the meeting of the heads of state can be held in early August in Moscow or in some other city".

Presidents View Tajikistan

LD2907145893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1436
GMT 29 Jul 93

[By KAZTAG news agency correspondent Konstantin Borodinov for TASS]

[Text] Almaty July 29 TASS—The necessity of an economic union of CIS countries was again emphasised here on Thursday [29 July] at a joint press conference of President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan and President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistan.

At their meeting here on Wednesday, the two presidents adopted an address to the heads of state of CIS countries, suggesting that a CIS summit be held in Moscow or elsewhere at the beginning of August. The acute problems that must be discussed, in their view, are prospects for economic cooperation of CIS countries, ways to get out of the obtaining crisis jointly.

The presidents of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan declared for the development of relations between the sovereign states at a new level. "Only a realistic and competent approach to the establishment of good economic relations, and efficient transportation arrangements will enable all of us to get out of the deadlock," it was pointed out at the press conference.

As far as the events on the Tajik-Afghan border are concerned, the two presidents regard as unacceptable a solution to the issue by strongarm methods. The conflict can resolved only through diplomatic, political methods, through negotiations with the Governments of Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and other neighbouring states.

Islam Karimov and Nursultan Nazarbayev believe that it is also essential to do active work among the opposition inside the country and seek reasonable compromises along the road of democratic reforms.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Tajikistan

LD2907213593 Moscow *ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian* 1355 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Report by ITAR-TASS correspondent Amangeldy Akhmetaliyev]

[Excerpts] Almaty, 29 Jul—"Encroachments on the territorial integrity of sovereign Tajikistan pose a real threat, not only to that country, but to the whole Central Asian region as well. In these conditions, all sides should take part in a dialogue in order to search for a solution to the deadlock," says a statement by Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry, circulated by its press service today. The statement says that "it has been observed in Kazakhstan that armed attacks on the border posts in Tajikistan are mainly launched from the territory of Afghanistan. This has already brought about unjustifiable deaths of Russian servicemen who are guarding the border at the request of Tajikistan's government and in agreement with corresponding decisions of the conference of the CIS heads of state."

Kazakhstan's Foreign Ministry believes that "Tajikistan has a lawful right to take the required retaliatory steps in order to repulse the aggression and protect its territorial integrity."

Bulgaria's Zhelev Arrives, To Sign Agreements

AU3007054693 Sofia *BTA in English* 1826 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Sofia, July 29 (BTA)—Bulgarian President Zhelyu Zhelev today arrived on a two-day official visit to Kazakhstan, at the invitation of Kazakh President Nursultan Nazarbayev. At the airport President Zhelev was welcomed by Supreme Soviet Chairman Serikbolsyn Abdildin and other officials.

In a short statement for the Kazakh Television at the airport, Mr. Zhelev stressed the importance of the bilateral treaty expected to be signed tomorrow which will set the legal framework for the signing of the remaining seven agreements between different Bulgarian and Kazakh organizations and firms, as well as for the signing of a trade cooperation agreement and a protocol on the delivery of goods and services, the Bulgarian National Radio's special correspondent reported from Almaty.

Representatives of Bulgarian private companies who arrived in Almaty before the official delegation have signed agreements on financial cooperation and payments guarantees.

A considerable number of Bulgarians are now living in Kazakhstan. The Bulgarian colony dates back to the late 50s and early 60s when the Karaganda Metallurgical Combined Works were built. Bulgarian and Kazakhstan are expected to reach an agreement on establishing conditions for the preservation and development of the ethnic, language, cultural and religious identity of their fellow countrymen.

Tomorrow the two presidents will first hold a private meeting which will be followed by talks between the official delegations of the two countries.

On board the plane to Almaty President Zhelev told journalists that Kazakhstan is "a country of great opportunities" in which many countries are showing interest. He expressed the hope that Bulgaria will not be too late in establishing closer contacts with Kazakhstan and its enormous economic potentials.

Signs Cooperation Treaty

AU3007091893 Sofia *Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian* 0800 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] In Almaty the presidents of Bulgaria and Kazakhstan, Zhelyu Zhelev and Nursultan Nazarbayev, signed a state treaty on friendship and cooperation between the two countries. The main principle embodied in the treaty is partnership on an equal basis.

Our special correspondent, Khristo Khristov, informed us that this important document formed the juridical framework on the basis of which a trade and economic agreement was signed on cooperation in the fields of agriculture, industry, pharmaceuticals, and construction. The two sides also signed agreements between sectors of the two countries' economies.

Space Equipment Workers Protest Working Conditions

PM2907132193 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
28 Jul 93 First Edition p 6

[Undated letter from Kazakhstan signed by G. Sonis, leader of Samara's "Progress" Enterprise; Ye. Drozdov, chief engineer; and 10 other unidentified signatories, carried under the "Readers' Opinions" rubric: "No. 125: 'Nightmare at the Cosmodrome'"]

[Text] The "Progress" Plant which employs us is situated in Samara, while the assembly and test complex where the collective works is at the Baykonur Cosmodrome. We are engaged in assembling the "Energiya" launcher. We work but have no idea whether all this is necessary.

The launch complexes constructed for the "Energiya" are falling apart, the airfield where the "Buran" used to land is becoming overgrown with weeds, while we workers in the space sector, which was a source of pride until recently, finds itself in a really strange situation.

Winter was a struggle against the cold, the building was virtually unheated, and top-class specialists turned plumbers—replacing the burst heating systems and draining off water from the mains to prevent any new freeze-up.

The summer came and brought new problems with it: A constant water shortage, let alone the fact that the water is generally unfit for consumption; the shutdown of a compressor station; the flooding of underground structures by drainage water; the constant threat of the electricity being cut off for nonpayment; and so forth. Despite this, the building stores several assembled rockets and custom-made equipment, and visiting foreign delegations continue to marvel at and admire our complex.

Our machine shop (with a total of around 300 machine tools), which is capable of producing any equipment, can no longer function normally. The supply of materials and instruments from the base enterprise in Samara has been stopped because of customs duties. Imagine having to pay duty to send a piece of apparatus to be checked at the plant laboratory.

[Signed] Enterprise leader G. Sonis, Chief Engineer Ye. Drozdov, total of 12 signatures

Kyrgyzstan

Status of Tajik, PRC Borders Examined

LD2907175093 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 0322 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Excerpt] We are now going over live to Bishkek to hear today's news from Kyrgyzstan; above all, the details of certain events on the republic's external and internal borders. So, I say good morning to our correspondent, Aleksandr Mirtov.

[Mirtov] Good morning. Naturally, we are all following present events on the Tajik-Afghan frontier. Another reason why peace and stability in this region are so important to Kyrgyzstan, as well as to other Central Asian republics, is the geographical proximity of these republics to the hotbed of tension.

In accordance with the Minsk agreement reached by the CIS heads of state, a battalion of Kyrgyzstan's Armed Forces arrived in the Khorog sector of the Tajik-Afghan border the other day. Five hundred soldiers, sergeants, and officers—all of whom are volunteers serving under contract—will be stationed there.

Why has the Kyrgyz battalion been deployed in this specific sector of the border? The Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast of Tajikistan, which borders directly on Afghanistan, is connected via mountain passes with the town of Osh, an oblast center in Kyrgyzstan. Naturally, therefore, this will be a direct escape route into our republic in the event of any unpredictable contingencies.

So, in the Khorog area of Tajikistan, the external border is being reinforced. But an event has taken place that encourages optimism in a different sector of Kyrgyzstan's external border. Yesterday, Kyrgyzstan President Askar Akayev took part in the formal opening of the Torugart border checkpoint on the Sino-Kyrgyz border. The new checkpoint will be a kind of gateway to the outside world for our republic. It matches up to all the international requirements expected of border customs posts. In recent times, the border between Kyrgyzstan and China has become a border of friendship and good-neighborliness. The flow of goods carried along this road has increased significantly. The number of tourists has also increased. The road from Kyrgyzstan to China via Torugart will link our republic to Pakistan and India in due course, and thereby facilitate access to the high seas. This will, of course, offer great economic advantages.

Now, for a few words about events on our internal borders. Customs officials in areas of Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan that border on Kyrgyzstan are particularly busy at the moment. By remaining in the ruble zone, these republics are now obliged to stem the uncontrollable flow of motorists, most of them citizens of Kyrgyzstan, who are streaming in with their Soviet rubles. This has been caused by the bank note exchange announced by the Russian Central Bank. Furthermore, hundreds of people are now besieging the Russian Federation Embassy in Bishkek, demanding help in exchanging their wooden rubles for Russia's 1993 bank notes. These are people who mainly intend to emigrate permanently to Russia. On the point of departure, they suddenly find themselves saddled with completely unwanted rubles. Also affected are people who normally work in Russia but who are currently visiting relatives and friends in Kyrgyzstan or spending holidays there. Now they find themselves without any means of supporting themselves, and nobody knows how to help them. [passage omitted]

Akayev Opens Customs Point on PRC Border

LD2807162593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0948 GMT 28 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Maynaye]v]

[Text] Bishkek, 28 Jul—The president of the Republic of Kyrgyzstan is taking part today in an opening ceremony of a customs point at Torugart pass on the Chinese border. Kyrgyzstan remains China's third largest trading partner among Central Asian republics of the former Soviet Union. Last year trade turnover between the two countries amounted to \$35 million. Kyrgyzstan exports to China fertilizers, glass, metal bars, and pipes; and imports light industry goods, sugar, and kitchenware. Twenty-six joint Kyrgyz-Chinese ventures have been created in Kyrgyzstan.

Akayev Postpones Moscow Trip Due to Zhelev Visit

LD3007110593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0755 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Nainaye]v]

[Text] Bishkek July 30 TASS—President Askar Akayev of Kyrgyzstan has put off his visit to Moscow for several days. The postponement is due to the fact that President Zhelyu Zhelev of Bulgaria is expected to arrive on a visit to Bishkek on Saturday [31 July].

Prime Minister Discusses Army's Role, Defense Doctrine

LD2807194393 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1330 GMT 28 Jul 93

[By KYRGYZKABAR correspondent Albert Bogdanov for TASS]

[Text] Bishkek, 28 Jul—"We should not delude ourselves that Kyrgyzstan does not have any potential enemies at this time. The situation can change at any moment and the republic's neutrality must be defended by the Army," Prime Minister Tursunbek Chingyshev, who was visiting troop units of the young state, said today. He stressed that in Kyrgyzstan's draft defense doctrine a special role is allocated to comity with the Russian Armed Forces and other CIS states. This is particularly important now when the republic's Army is suffering from an acute shortage of officer cadres.

Official Stresses Close Ties With Russia

LD2907100593 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1249 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By KYRGYZKABAR correspondent Albert Bogdanov for TASS]

[Text] Bishkek July 29 TASS—"Only with the help of Russia do we intend to solve our military problems,"

said Myrkazan Subanov who has been appointed chairman of Kyrgyzstan's Defence Committee.

Subanov stressed that the military doctrine which has yet to be approved by the republican parliament is directed towards close cooperation with Russia and other CIS states.

Subanov is a career officer. He graduated from two military academies and served in Afghanistan. Before the appointment he worked as first deputy chief of staff of the Turkestan Military District.

Tajikistan**Attack on U.S. Diplomat's Residence Reported**

NC3007085493 Paris AFP in English 2323 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Dushanbe, July 30 (AFP)—A grenade exploded outside the home of a U.S. diplomat in the Tajik capital Dushanbe late Thursday [29 July], slightly wounding a guard on duty, the diplomat said.

Tajik security officials blamed the attack on Islamic opposition forces who fled to northern Afghanistan last year after a pro-communist faction drove out the Islamic-led government from Dushanbe in November.

The diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity, was absent at the time of the blast around 9:30 p.m. (1630 GMT).

The guard was slightly wounded by flying glass. He had taken cover after noticing that electrical wires and the telephone had been cut.

Russian officials expressed concern after the attack, saying it may be part of a campaign to force foreign envoys out of Tajikistan.

Moscow and Dushanbe signed a mutual assistance agreement last May under which Russian troops are to help Tajikistan until 1999.

Russia has sent reinforcements to Tajikistan since 25 Russian border guards were killed in fighting with Islamic Tajik rebels on the Afghan border on July 13.

Russia's Adamishin Arrives, Comments on Peace Talks

LD2907141293 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1347 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Galina Gridneva and Yuriy Tyssovski]y]

[Text] Dushanbe July 29 TASS—A Russian delegation, led by Anatoliy Adamishin, first deputy minister of foreign affairs, arrived here on Thursday [29 July]. Upon arrival, the Russian diplomat told journalists that he brought with him a message from President Boris Yeltsin to Tajikistan parliament chief Imamali Rakhmanov.

"The purpose of our mission proceeds from Russia's stand—to help friendly Tajikistan in the hour of need," Adamishin said. "We shall, of course, do everything that will depend on us. By Tajikistan I mean primarily its legitimate government, with which we, other countries and the United Nations maintain relations," he said.

Touching upon a possible participation of Tajik opposition representatives in talks between Russia, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Afghanistan at subsequent stages, the Russian delegation leader said "the problem is of purely intra-Tajik nature".

"We, for our part, can render the necessary assistance in this respect if we are asked to do that," he said. "Russia's stand is that it is essential to look for as wide national accord as possible on the basis of political means. Military measures should also be taken, of course, because if there are instances of attack on the territory of Tajikistan, such attacks should be repulsed. But Russia lays main emphasis on political settlement measures".

In response to a question from an ITAR-TASS correspondent about Afghanistan's attitude to a four-sided meeting, Adamishin said work to prepare such a meeting is now in progress and recalled that the idea of such a meeting was suggested precisely by Afghanistan. The idea was supported by the leadership of Tajikistan that suggested Dushanbe as a venue. The point is not whether it will be held in the capital of Tajikistan or elsewhere. It is important that it be held with the consent of all the four sides.

Anatoliy Adamishin has had a meeting with Imamali Rakhmanov.

Russian, Tajik Troops Continue Operations Against Opposition

LD2907172893 Moscow Radio Rossii Network in Russian 0334 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Here is our special correspondent Vladimir Makarachev on the telephone from the combat zone on the Tajik-Afghan border:

[Makarachev] In the hills on Tajikistan territory, 15 kilometers from the Afghan border, guerrillas have set up a base where for two months they have deposited weapons and ammunition. The aim of the Islamic Revival Party guerrillas is pretty clear: To extend their influence to the border territories of Tajikistan, to take the towns of Kulyab and Gorno Badakshan Oblast, and then to proclaim the establishment of an independent Islamic state. This kind of action threatens the integrity and independence of the Republic of Tajikistan.

As you already know, in the area of border posts 11 and 12, operations continue to wipe out a large group of guerrillas. The operation is being carried out by the Armed Forces of Tajikistan and Russian border troops.

Subunits of Russia's 201st Division are supporting the border troops with artillery and mortar fire. [sentence indistinct]

Preliminary results of the operation say that two ammunition dumps and some weapons have been blown up, around 50 guerrillas have been killed, and the guerrillas have been beaten back from all the dominating high ground and partially dispersed. A group of around 80 men have been surrounded five or six kilometers from the border. For the second night now the guerrillas have been making unsuccessful attempts to break out and reach the territory of Afghanistan across the River Pyandzh.

Early this morning a group of around 200 guerrillas approached the crossing point from Afghan territory, started a push through to those surrounded, and a battle was engaged. In order to prevent the guerrillas from reaching the territory of Tajikistan, it was decided to make a bombing raid by ground support aircraft from Commonwealth countries on the crossing. The fighting is continuing at the moment; there are no fatalities on our side. I would like to stress that the bombing strike by ground support aircraft from the Commonwealth countries is the second in the past three days. Air and artillery strikes are being made exclusively against the border, Afghan territory is not being fired upon. I am not afraid to express the general view of Russian border troops here in Tajikistan, that Russia must help the young state to guard its border and stop the aggression from the territory of the neighboring state of Afghanistan, even though Russia has no border with Tajikistan.

The stable border of a neighboring friendly state is stability for the borders of Russia.

Border Remains Tense

LD3007105793 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0830 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vladimir Gondusov]

[Text] Moscow, 30 Jul—The last 24 hours have been calm on the Tajik-Afghan border. There were no hostilities and no border violations were registered, an ITAR-TASS correspondent was told at the press service of Russian border troops. The situation remains tense, however, and urgent measures are being taken to prevent new attempts to violate the state border or to break through.

In the near future, border guards from other military districts and groups of forces will be dispatched to reinforce the group of Russian border guards in Tajikistan as envisaged by the Russian president's decree "On measures to settle the conflict on the Tajik-Afghan border and normalize the overall situation on the Russian Federation border."

Officers with extensive practical experience are to head operations for technically equipping the auxiliary points of border posts and to train personnel for defense combat.

Opposition Active in Gorno-Badakhshan

PM2907111193 Moscow ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA in Russian 28 Jul 93 First Edition p 7

[Vladimir Berezovskiy report under "Hot Spots" rubric and general headline "Echo of the Tajik Tragedy": "Internal Opposition Agitates Young People"]

[Text] There has been a marked deterioration of the situation in the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast. Antigovernment forces are calling on local inhabitants to refuse to submit to the authorities, to stir up unrest, and to seize installations. They are threatening reprisals against villagers who do not help the opposition. Local radio has broadcast an appeal from antigovernment forces to the population of Gorno-Badakhshan, calling on young people to fight on the side of the opposition. An assembly point was indicated in the region of the village of Tavildara. There the opposition has a firm hold on the Khaburrol Pass, through which passes the strategically important Dushanbe-Khorog highway.

Last weekend there was an unusual calm on the Afghan-Tajik border. It would appear that the mojahedin were taking a time-out, having encountered the new tactics of the Russian border troops. The artillery and aviation which are being actively employed against the bandits are scattering their detachments as far back as the approach roads to Pyandzh, preventing them from massing their forces for a concerted attack.

At the same time, according to information from the Tajik Government, guerrillas of the banned Islamic Revival Party have not abandoned plans to transfer the war to the territory of the republic. In the Afghan village of Bahor a group of 900 men has been put together. It is preparing to infiltrate the border in Gorno-Badakhshan in order to link up with opponents of the present government, in effect occupying this autonomous oblast.

Incidentally, it is here, in the sector of the Khorog border detachment, that a Kazakh peacekeeping battalion is operating. At the headquarters of the Russian Border Troops in Tajikistan I was informed that Kyrgyz servicemen are expected to be brought to the border in the region of Ishkashim 28 July. So far there is no information about an Uzbek battalion.

Presidium Adopts Amnesty Decree, Views Economy

LD2907195793 Dushanbe Radio Dushanbe Network in Tajik 1700 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Excerpts] A regular session of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Tajikistan was held on 29 July, chaired by Supreme Soviet Chairman Imamali Rakhmanov. The session examined the issue of

paying compensation for the savings held by the population in the Tajikistan Savings Bank as a result of the monetary crisis.

In accordance with a decree passed at the session, savings remaining in the Savings Bank until 1 January 1993 will be increased by 100 percent, and savings deposited after 1 January 1993 that were not withdrawn until 1 May 1993 will be increased by 50 percent.

In accordance with a proposal by the Council of Ministers, the session examined a draft of a decree by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on granting concessionary loans to those people who have taken part in armed conflicts in defense of the legitimate government of the Republic of Tajikistan and those people who have been deprived of their [word indistinct] as a result of these conflicts. In accordance with this draft decree, concessionary loans of more than 7,000 rubles will be given to these people for: the construction or purchase of residential homes, additions to existing homes, the repair of damaged properties, the purchase of household goods, the purchase of cattle, and for other purposes. These concessionary loans will be repaid within 20 years, starting four years after the grant of the loan. [passage omitted]

The session also discussed a plan to deliver food stuffs and other goods during 1993-1994 to the mountainous regions of the republic. Mukhtashev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic, presented a report on the issue. [passage omitted]

Rakhmanov said resolutely at the session that criminal proceedings will begin against those who hinder the transportation of food stuffs to Badakhshan. A decision made in this regard instructs the Council of Ministers to resolutely supervise implementation of the plans for transportation of goods to inaccessible regions during 1993-1994. The Ministry of Internal Affairs, the National Security Committee, and the Defense Ministry were assigned the task of ensuring the security of convoys carrying goods on the roads.

On the occasion of the national holiday—Tajikistan's independence day—and in order to further stabilize the situation taking into account humanitarian principles, the session adopted a decree on a general amnesty that will be published in the press. This decree also extends to those who have taken refuge in the neighboring state of Afghanistan.

Article 4 of the decree on general amnesty states that the following category of citizens of the Republic of Tajikistan will be made exempt from criminal proceedings:

a) Those persons who are on the territory of the Islamic State of Afghanistan and are not members of armed formations active against the existing legitimate authorities of the Republic of Tajikistan, or those who voluntarily leave these armed formations and return to the Republic of Tajikistan no later than 9 September 1993;

b) Those persons who are members of the illegal armed formations active on the territory of the Republic of Tajikistan, provided they voluntarily leave these formations and give up their arms by 9 September 1993.

The session also adopted a decision to convene the World Tajik Congress on 9 September 1993 in the city of Dushanbe. An organizing committee was set up to convene the congress.

The session also discussed a number of other important state issues of the republic. The session was also attended by Samadov, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan.

Compensates Depreciation of Savings

LD3007125593 Moscow Programma Radio Odin Network in Russian 0730 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] Tajikistan's Supreme Soviet Presidium passed a decree today on the compensation of the population for the losses from the depreciation of their savings held in the republic's Savings Bank. The balances on the deposits of the population of Tajikistan in the Savings Bank as of 1 January 1993 have increased by 100 percent, and the deposits made at the Savings Bank after 1 January 1993 and which had not been withdrawn by May Day 1993 have increased by 50 percent. Five billion rubles are being allocated by the National Bank for these purposes.

Turkmenistan

Niyazov Issues Decree on Customs Control

LD2907202893 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 1956 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Lyudmila Glazovskaya]

[Text] Ashgabat July 29 TASS—President Saparmurad Niyazov today issued a decree on urgent measures to organize customs control in Turkmenistan to protect economic interests of the state. It is decreed that the customs control zone is the territory along Turkmenistan's border with adjacent states. The state customs are authorized to open customs posts and as of today register the passage of goods and other articles transferred by enterprises and organizations with every kind of property and by individuals across Turkmenistan's customs border. The decree prohibits the bringing into the republic's customs territory of rouble banknotes of the 1961-1992 issues.

The state customs are to ensure customs control over the influx and outflow of money in circulation in Turkmenistan's territory. The state Central Bank is to revise the norms for bringing and taking out money in circulation in Turkmenistan's territory and the procedure of the disposal of funds confiscated from citizens.

Afghan Officials Sign Cooperation Agreement

LD2807200293 Kabul Radio Afghanistan Network in Pashto 1530 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Text] At the invitation of Turkmenistan President Saparmurad Niyazov, a high-ranking delegation of the Islamic State of Afghanistan presided over by esteemed General Ismail Khan, special representative of the president of the Islamic State of Afghanistan, recently went to that country. The Afghan delegation was received at Ashkabad airport by the vice president, foreign minister, and a number of senior officials of the Republic of Turkmenistan. The Afghan delegation consists of esteemed Gholam Sakhi Mesbah, deputy cultural affairs minister, esteemed Mohammad Rahim Qazizada, head of [word indistinct] and political department of the Presidency, and Lieutenant General Gholam Jailani, deputy minister of technical affairs. According to another report the delegation had useful meetings with the vice presidents and ministers of foreign affairs, defense, internal affairs, and national security. As a result, a cooperation agreement was signed on the supply of fuel, [words indistinct], and the placing of asphalt on the Toghondi-Farah road.

Iranian Ambassador Discusses Agricultural Cooperation

LD2907091993 Tehran IRNA in English 0705 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Moscow, July 29, IRNA—Turkmen Vice President for Agriculture [title as received] Jorakuly Babakulyev and Iran's Ambassador to Ashgabat Gholam Reza Baqeri Wednesday [28 July] discussed outlooks for Iran-Turkmenistan cooperation in the area of agro-industries.

The Turkmen official proposed that Iranian farmers in Mazandaran province of Iran offer their expertise to Turkmen farmers across the border and especially in Gizil Atrak and Gizil Arvat, two Turkmen towns on the eastern side of the Caspian Sea just off the border with Iran.

Baqeri and the Turkmen official also discussed issues on the outlooks for the two countries cooperation in the area of agricultural machinery, horticulture and development of tropical and desert-type plants. They reached preliminary agreement on those areas pending follow up talks and subsequent feasibility studies by experts of both countries.

Armenia

Details of Karabakh-Azerbaijan 28 Jul Talks

NC2907201193 Yerevan ARMENPRES International Service in Armenian 1418 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] A meeting of the representatives of the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh and Azerbaijani Republics took place in Nagorno-Karabakh Republic's [NKR] Markertskiy Rayon between 1400-1800 hours on 28 July.

Acting Defense Minister S. Abiyev, State Minister I. Aliyev, a responsible official of the Azerbaijani AGN [expansion unknown] T. Zulfukarov, and Deputy Chairman of the Commission on POWs and Hostages I. Kazimov took part on the Azerbaijani side.

Foreign Minister Arkadiy Gukasyan, Defense Minister Serch Sargisyan, Chairman of the State Directorate for National Security Kamo Abrahamyan, and Chairman of the Commission on POWs and Hostages Aleksandr Agasaryan took part on the NKR's side.

According to the report from the NKR Defense Army headquarters, the sides discussed the issue of extending the cease-fire by five more days and the possibility of a high-level meeting between the leaders of the two republics.

They also discussed a list of issues related to POWs and hostages.

The Karabakh side put forward two draft agreements on the long-term cessation of shooting and on the meeting of the leaders of the two republics as soon as possible.

The Azerbaijani side indicated that these proposals will be presented to the leadership for its consideration, and only after that will a reply be given.

The sides expressed the view that all measures must be taken for the peaceful resolution of the conflict, and noted the importance of periodic meetings between the leaders of the two countries. The sides agreed to hold periodic contacts to discuss the overall aspect of the problem.

As a good-will gesture, the Karabakh side handed over a prisoner to the Azerbaijanis soon after the meeting. A preliminary agreement was reached to exchange all the prisoners without preconditions.

At the conclusion of the meeting, which passed in a constructive atmosphere of mutual trust, the leaders of the defense departments of the two sides signed an agreement.

Karabakh Foreign Minister To Lead Talks

NC2907200093 Yerevan SNARK in English 1546 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Stepanakert, July 29 (SNARK)—Karabakh parliament acting chairman Karen Baburyan instructed Arkadiy Gukasyan from now on to lead negotiations and

sign documents on the question of organization of summit between Azerbaijani and Karabakh leaders. The resolution was adopted in accordance with the agreement among officials of the two republics taken place at the Karabakh-Azerbaijani border.

Meanwhile, Karabakh defence state committee informed SNARK that according to its information the Azerbaijani side has not yet granted its representative with such powers.

Deputy Argues Armenian Intelligence Vulnerable

LD3007101193 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0851 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Tigran Liloyan]

[Text] Yerevan July 30—"Armenia now is actually an open country: It is not controlled by its national secret service. People are recruited by foreign intelligence service agents, who unhamperedly gather various information, evidently bribing and brain-washing officials. People travel to Stepanakert and Nagorno-Karabakh to gather military information.

"The free Armenian media publish very many materials, facts and figures which suffice to make a profound analysis of the current situation and its prospects, military-economical and technical potential of the republic can be estimated. It is not very difficult to take out of the republic any technical documents, that could otherwise be worked out only by large laboratory or industrial espionage professionals.

"If the Armenian security system is not developed in a year, we shall lose not only the war but also our national state," the newspaper GOLOS ARMENIYI quoted a member of Armenian parliament Igor Muradyan as saying.

Azerbaijan

Referendum on Confidence in Elchibey Rejected

NC2907190793 Baku TURAN in English 1508 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Baku July 29 (TURAN)—The committee on legislation of Milli Mejlis declined a proposal of Geydar Aliyev of holding general referendum on confidence to President Abulfaz Elchibey. As the member of the committee Ibragim Ibragimov reported TURAN agency, the refusal was motivated by the assertion that a referendum cant be held under circumstances of state of emergency.

As known, the state of emergency was introduced in Azerbaijan early April this year for a term of 60 days, and then it was prolonged for the same term. Today Milli Mejlis will discuss a question of prolonging the term of state of emergency in the Republic.

Referendum 'Will Be Held'

NC2907173093 Baku AZERTAC in Azeri 1648 GMT
29 Jul 93

[Text] Baku, 29 Jul (AZERTAC)—A referendum on confidence in the Republic's President Abulfaz Elchibey will be held in Azerbaijan on 28 August. The ongoing session of the Azerbaijan National Assembly just adopted this decision.

As reported, following the Ganja incidents Abulfaz Elchibey left for Keleki in Ordubadskiy Rayon on 18 June, and he is still there.

State of Emergency Extended for Two Months

LD2907164593 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1555 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent]

[Text] Baku, 29 Jul—The state of emergency in Azerbaijan was extended for a further two months by a decision of the republic's National Assembly this evening. The state of emergency was declared here at the beginning of April in connection with a deterioration in the sociopolitical situation caused by the occupation of Kelbadzhar Rayon by Armenian armed formations and has already been extended once. Official authorities are saying that this decision is dictated by the continuing tension in Azerbaijan, which has grown following the capture of Agdam by Armenian armed formations.

National Assembly 29 Jul Session Elects New Members

NC2907182493 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] The Azerbaijan National Assembly resumed its work today. The deputies elected Prime Minister Surat Guseynov, Deputy Prime Minister Rasul Guliyev, and People's Deputy (Asya Monakova) as members of the National Assembly.

The National Assembly approved the appointment of Tahir Aliyev as the chairman of the Azerbaijan [word indistinct] Committee and Muzamil Abdullayev as the minister of agriculture and food. Later, the members of the National Assembly approved the resignation of Tahir Kerimli, chairman of the Azerbaijan Supreme Court. The session debated the extension of the state of emergency in the Republic. The decision of the National Assembly on the matter was approved.

The National Assembly adopted a decision for a referendum on the question of confidence in President Abulfaz Elchibey.

Changes Government Staff

NC2907191393 Baku TURAN in English 1508 GMT
29 Jul 93

[Text] Baku July 29 (TURAN)—Yesterday at midnight close sitting of Milli Mejlis, in the result of which a number of new appointments in the government had been made, came to the end.

Rakhim Gaziyeu, adversary of President Elchibey, who had been defense minister from March 1992 till February 1993, was appointed by Milli Mejlis vice-premier of defense industry.

Tahir Aliyev, the chairman of MM [National Assembly] Commission on Ethics, who had occupied in 1992 the offices of defense minister and minister of internal affairs, is appointed the chairman of Custom-House Committee.

Muzamil Abdullayev is appointed minister of agriculture.

President Elchibey's supporters, the Chairman of Custom-House Committee Muzamil Abdullayev, Minister of Agriculture Tofik Guseynov and Minister of Foreign Economic Relations Rauf Karayev are resigned.

At the same time 29 members of Azerbaijani Supreme Court have sent an appeal to Milli Mejlis, demanding that their chairman Tahir Kerimli, member of PFA, [People's Front of Azerbaijan] be resigned.

Addressing Milli Mejlis, Kerimli pointed, that he would resign only if legitimate President Elchibey demanded that.

Last summer T. Kerimli was appointed the chairman of Supreme Court. In line with legislation, Milli Mejlis can confirm the chairman of Supreme Court on representation of the president of the Republic. The process of liberation is going on in reserve succession.

On Geydar Aliyev's proposal the question of the chairman of Supreme Court is postponed for three days.

Yesterday Milli Mejlis made amendments into the decree on the regime of state of emergency, which hardened the punishment towards violators. The term of administrative arrest is prolonged for 30 more days instead of 15 ones. Administrative fine can be passed in a number divisible by 7 from minimal payment. Minimal payment in Azerbaijan is amounting 5 thousand roubles.

Today Milli Mejlis will continue its work. The matter on referendum on confidence to the president and on introducing of amendments into the decree on regime of state of emergency is on the agenda.

Aliyev, Moscow Government Official Discuss Trade

LD2907181993 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1240 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondents Sevidzh Abdullayeva and Viktor Shulman]

[Text] Baku, 29 Jul—The expansion of direct links between Azerbaijan and Moscow was discussed today at a meeting between the Geydar Aliyev, the acting president of Azerbaijan, and Ernest Bakirov, deputy prime minister of the Russian capital's government. The representative of the Moscow Government has arrived in Baku to discuss issues connected with the upcoming signing of an agreement on trade and economic cooperation between Azerbaijan and the Russian capital.

The interlocutors expressed their dissatisfaction with the present level of bilateral links by underlining that "they should be raised to a higher level." According to Geydar Aliyev, these contacts could become "the path" along which one could go onto the road of a wider cooperation between the two states which have deep historical roots.

During the meeting in Baku it was underlined that there is a necessity to work out the mechanisms of interaction between the Azerbaijani and Moscow partners. The deputy prime minister of the Moscow Government told correspondents about the intention to up a joint stock company and a joint bank. He said that this would be a private-state company, that would assist in setting up direct economic links between the economic structures and enterprises of Moscow and Azerbaijan.

UNSC Demands Troop Withdrawal From Agdam

LD3007101693 Moscow ITAR-TASS in English 0653 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Boris Sitnikov]

[Text] United Nations Organisation July 30 TASS—The U.N. Security Council has demanded the immediate withdrawal of occupation forces from Agdam and all other occupied regions of Azerbaijan, says Resolution No. 853 (1993), which was unanimously adopted at its Thursday session.

The resolution says that the Security Council demands the immediate termination of all hostilities and the immediate, full and unconditional withdrawal of all the occupation troops, taking part in the conflict, from the area of Agdam and all other recently occupied regions of the Republic of Azerbaijan. The Security Council urged Armenia to continue to exert its influence in order to persuade Armenians, living in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan, to observe Resolution 822 and the present resolution, and to accept proposals of the CSCE Minsk group. The resolution welcomes measures for preparing the CSCE observer mission, as well as the examination of proposals on ensuring CSCE presence in the region.

The Security Council urged the U.N. secretary-general and corresponding international organisations to render urgent humanitarian assistance to the suffering civilian population and to help displaced persons return home.

Armenian Forces Reportedly Bombard Fizuli

NC2907191993 Baku TURAN in English 1508 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Baku July 29 (TURAN)—Today Armenian armed forces, having half circled Azeri town Fizuli, went on bombardment of the town.

As defense headquarter of Fizulinskiy region informed, situation remains critical.

As it was reported from the other regions of the conflict, both sides abstained from using the weapons.

Memorandum on Cooperation Signed With Iran

NC2907154393 Baku Radio Baku Network in Azeri 1700 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Text] First Deputy Prime Minister Vahid Akhmedov today received an Iranian delegation headed by Mohammad Sa'idi-Kia, the minister of roads and transportation. Akhmedov also received the visiting Iranian delegation on 26 July. The Council of Ministers press center informed an AZERTAC correspondent that the two sides welcomed the systematic development of economic relations between Azerbaijan and Iran and stressed the need to improve bilateral cooperation. On behalf of the Azerbaijani Government, Vahid Akhmedov expressed deep gratitude for Iran's aid to the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic in the [words indistinct] and other fields.

Mohammad Sa'idi-Kia said: We know what war means. So, we will not refrain from helping Azerbaijan's friendly people.

He also informed Akhmedov that Iran will dispatch 5,000 tents, 3,000 [word indistinct], 20 tonnes of [word indistinct], and 10 tonnes of wheat and other provisions to the refugees in Azerbaijan soon.

The sides discussed the possibility of removing the problems to make travel and freight transport between the two countries easier. They signed a memorandum on cooperation on international transport services between the two countries. The memorandum relates to automobile, rail, and air transport between Iran and Azerbaijan. The two sides agreed [words indistinct] that Iran is facilitating the opening of an Azerbaijani Airline Company office in Tehran.

A committee of experts was established to solve the problems relating to the establishment of [words indistinct], the construction of guest houses, and the opening of joint businesses.

Georgia

Shevardnadze, Abkhaz Officials Discuss Cease-Fire

LD2907134793 Moscow Mayak Radio Network in Russian 1200 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Eduard Shevardnadze held a meeting today with representatives of the pro-Tbilisi government of the Abkhaz Autonomous Republic and officers of the 23d Army Brigade in Sukhumi. The question of the implementation of the cease-fire agreement was discussed. The Georgian leader is continuing his meetings in Sukhumi today.

Deputy Speaker Says Cease-Fire Pact 'Painful'

LD2907213493

[Editorial Report] Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian at 1505 GMT on 29 July carries a three-minute live or recorded interview with Rusudan Beridze, deputy speaker of the Georgian parliament, by an unidentified correspondent. The place and date of the interview are not given.

Beridze says: "It is painful and hard to speak about this agreement, but there was no other way out at the time. An agreement had to be signed, and the dreadful butchery had to be stopped." She says that a quiet day evokes hopes that the agreement will be viable.

Beridze says that the intervention by the United Nations and a proposal that 150 U.N. observers should be sent to Abkhazia instead of the 50 previously planned is encouraging. She says she has always supported the idea of a peaceful settlement of the conflict. She says: "There are very hard points. This is understood by everyone." She adds that the main thing is: "There will be no more casualties."

In response to a question about the possibility of Russia's violating the agreement, Beridze says that past experience prevents her from fully trusting the Russians and calls for being cautious. She says: "They cheated us many times and let us down many times." She says that Russian Foreign Minister Andrey Kozyrev's recent statement stirs some hope, however; Russia would rather have the Abkhazian conflict settled because it has a lot of other hot spots like Tajikistan and Ukraine. Beridze says: "You cannot hope that Russia will do something because it is in sympathy with us."

Georgian Troops Report Shelling by Abkhaz Forces

LD3007084493 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 0800 GMT 30 Jul 93

[Text] The press center of the Georgian Armed Forces in Abkhazia told CONTACT INFORMATION AGENCY this morning that it was rather tense on the front lines last night.

The Abkhaz armed formations attempted an assault near the village of Tsugorovka in the direction of Shroma and Akhalsheeni, where they opened fire on the positions of the Georgian Armed Forces.

The enemy also breached the cease-fire agreement in the Ochamchira Rayon and shelled the Georgian positions using mortars and grenade launchers.

It is quiet in Sukhumi. No combat actions are taking place this morning. Unpleasant activities are taking place in the conflict zone, which prevent implementation of the cease-fire agreement, but it is hoped that the participation of the international observers will play a positive role in settling this issue.

Georgian Troops Reportedly Attack Gumista, Shroma

LD3007103693 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 0932 GMT 30 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Irina Shchegoleva]

[Text] Sochi, 30 Jul—An ITAR-TASS correspondent has been told at the Abkhazian Supreme Soviet press service that Georgian troops fired on Abkhazian positions at the Gumista sector of the front, using machine guns on Thursday evening. Overnight the Georgian troops attacked the Shroma sector of the front. According to the same source, the attack was repelled. There were light exchanges of fire and machine-gun fire at the central sector of the eastern front. The Abkhaz Republic Defence Ministry has organized a group of officers who will take up their duties as part of the trilateral commission of observers along the entire line of the Gumista and eastern fronts.

Health Ministry Reports Casualties in Abkhaz Conflict

LD2907183693 Tbilisi IBERIA NEWS AGENCY in Georgian 1435 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Tbilisi, 29 Jul—An IBERIA correspondent reports from the Georgian Ministry of Health that, since the beginning of the war in the Abkhazian region, the number of casualties in the Georgian Armed Forces is 5,502 wounded and 1,510 dead servicemen.

Shevardnadze on Current Situation in Abkhazia

LD2907180093 Tbilisi Radio Tbilisi Network in Georgian 1505 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] During his interview in Sukhumi on 29 July, Eduard Shevardnadze, the chairman of the Georgian parliament and head of state, pointed out that the previous night had been the first quiet night for months. However, there have occurred small violations in the Sukhumi area, and an incident near the village of Tamyshe since a cease-fire agreement was implemented, he said. Shevardnadze emphasized that back in the airplane he was informed that a 150-man assault group

had been landed in Ochamchira rayon, but the information was wrong and in fact only a minor local incident took place there.

Eduard Shevardnadze said that fairly good contacts had been fixed with the Gudauta leadership. At the moment, the issue of arranging temporary points of observation is significant. They will be placed in the most dangerous areas. The establishment of these will create a better chance to control the situation in a more efficient way.

Edouard Brunner, the U.N. secretary general's personal envoy, who has been entrusted with an important mission of ensuring the arrival of U.N. military observers and peacekeeping forces, is arriving in Sukhumi today. Brunner will visit Gudauta.

Also today, in Moscow, a decision will be taken on the issue of creating a Russian commission that will be included into the united commission.

This is an interim stage, and when U.N. representatives join in, the work on drawing up comprehensive agreements will begin. It will begin literally in a few days for the job cannot wait.

Answering a question whether Georgia has lost Samachablo [formerly South Ossetia] and Abkhazia, Eduard Shevardnadze stated categorically that nothing has been lost and everything that has been done is in the interests of Georgia. He emphasized the importance of preventing a repetition of mistakes made during the first two attempts to settle the conflict in Abkhazia. He added, "but I think the Russian leadership better understands

the size of the responsibility today. We have established a fairly good understanding. Russia is interested in Georgia's stability and peacefulness."

Russian Ruble Declared Foreign Currency From 3 Aug

*PM2907170493 Moscow ECONOMIC NEWS
AGENCY in Russian 1500 GMT 29 Jul 93*

[Text] The Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Georgia has resolved that from 3 August the Russian ruble will be deemed a foreign currency in the territory of Georgia. Ruble transactions in retail trade, the resolution says, will be illegal and will be treated as a crime. The republic's National Bank coupon will be the sole means of payment.

The Russian ruble is receiving the status of foreign currency and is subjected to the currency regulations operating in Georgia. As with the U.S. dollar, the German mark, the British pound sterling, and other currencies it will be possible to exchange the ruble for local coupons at the relevant market rate of exchange through banks and money exchanges, that need to have a license for this from the republic's National Bank.

This is the response of the republic's government to Russia's decision to remove from circulation its banknotes issued prior to 1993. At the same time, it has been decided to help the population who do not trust banks and keep savings at home by permitting R [Ruble] 100,000 to be exchanged for coupons at a rate of 1:1, although a few days ago the rate was 1:6.

Estonia

Yeltsin Representative Concerned Over Citizenship

LD2907162893 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 0900 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Russian President Boris Yeltsin is worried because several problems have not been solved in Estonia that concern granting citizenship to Russians living here.

According to a BNS report, a representative of Yeltsin, Abdullah Miktayev, yesterday handed over to President Lennart Meri a message from the Russian leader, Boris Yeltsin. In his letter Yeltsin directs the attention of President Meri to the provisions of the agreement on the foundations of Estonian-Russian interstate relations.

The head of the committee on citizenship, under the president of Russia, Miktayev, added that precise fulfillment of this agreement would assist Estonian-Russian talks out of the deadlock.

The Russian representative announced that President Meri had promised to make an address soon with which he would attempt to dispel the tensions that have arisen, and explain the policy of the powers with regard to national minorities.

In the words of Miktayev, Meri had thanked the Russian-speaking inhabitants of Estonia who during the tense time, which arose after the adoption of the Law on Foreigners, did not take inconsiderate steps and did not submit to emotions.

Today and tomorrow Miktayev, together with the delegation accompanying him, is staying in Narva and Sillamae.

Foreign Minister on Replacing Troops at Paldiski

LD2907084593 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Excerpts] [Unidentified correspondent] In accordance with the government's decision the volunteer company of light infantrymen of Laanemaa has left Paldiski, and its place has been taken by the A Company of the Kalev Battalion. We have at present a direct telephone connection with Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste, acting for the prime minister. Would you please tell us how the operation in Paldiski succeeded?

[Velliste] The operation proceeded very well. At around 0600 the company decided to leave Paldiski. This is in full accordance with yesterday's decision by the government. As the government has decided at the same time that it will begin to effectively control Paldiski, then, some time after that, the A Company of the Kalev Battalion entered Paldiski. This is, then, in accordance with the instruction by the head of the defense forces, General Einseln. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Has the company of light infantrymen also handed over arms?

[Velliste] Not yet, but we hope that this will occur as soon as possible. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The leaders of the company of light infantrymen have threatened that should it go as far as shooting, then they would also return fire. What do you think? Is the recovery of arms also connected with complications?

[Velliste] I do not think so. I am rather sure that it will not go as far as shooting, because the government, on its part, does not intend to begin any kind of shooting, and I think that the leaders of the company of light infantrymen will understand what this is about. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Have any kind of measures been implemented against the leaders of the company of light infantrymen? Have they been punished, or, is there an intention of punishing them?

[Velliste] Lawyers are dealing with that, but a bigger problem is in their past. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Have you had any contact with those leaders today? Have they given any explanation to the government?

[Velliste] Yes, there has been contact, there have been several instances of contact. [passage omitted]

Velliste on 'Final Round' of Talks

LD2907204593 Tallinn Radio Tallinn Network in Estonian 1700 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Excerpts] Members of the Riigikogu, the government, and defense force heads have today discussed at length what to do with the former volunteer company of light infantrymen which has been disbanded, but has not surrendered its arms. We requested Foreign Minister Trivimi Velliste, acting for the prime minister, to tell us how the situation is being solved.

[Begin Velliste recording] The situation reminds one a little of hijacking an aircraft, when four people have subjected others to their arbitrary power. You will have quite a clear idea that the ordinary soldiers of that company are entirely ordinary and normal soldiers. [passage omitted]

This evening there is a final round of talks in this phase. We shall propose to them that the former heads of the company, Asso Kommer, Jaak Mohil, Lembit Tonsve, and Juhan Kodar, leave the unit of troops without delay, as soon as the new leadership arrives on the spot. This will take place, evidently, tomorrow. The legal questions that have arisen will be solved by way of the court. Until the final decision of the court, the four mentioned men are to commit themselves to avoiding contact with the former personnel of the company.

Apart from that, we are proposing to the entire former company that with the arrival of the new leadership they accept that new leadership. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Can it also be assumed from these talks that Asso Kommer has not gone on the courses he was sent to?

[Velliste] No, he did not go there, and this is, well, the latest example of not obeying an order by the head of the defense forces.

[Correspondent] Do I understand from what you say, that whether they decide to lay down arms or not will become clear tomorrow?

[Velliste] In the better event, as early as this evening, but I hope by tomorrow at the latest.

We have decided to be flexible to a certain extent, and flexible precisely because the rank-and-file composition of the company, the ordinary soldiers are really rather innocent, and they have not, very probably, found out for themselves quite properly, and only now they begin to find out, well, in how serious a situation they have got themselves into. [end recording]

Lithuania

Defense Minister Receives New U.S. Military Attache

WS3007110293 Vilnius ELTA NEWS BULLETIN in English 1310 GMT 28 Jul 93

[From ELTA "NEWS BULLETIN" No. 296]

[Text] Vilnius, July 27 (ELTA)—Today National Defence Minister Audrius Butkevicius has received credentials from USA military attache Michael Matthies. He has replaced a retired colonel Lionel Ingram who had served in this position for one year. Colonel Michael Matthies' residence is in Copenhagen. After the accreditation, USA military attache has left to observe training of the Lithuanian army which will start on July 28 in Klaipeda region. The participation of the maneuvers will be land army, units of air and navy forces.

Kazakhstan To Sell Nuclear Fuel 'Cheaper Than Russia'

LD2907142993 Vilnius Radio Vilnius Network in Lithuanian 1200 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] Kazakhstan agrees to sell nuclear fuel to Lithuania cheaper than Russia. ELTA has been informed about it by Lithuanian Minister of Power Engineering Stasiukynas. Kazakhstan has expressed its wish to use the capacities of the Lithuanian oil refining complex. Lithuania is prepared to acquire some oil from Kazakhstan. However, prior to this, it is essential to reach an agreement with Russia on the use of oil pipelines. Kazakhstan agrees that Lithuania pays with its goods for energy raw materials.

IMF Supports 'Rigid' Monetary Policy

LD2807223093 Vilnius Radio Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Text] IMF representatives do not conceal the fact that they support the stand of the Bank of Lithuania which is being criticized by the country's industrialists. Representatives of the Lithuanian industrial enterprises openly express their dissatisfaction at the rigid monetary policy pursued by the Bank of Lithuania. With this policy the bank is striving to strengthen the exchange rate of the national currency—the litas. The industrialists say that as the litas becomes stronger goods manufactured in Lithuania lose their export opportunities.

Meanwhile it was announced today that the Bank of Lithuania has once again increased the official exchange rate of the national currency—the litas—in relation to the convertible currency. The rate of the litas was increased by two percent only a few days after the establishment of the previous rate. Yesterday the official exchange rate of the litas was raised by approximately one percent, from four litas 30 cents to four litas 25 cents for one U.S. dollar, and from tomorrow one dollar will be officially equal to four litas and 15 cents. From the first day of the introduction of the national currency, 25 June, when one dollar was officially equal to four litas and 50 cents, the value of the national currency in relation to the convertible currency has increased by almost nine percent.

Lithuanian commercial banks are buying and selling foreign currency in accordance with their established rate. Today one U.S. dollar was bought on the average for 4 litas and 5 cents, and sold for 4 litas and 20 cents.

Military Exercises Begin in Baltic Shore Area

LD2907181093 Moscow ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian 1055 GMT 29 Jul 93

[By ITAR-TASS correspondent Vldas Burbulis]

[Text] Vilnius, 29 Jul—Lithuanian radio has reported that the first military operational "games" conducted by the Lithuanian Army in the Baltic shore area—code-named "Barrier-93"—began on Wednesday and will be continued today. Participating in the exercises are more than 1,000 ground troops, border guards, Air Force and Navy subunits, and the country's volunteer security service. The aim of the exercises is the coordination of actions of military subunits stationed in the western part of the republic in reinforcing the security of Lithuania's state borders on land and at sea.

As a spokesman for Lithuania's Security Ministry—which is participating in the exercises—reported, Lithuania's shores planes will carry out training by firing blanks during the military "games" on the Baltic Sea today.

Lithuanian media reports that maneuvers by units of Russia's Baltic Naval Fleet, stationed in the town of Baltiysk, are taking place in neighboring Kaliningrad at

the same time. Is this a coincidence or chance? That is the question being asked today by the republic's newspapers.

Poll Shows President Brazauskas Losing Popularity

LD2907220093 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 29 Jul 93

[Text] According to the latest opinion poll, Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas, for many months the most popular person in Lithuania, has given up first place in the ratings to lawyer Egidijus Bickauskas, deputy chairman of the Seimas, representative of the Center Union.

Although the ruling Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party (LDLP) has lost a share of its supporters it still remains the most popular political force in the country.

An opinion poll was carried out several days ago by the Lithuanian Radio and TV Sociological Research Service the results of which indicate that President Algirdas Brazauskas having lost 11.5 points in the popularity rating during the last three months now has 26.2 points.

Egidijus Bickauskas, who is in first place at the moment has lost less than four points during the same period of time, and is in the lead having received almost 30 points.

President Algirdas Brazauskas and Foreign Minister Povilas Gylys have lost the greatest share of their supporters during the period of the last three months. The popularity of Povilas Gylys has dropped by 10.7 points and he is now in 18th place in the above rating.

Meanwhile the situation has changed insignificantly concerning the list of political parties: The ruling LDLP remains in first place with 24.1 points which is 2.5 points less than three months ago.

The Christian Democrats lost only 0.1 point of their popularity during the same period and are now in second place.

New Press Spokesman Wants Fewer News Conferences

LD2907090193 Vilnius Radio Vilnius in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 28 Jul 93

[Text] Nerijus Maliukevicius, a 39-year-old expert of the English language, former director of the Lithuanian radio, has been appointed press spokesman of Lithuanian President Algirdas Brazauskas.

Lately Nerijus Maliukevicius has been working for the weekly LITHUANIAN WEEKLY, published in English. Hitherto, news conferences by Algirdas Brazauskas used to be conducted by the Seimas press spokesman, Vilijus Kavaliauskas, or the head of the president's chancery, Andrius Meskauskas.

Speaking to the daily LIETUVOS RYTAS, Maliukevicius stated that the president's news conferences should not be held frequently. All leaders make a mistake by appearing all too frequently appearing on television and making statements to the press. It is impossible to say something new every second day and this is boring, said Maliukevicius.

He will begin work on Monday, 2 August.